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The	macro-financial	 situation	of	 the	Spanish	economy	has	 improved	since	
the	 publication	 of	 the	 last	 Financial Stability Report (FSR); however, 
vulnerabilities and risks are still at heightened levels. The progress in the 
vaccination of the population and the effectiveness of the measures implemented 
by the authorities to mitigate the impact of the pandemic have allowed the activity 
to recover progressively, in line with the central scenario of forecasts, although the 
sectors most affected by the health crisis are still clearly below the level of 2019. 
These factors explain why there has been no increase in doubtful loans in the bank 
credit portfolio as a whole, although there are latent impairments whose 
materialization will depend on the evolution of the economy and the pace of 
withdrawal of the measures. In this context, bank profitability has recovered to pre-
pandemic levels, although this was low compared to other sectors and geographies. 
In any case, it is necessary to continue to maintain a close surveillance of the 
financial system, since, as detailed below, vulnerabilities remain high in relation to 
levels prior to the onset of the crisis, and there are risks whose materialization could 
hinder the process of economic and financial normalization (see Figure 1). 
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FINANCIAL STABILITY RISKS AND VULNERABILITIES – AUTUMN 2021 (a)
Figure 1
R1. Deterioration of financial conditions and correction of financing asset values 
R2. Downward adjustments or delay to the recovery of economic growth
V1. Financial weakness













SOURCE: Banco de España.
a In this report, vulnerabilities are defined as economic and financial conditions that increase the impact or probability of materialisation of risks to financial 
stability. The latter are in turn identified as adverse changes in economic and financial conditions, with an uncertain probability of occurrence, which 
hamper or impede financial intermediation, with negative consequences for real economic activity.
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The main vulnerabilities1 of the Spanish economy and financial system include:
 — V1.	The	weak	financial	position	of	certain	segments	of	households	
and	firms. By the end of the first half of 2021, most sectors of activity had 
regained their pre-crisis turnover levels (see Chart 1). This has allowed 
profitability to recover, while favourable financing conditions have 
moderated liquidity risks, and average debt and financial burden ratios 
decreased. However, the recovery remains incomplete in the hardest-hit 
sectors (e.g. hospitality, transport and car manufacturing), which have 
recorded the largest increases in bank debt, and also non-performing 
loans (see Chart 2). These sectors also account for the bulk of the latent 
impairment of bank loans. For now, scenarios of significant increases in 
business failures appear to have been avoided, but it should be noted that 
extraordinary measures continue to provide very significant support. In 
the case of households, the overall trends of recovering income and 
employment (which is now close to its pre-crisis levels), and rising saving 
1	 	In	this	report,	vulnerabilities	are	defined	as	economic	and	financial	conditions	that	increase	the	impact	or	probability	
of	materialisation	of	risks	to	financial	stability.
SOURCES: Agencia Estatal de Administración Tributaria and Banco de España.
a The severely affected sectors are those whose turnover fell by more than 15% in 2020.
b The moderately affected sectors are those whose turnover fell by more than 8%, but less than 15% in 2020.
c The least affected sectors are those whose turnover fell by less than 8% in 2020.
d Credit to sectors affected to a differing degree by the COVID-19 crisis is measured on the assumption that the NACE sectors identified in Chart 1 correspond 
















2  CUMULATIVE CHANGE IN BANK CREDIT TO NON-FINANCIAL














































































































































































































































CHANGE IN ANNUAL TURNOVER: 2019-2020
CHANGE IN SIX-MONTHLY TURNOVER: 2019 H1-2021 H1
%
1  BUSINESS TURNOVER BY SECTOR
Rate of change relative to the same period of 2019
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SOURCES: Intervención General de la Administración del Estado (IGAE) and Banco de España.
a The pre-Covid-19 scenario replicates the simulations of public debt over GDP ratio produced with data and projections with the cut-off date December 2019. 
The neutral fiscal policy scenario simulates the projections of debt using the last Banco de España’s forecasts, see Macroeconomic Projections for the Spanish 
Economy (2021-2023), with no additional restrictions on the structural balance variation. The fulfilment of the SGP scenario, assumes a consolidation plan for 
public debt with a reduction in the structural deficit, up to the budged balance, of 0,5 pp of GDP every year. The last scenario adds structural reforms that would 
lead to an increase of potential GDP in 0.6 pp in the long term.
b The red (green) colour of the bars indicates a negative (positive) contribution of the item concerned to the change in consolidated profit for June 2021 with 
respect to June 2020. The black diamonds show ROA excluding extraordinary items. In particular, in June 2020: goodwill adjustments (-€12.2 billion), 
deferred tax asset adjustment (-€2.5 billion) and asset management business sale (€0.3 billion); and in June 2021: extraordinary income as a result of a 
merger (€2.9 billion) in particular, negative goodwill; segregation of an insurer (€0.9 billion) and extraordinary restructuring costs (-€1.2 billion).
































4  A BREAKDOWN OF THE CHANGE IN PROFIT OF THE BANKING SECTOR
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3  SIMULATED PATHS OF PUBLIC DEBT (a) 
are firming. However, households with close links to employment in the 
sectors hardest hit by the health crisis and those with low incomes have 
benefited less from the recovery and are especially vulnerable. Moreover, 
their borrowing behaviour differs from that of other households. A slower 
than expected recovery in activity or an increase in financing costs may 
lead to significant increases in non-performing loans in these more 
vulnerable segments of households and firms.
 — V2. The increase in government debt. As noted in the FSRs published 
since spring 2020, a corollary of the necessary and decisive economic 
policy response has been an increase in public debt. In Spain, the 
expected reduction in the budget deficit in the coming years is notable, 
as a result of the improvement in the cyclical situation. However, a 
significant reduction in of public debt in the medium term will require the 
elimination of the structural component budget deficit, in line with 
European regulations  and, in the absence of an adequate fiscal 
consolidation plan, the level of debt may remain high for an extended 
period (see Chart 3). During this process, the high level of public debt 
makes the Spanish economy vulnerable to any deterioration in financing 
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conditions and reduces its capacity to respond to a potential risks that 
materialise. The cost of the increase in public debt has, so far, been 
limited by the expansionary monetary policy and this effect will last 
some time longer, given that the debt that is currently maturing was 
issued at higher interest rates. In this context, the recent increase in 
inflation stems from temporary factors, so that the monetary policy 
stance can be expected to remain accommodative; indeed, if monetary 
policy is normalised more rapidly than expected, the potential impact of 
this vulnerability will increase. The yield on long-term sovereign debt 
would probably be that most affected by the uncertainty that could arise 
in the financial markets in the event of a premature withdrawal of the 
central bank purchase programmes launched to mitigate the impact of 
the pandemic. In Spain, the relatively long sovereign debt maturities 
would reduce the immediate impact of these shocks to the interest 
burden.
 — V3.	The	weak	profitability	of	financial	intermediaries. The revival of 
the economy and the improved outlook have led to a reduction in the 
expected losses anticipated by the banking sector and, consequently, in 
the provisions for financial impairments. This, along with the absence of 
the extraordinary charges recorded in 2020, explains the rise in bank 
profitability in the first half of 2021, to its pre-crisis levels, even when the 
extraordinary income for this half is excluded (see Chart 4). The 
contribution of international business to Spanish banks’ performance 
has also returned to normal in the first half of 2021, reflecting how, in 
contrast to initial expectations, geographical diversification is allowing 
to cushion the impact of this global crisis the impact of the crisis on the 
profitability of the banking sector, up to mid-2021, can be considered 
contained. This highlights the effectiveness of economic policy measures 
in mitigating the impact of the crisis, as reflected in the results of the 
stress tests for this year (see Chart 5), which show more contained 
capital charges under the adverse scenario than last year, although a 
certain degree of heterogeneity is observed across banks. In any event, 
the distribution across banks of the CET1 ratio under this scenario would 
not suggest the need for extensive supervisory intervention. However, 
this does not mean that there may not be latent impairment in credit 
portfolios that may materialise in the coming quarters and reduce the 
profits generated by the sector, which would further weaken the 
intermediation capacity of those banks with a lower level of solvency. 
Also, the structural challenges for the generation of profit by the banking 
sector and other financial intermediaries, which the health crisis has 
made no less pressing, continue to exist. These include, in particular, 
the generation of profitable business volume in a low interest rate 
environment, growing competition from technology firms, the increase 
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in cyber risks and the potentially negative effects associated with climate 
risks.
There follows a discussion of the main risks2 to the stability of the Spanish financial 
system:
 — R1.	Possible	deterioration	of	financing	conditions	and	the	correction	
of	financial	asset	values. Despite some temporary correction episodes 
in the first half of the year, the prices of risk-bearing assets on international 
financial markets remain high (see Chart 6). The low equilibrium level of 
long-term real interest rates, as a result of structural factors, such as 
demographic and productivity trends in developed countries and the 
demand for safe assets, which monetary policy attempts to accommodate 
through significant central bank bond purchase programmes, is an 
important factor supporting these valuations (see Chart 7). In this respect, 
2	 In	 this	 report,	 risks	are	 identified	as	adverse	changes	 in	economic	and	 financial	 conditions,	with	an	uncertain	
probability	of	occurrence,	which	hamper	or	impede	financial	intermediation,	with	negative	consequences	for	real	
economic activity.
SOURCES: Refinitiv Datastream and Banco de España.
a The net effect of positive (negative) flows is indicated by the figure above (below) the bar in question. The initial and final CET1 ratios are presented as 
"fully-loaded". Other impacts include, the change in RWAs between 2020 and 2023 and the effect of ICO guarantees. Aggregate results, including both 
institutions directly supervised by the SSM and the Banco de España.
b This variable includes net operating income in Spain and net income attributable to business abroad. Thus, the possible funds generated by the banking 
group as a whole are compared with the impairment losses in Spain (the focus of these tests).
c This variable shows the projection over the three years of the exercise of gross losses due to credit portfolio impairment for exposures in Spain and other 
types of losses (associated with the fixed-income portfolio, the management of foreclosures and the sovereign portfolio).
d The cyclically adjusted PER is calculated as the ratio between the price of the shares and the 10-year moving average of profits. The historical averages are 
calculated for the period 1997-2021.
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a fall in asset prices and a tightening of financial conditions (with an 
increase in the currently very low maturity premia, in particular) may be 
triggered if monetary stimulus is withdrawn at a faster rate than the financial 
markets expect. These adverse developments could also occur if investors’ 
expectations of future economic developments or the solvency of certain 
segments of the corporate sector deteriorate. This process may spread to 
other assets and geographical areas given the close interconnections 
between markets and financial intermediaries.
 — R2. Downside risks to economic growth continue to be present, 
although	the	baseline	scenario	 is	more	favourable	than	 in	previous	
quarters. The progress made with vaccination programmes in 2021 has 
strengthened the confidence of economic agents. At the same time, 
economic policy measures have continued to prove their effectiveness in 
averting the less favourable growth scenarios that the pandemic could 
have given rise to. That said, downside risks - albeit more contained - 
remain. These are linked to adverse developments in the health situation, 
which might require the introduction of restrictions on certain activities. 
Also, the risks to activity are now skewed downwards as a result of the 
SOURCES: IHS Markit, Refinitiv Datastream and Banco de España.
a Risk premia are obtained from a decomposition of 10-year interest rates into term risk premia and expectations about short-term interest rates. Expectations 
are obtained by predicting the instantaneous short-term interest rates using an ARFIMA model on each of the components of the yield curve (long-term level, 
slope and curvature) estimated daily. Once the short-term rate expectations are obtained, the premia can be had taking the difference between 10-year rates 
and short rate expectations. The historical averages of the term premia are calculated for the period 2003-2021.
b The historical average real 10-year interest rate in the euro area and the United States is calculated for the period 2004-2021. Until July 2008 in the euro 
area and June 2007 in the United States data are used for indexed bonds in France and the United States. After those dates, the real interest rates are 
calculated in the euro area as the difference between the 10-year overnight indexed swap rate and the compensation for inflation with the same term and 
in the Uinited States as the difference between the 10-year government bond and the compensation for inflation with the same term.
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sharp increase in the price of energy and the emergence of global 
production chain bottlenecks (see Chart 8). This is leading to increases in 
inflation that erode agents’ purchasing power and, consequently, the 
incipient reactivation of activity. In addition, if these factors that temporarily 
raise inflation were to be prolonged over time, they could end up raising 
the medium-term inflation expectations of the agents, and they may 
contribute to a tightening of financing conditions in the short term, and 
dampen further the potential for economic recovery (see Chart 9). A slowing 
of the recovery would have a negative effect on the quality of credit to 
households and firms, especially in the most vulnerable sectors. These 
may see an increase in non-performing loans even amid a general recovery, 
if this is asymmetric and fails to reach the hardest-hit sectors. Economic 
activity faces greater risks in the emerging economies; the ability of 
economic policy to react to shocks to activity is limited by the stronger 
inflationary pressures in these economies and they are exposed to a 
tightening of financing conditions as a result of the normalisation of 
monetary policy in the advanced economies.
SOURCES: Instituto Nacional de Estadístico and Banco de España.
a The shaded areas show two periods of financial crisis identified in Spain since 2009. These correspond to a period of systemic banking crisis (the last crisis: 
2009 Q1-2013 Q4) and the crisis caused by COVID-19 (2020 Q1-2021 Q2).
b The output gap is the percentage difference between actual GDP and its potential value. Values calculated at constant 2010 prices. See Cuadrado, P. and 
Moral-Benito, E. (2016), Potential growth of the Spanish economy, Occasional Paper No 1603, Banco de España. The credit-to-GDP gap is calculated as the 
difference in percentage points between the actual ratio and its long-term trend, calculated by applying a one-sided Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing 
parameter equal to 25,000. This parameter is calibrated to fit the financial cycles observed in the past in Spain (see Galán, J.E. (2019), Measuring credit-to- 
GDP gaps. The Hodrick-Prescott filter revisited, Occasional Paper No 1906, Banco de España). Data available to June 2021. The broken red horizontal line 
represents the reference CCyB activation threshold of 2 pp for the credit-to-GDP gap. 
c Each point in the chart coresponds to a sector of business activity in accordance with the NACE Rev.2 classification and represents the difference of the 
average PD (weighted by the number of borrowers) for this sector over a three-year horizon between a baseline trend scenario without the application of 
measures and adverse scenarios resulting from different extensions of the CO2 Emissions Trading Scheme. See Box 3.1 for further details. 
d This adverse scenario considers an increase in the price of CO2 emission allowances from €25 to €100.
e This adverse scenario considers the combination of the scenario described in (d) with an extension of the requirement for allowances to more productive 
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Precisely	 tuned	monetary	 and	 fiscal	 policies	 continue	 to	 be	 essential	 for	 the	
recovery	in	economic	growth	to	firm. The expansionary stance of these policies still 
needs to be maintained in the short term since, although financial stability risks and 
vulnerabilities stemming from the pandemic have moderated in recent months, they 
continue to be high. A flexible approach adapted to changes in the economic situation 
and risk profile also needs to be maintained, avoiding a premature withdrawal of the 
stimulus before the recovery firms. 
Developments	in	inflation	expectations	and	the	rate	of	recovery	of	activity	will	
be	decisive	in	the	positioning	of	monetary	policy. Monetary policy is expected to 
be less accommodative in the coming months, in particular as a result of the winding 
down of asset purchase programmes in Europe and the United States. However, the 
baseline scenario continues to assume that the increase in inflation will be temporary, 
so that the rate of policy tightening is not expected to accelerate.
Fiscal	policy	must	remain	expansionary	in	the	short-term,	but	a	medium-term	
fiscal	 consolidation	 programme	 to	 contain	 and	 reduce	 the	 vulnerabilities	
associated with high public debt needs to be drawn up. The fiscal policy 
measures deployed during the crisis need to be increasingly selective and focused 
on the economic sectors and population segments for which the recovery is proving 
to be slowest. In addition, an ambitious structural reform programme to boost the 
potential growth of the Spanish economy would also contribute to this objective and 
mitigate the other risks considered. Effective application of the Next Generation EU 
(NGEU) funds would help to reconcile these two aims.
In	the	absence	of	signs	of	systemic	financial	imbalances	building	up	in	Spain,	
a	loose	prudential	policy,	without	the	activation	of	macroprudential	tools,	 is	
also advisable. It should be noted that, in spite of the support measures adopted, 
the pre-pandemic levels of activity have still not been recovered. Key indicators of 
financial imbalances, such as the credit-to-GDP gap, are still dominated by the 
sudden fall in output in Spain in 2020 and their high level should not be interpreted 
as signalling a build-up of risk (see Chart 9). The negative output gap has begun to 
close and, in line with the expectations for recovery, a significant reduction is 
expected by the end of next year. In any event, the reduction of output and credit 
gaps is subject to downside activity risks and also to the vulnerability of certain 
segments of households and firms, so that continuous monitoring is needed for 
early detection of signs of risk. 
In	 some	European	 countries	macroprudential	 policy	 tightening	 has	 already	
begun,	mainly	as	a	result	of	warning	signals	in	their	property	markets. In Spain, 
the real estate cycle does not appear to be as advanced. At aggregate level, housing 
is not showing signs of overvaluation; new mortgage credit is growing strongly in 
2021, but from very low levels, without a significant increase in the stock or any 
loosening of credit standards. However, if the expansionary trend in real estate 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 21 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT. AUTUMN 2021   THE STABILITY OF THE SPANISH FINANCIAL SYSTEM: MAIN VULNERABILITIES AND RISKS
intensifies, this risk diagnosis will need to be reassessed. In this respect, the reform 
of Circular 2/2016 will provide new macroprudential tools to address with a more 
effective and focused approach the potential build-up of risks in the future.
Other more long-term risks must also continue to be taken into account, 
including	those	of	financial	digitalisation	and	climate	change. Digitalisation is 
not only generating new financial products and changing the way in which the 
markets that trade them are organised, but also making the financial system more 
vulnerable to cybernetic risks. Climate change may also have important financial 
stability effects, through the materialisation of both physical and transition risks. In 
the case of the latter, the estimated impact on bank solvency is still moderate, but 
adds to the pressure of the low bank profitability. At the same time, the materialisation 
of physical risks would potentially have a very significant long-term economic impact, 
which would exceed the impact of the transition costs. Thus, according to this 
analysis, the action required to achieve an environmentally sustainable productive 
model that does not contribute to the materialisation of climate change should be 
taken without delay.
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The headway made in global vaccination is helping to reduce restrictions on 
activity, despite some heterogeneity by geographical area. This has translated into 
a relatively widespread economic recovery. It is also reflecting in lower uncertainty, 
a favourable macroeconomic outlook in the medium and long term and an 
improvement in the non-financial sectors’ financial position. However, certain 
segments continue to show greater financial vulnerability than before the COVID-19 
crisis. At the same time, risks linked to the adverse unfolding of the pandemic, to 
the recent disruptions in the global production chains and to a sharper and more 
persistent than expected increase in inflation, which could lead to a faster 
withdrawal of monetary stimuli than anticipated by the financial markets, persist. 
The materialisation of these risks might trigger abrupt asset price corrections in 
the international markets, adversely impacting economic growth and financial 
intermediaries’ credit risk. Greater buoyancy in demand and prices has also been 
observed in the Spanish real estate market, but the risks to financial stability 
appear to be contained for the time being.
1.1 Macroeconomic environment
1.1.1 Systemic and materially significant countries
Global	economic	activity	has	continued	to	recover	 in	2021,	albeit	at	a	more	
moderate pace in recent months. Against a backdrop of the spread of the 
COVID-19 Delta variant, activity patterns in advanced and emerging market 
economies have tended to diverge (see Chart 1.1.1), in good measure owing to the 
uneven levels of vaccination and to the differences in economic policy support.1 
Also, the appearance of bottlenecks in the global supply chains, prompted among 
other factors by the rapid recovery in demand in advanced countries and by rising 
commodity and transport prices, is affecting production, particularly in the 
manufacturing sector (see Chart 1.1.2).2 
The	 recovery	 of	 activity	 has	 been	 accompanied	 globally	 by	 considerable	
inflation	 rate	 hikes	 (see	 Chart	 1.1.3).	 These increases arise from various 
idiosyncratic factors which are, in principle, temporary. They include the base effects 
1  See Quarterly	report	on	the	Spanish	economy	2021	Q3, Economic Bulletin.
2	 	See	 Box  3	 “Euro	 area	 manufacturing	 bottlenecks”, Quarterly	 report	 on	 the	 Spanish	 economy	 2021	 Q3,	
Economic Bulletin. 
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derived from sharp falls in some services prices recorded at the height of the 
pandemic; the rise in energy and commodity prices from the abnormally low levels 
recorded in the summer of 2020; and, in 2021 Q3, the aforementioned impact of the 
global value chain disruptions on industrial prices and their potential pass-through 
to consumer prices. In certain areas, the degree of fiscal policy expansion necessary 
to speed up the recovery may also be playing a role.
The easing of restrictions to mobility has helped to consolidate the economic recovery over 2021, albeit with diverging outlooks between 
advanced and emerging market economies as a result of uneven vaccination rates and degrees of economic policy support. Global inflation 
rates have increased in recent months, in principle owing to temporary factors.
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY CONTINUES TO RECOVER IN 2021, BUT WITH DOWNSIDE RISKS DERIVING FROM UNCERTAINTY
OVER THE UNFOLDING OF THE PANDEMIC, THE PERSISTENCE OF BOTTLENECKS AND A POSSIBLE TIGHTENING OF
FINANCIAL CONDITIONS
Chart 1.1
SOURCES: IHS Markit, national statistics and Institute of International Finance Global Debt Monitor.
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The	current	medium-term	prospects	of	consolidation	of	the	global	economic	
recovery	and	a	 return	 to	moderate	 inflation	 rates	are	 subject	 to	 significant	
uncertainties. The progressive resolution of the global health crisis, on which the 
outlook of ongoing improvement in activity is based, is not guaranteed. The main 
risks include the slow pace of vaccination outside the main advanced economies 
and the possible spread of new, more resistant and infectious variants of the virus. 
Despite the prevalence of negative output gaps, the sectoral mismatches that are 
arising between a buoyant demand and a supply that is slower to respond to the 
recovery, owing to the appearance of bottlenecks causing recent increases in certain 
prices, may be more persistent than expected. This could lead to second-round 
effects and to core inflationary pressures as a result of the de-anchoring of inflation 
expectations, particularly in economies with a low level of monetary policy credibility.
Despite	 the	 favourable	 expectations	 for	 internal	 demand,	 especially	 in	 the	
advanced	 economies,	 the	 recovery	 continues	 to	 depend	 on	 the	 adequate	
calibration	of	monetary	and	fiscal	policy	stimuli. A premature withdrawal of such 
support may have highly adverse consequences. Thus, a faster and more intense 
normalisation of monetary policy than expected, particularly in the United States, 
might lead to abrupt corrections in asset prices. These corrections would bring 
about adverse effects on global financial conditions and activity in a setting of high 
vulnerability owing to the significant increase in public and private debt in many 
countries (see Chart 1.1.4). Likewise, an early withdrawal of fiscal stimuli in other 
areas, owing to possible political or market pressures, could lead to a reassessment 
of expectations regarding the repayment capacity of the most heavily indebted 
private agents, particularly non-financial corporations. The recent liquidity difficulties 
and the possible insolvency of China’s main real estate company, Evergrande, which 
had resorted heavily to external financing over the last five years, illustrates the types 
of risks generated by the above-mentioned increase in indebtedness. In the 
hypothetical case that these problems were to extend to the rest of the real estate 
sector or to the Chinese financial system, there would be severe consequences for 
growth in China, with contagion effects for the rest of the world.
Financial conditions have tightened somewhat in the emerging market 
economies,	although	they	continue	to	be	globally	favourable.	The increase in 
inflation has led to the start of a cycle of policy interest rate hikes in many countries 
in Latin America3 and Eastern Europe, to avoid possible second-round effects and a 
de-anchoring of inflation expectations (see Chart 1.2.1). Also, economies with greater 
fiscal vulnerabilities, or those recording episodes of social and political tension, have 
observed an increase in local-currency long-term interest rates, a depreciation of 
their currencies against the dollar and an increase in the external sovereign debt 
3  See the Report	on	the	Latin	American	economy.	Second	half	of	2021.	Outlook,	vulnerabilities	and	policy	space, 
October 2021.
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yield spreads. Also, the total or partial withdrawal of credit support plans in most of 
these economies has prompted a marked slowdown in bank lending, with possible 
adverse effects on the activity of these material countries for the Spanish banking 
system (see Chart 1.2.2).
A	 potential	 deterioration	 of	 the	 growth	 outlook	 in	 light	 of	 an	 unfavourable	
unfolding	of	the	health	situation	might	negatively	affect	the	financial	markets	
of	these	economies	and	tighten	their	financial	conditions,	as	economic	policies	
would	have	less	room	for	manoeuvre.	They might also be particularly affected in 
the event that the monetary policy stance in the advanced economies tightened 
more than expected or if national monetary policies had to face persistent inflationary 
or exchange rate pressures. The following can be noted in regard to the main 
emerging market countries with Spanish banking exposures:
In Mexico, the economy continued to recover during 2021 H1. However, there is a 
high degree of unevenness between the performance of services, supported by the 
progress made in the vaccination process, and the manufacturing sector, affected 
by global supply chain problems. The Mexican economy is exposed to risks similar 
to those of other emerging market economies, although it is more closely linked to 
the performance of the US economy. On the positive side, it has buffers against 
shocks, such as the swap line with the Federal Reserve and the flexible credit line 
Emerging market economies' central banks have started to tighten their monetary policies and are expected to continue doing so over the 
next twelve months, as credit growth moderates in light of the total or partial withdrawal of public credit support plans in most of these 
economies.
HIGHER INFLATION EXPECTATIONS EXERT UPWARD PRESSURE ON INTEREST RATES IN THE EMERGING MARKET 
ECONOMIES, WHILE CREDIT LOSES MOMENTUM
Chart 1.2
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with the International Monetary Fund. However, political uncertainty in the domestic 
and international fronts might negatively affect investment, which has been sluggish 
in recent years.4
In Brazil GDP growth stagnated in Q2, after a surprising rise in Q1. The country 
continues to accumulate imbalances in fiscal territory. Public debt is close to 90% of 
GDP and largely financed at interest rates linked to inflation or to the policy interest 
rate, which share a very pronounced upward trend. In addition, this debt is mostly 
acquired by domestic banks or their investment funds, which raises the sovereign-
bank nexus risk. Against this backdrop, the fiscal adjustment envisaged is subject to 
significant uncertainties. Political tensions have also increased significantly, and 
they are not expected to weaken in the short term in view of next year’s presidential 
elections. Indeed, Brazil’s financial markets have performed relatively worse, feeding 
back into fiscal vulnerabilities.
In Turkey, in 2021 H1 the economy continued to show significant buoyancy and 
notable imbalances which, however, have moderated with the gradual withdrawal 
of some stimulus measures such as the credit support. Bank lending slowed 
notably, with the exception of consumer loans, which maintained a strong growth 
rate. Although still significant, the current account deficit has decreased. 
Nonetheless, inflation has rebounded, standing at 19.6% year-on-year in 
September. Against a backdrop of sizeable external financing needs and very low 
international reserves, the Turkish economy’s biggest risk is the loss of confidence 
from the financial markets. This could be the result of reductions in policy interest 
rates, as occurred in September and October, that may prove to be early or greater 
than that discounted by investors.
1.1.2 Spain
The	 baseline	 projections	 for	 the	 Spanish	 economy	 envisage,	 for	 the	 short	
term,	a	continued	recovery,	favoured	by	the	headway	made	in	the	vaccination	
campaign,	the	consequent	lifting	of	the	pandemic	containment	measures	and	
the	economic	policy	support. This would help to recover the pre-health crisis level 
of activity over the horizon considered in the Banco de España’s most recent 
projections, which cover up to 20235 (see Chart 1.3.1). Activity would grow more 
during the first half of the projection period, boosted by the epidemiological 
improvement and by the implementation of NGEU programme projects.
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Uncertainty	 regarding	 the	Spanish	economy’s	growth	path	has	declined,	 in	
line with the recent improvements in the health and economic situation. Recent 
favourable epidemiological and economic developments in Spain have helped to 
reduce uncertainty over economic growth in the short and medium terms, in line 
with the behaviour observed in other advanced economies (see Chart 1.3.2).
Yet	developments	in	the	Spanish	economy	are	influenced	by	several	factors,	
including	the	possibility	of	greater	persistence	of	disruptions	to	global	value	
chains	and	increasing	inflation. First, if the supply problems recently observed in 
the global production chains ultimately weigh down on economic activity worldwide 
markedly and persistently, certain industrial sectors in Spain will be affected more 
durably. Another downside risk to activity, which has recently grown stronger, is the 
possibility of an increase in commodities and intermediate goods prices that is less 
temporary than currently assumed, with the consequent compression of households’ 
and firms’ income in real terms. This greater persistence could lead to the transfer of 
cost increases to final prices and wage demands, resulting in a more pronounced 
and long-lasting rise in inflation than that anticipated at this point in time.
The projections for the Spanish economy envisage high buoyancy in activity in 2021 and 2022, underpinned by the normalisation of 
economic relations and the maintenance of economic policy support. The pre-COVID-19 level of activity would recover over the forecast 
horizon, which covers up to 2023. The most significant downside risks include the potential negative effect of bottlenecks in the global 
production chains and a more persistent inflation increase than currently expected. Some uncertainty persists, although less than in previous 
quarters, over the health situation, which affects certain sectors in particular (e.g. accommodation and food service activities).
THE BASELINE FORECASTS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY ENVISAGE HIGH DYNAMISM AT SHORT TERM, ALTHOUGH
CERTAIN ECONOMIC AND HEALTH RISKS PERSIST
Chart 1.3
SOURCES: Instituto Nacional de Estadistico and Banco de España.
a The Banco de España’s September 2021 macroeconomic projections are shown. Their cut-off date was 14 September 2021 and they included the 
data available to that date, specifically the GDP flash estimate for 2021 Q2. Subsequently, the INE has published new data, which include the revision 
of Q2 and previous quarters and the flash estimate for 2021 Q3.
b See C. Ghirelli et al. (2021), "Measuring economic and economic policy uncertainty and their macroeconomic effects: the case of Spain", Empirical 
Economics. A decline in this indicator, constructed on the basis of the standard deviation of forecasters' projections of changes in GDP for 2021 
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Certain	downside	risks	related	to	the	unfolding	of	the	pandemic	and	its	impact	
on	economic	activity	also	persist.	These downside risks are related to the spread 
of new COVID-19 variants potentially more resistant to vaccines, which could lead to 
reinstating restrictions to mobility. They may also be related to the more persistent 
effects of the crisis on the business sector and employment. By contrast, if the 
health situation improves faster than forecast, economic growth might also gain 
momentum, mainly owing to a more pronounced freeing up by households of the 
stock of savings generated during the pandemic or to an early reactivation of 
spending by foreign tourists.
1.2 Financial markets and the real estate sector
1.2.1 Financial markets
The stock market indices in the main developed economies have tended to 
appreciate	over	the	last	few	months.	This was underpinned by the progress made 
in the vaccination campaign, the maintenance of an accommodative monetary policy 
stance and better corporate earnings than anticipated by the markets. However, 
some episodes of stock market price corrections have also been observed, mainly 
linked to fears regarding the impact of the spread of the COVID-19 Delta variant on 
economic growth, to the fear of a contagion effect of the Chinese Evergrande real 
estate crisis and to investor concerns about inflationary pressures possibly leading 
to the withdrawal of monetary stimuli earlier than envisaged. The S&P 500 index 
reached new all-time highs, accumulating a gain of 8.7% at the cut-off date for this 
report with respect to the levels at end-April. In the same period the EURO STOXX 50 
appreciated by 5.4%, while the IBEX 35 rose less (1.0%), affected by the negative 
impact of the spread of the pandemic in Spain over the summer in the sectors most 
exposed to it, such as leisure and tourism (see Chart 1.4.1). 
The	long-term	yields	of	higher-rated	sovereign	bonds	fell	between	April	and	
end-August and have rebounded since then, while sovereign and corporate 
risk premia have remained at low levels. The increase in long-term risk-free 
interest rates in recent months is linked to the rise in the upside medium-term 
inflation risks perceived by the financial markets. Following these movements, the 
long-term yields of higher-rated sovereign bonds stand at levels close to or even 
above (in the case of the UK and German benchmarks) those seen in Spring and 
much higher than posted at the start of the year (see Chart 1.4.2). The estimates 
available also point to an increase in term premia in recent months, although they 
currently remain well below their historical averages (see Chart 1.4.3). Also, since 
August long-term real interest rates have risen less than nominal interest rates 
(United States) or have even continued to fall in certain areas (the euro area), reaching 
highly negative levels (close to their all-time lows). This very low level of long-term 
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Positive corporate earnings and an accomodative monetary policy stance have supported the rise in stock market indices in international 
markets, although they have also been affected by one-off corrections. Long-term sovereign bond yields decreased between April and 
August and have rebounded thereafter, conditioned by the increase in the upside medium-term inflation risks perceived by the financial 
markets. Following these movements, these yields stand at levels much higher than at the beginning of the year. Despite these 
developments, term premia and long-term real interest rates remain at very low levels from a historical perspective. Euro area sovereign risk 
premia and non-financial corporations' bond premia have remained at low levels, supported by the continuation of accommodative monetary 
conditions and lower concern for credit risks.
STOCK MARKET INDICES HAVE RISEN, SOVEREIGN DEBT YIELDS HAVE INCREASED SINCE AUGUST AND SOVEREIGN
AND CORPORATE RISK PREMIA HAVE REMAINED AT LOW LEVELS
Chart 1.4
SOURCES: Refinitiv Datastream and Banco de España.
a Term risk premia are obtained from a decomposition of 10-year interest rates into risk premia by term and expectations of short-term interest rate 
changes. The expectations are obtained by forecasting the future short-term instantaneous interest rate using an ARFIMA model on each of the 
interest rate curve components (long-term level, slope and curvature) estimated daily. Once the short-term interest rate change expectations are 
obtained, the premium is obtained as the difference between the 10-year rates and the short-term rate expectations. The historical averages of 
the term premia are calculated between 2003 and 2021.
b The historical average of the 10-year real interest rate in the euro area and the United States is calculated between 2004 and 2021. Until July 2008 
in the euro area and June 2007 in the United States the data on French and US inflation-linked bonds are used. Thereafter, real interest rates are 
calculated in the euro area as the difference between the 10-year overnight indexed swap and the 10-year inflation compensation and in the United 
States as the difference between the 10-year government bond and the 10-year inflation compensation.
c High yield: ICE Bank of America Merrill Lynch Non-Financial High Yield Index. Investment grade: ICE Bank of America Merrill Lynch Non-Financial 
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risk-free real interest rates appears to be linked to various structural factors 
(demographic factors, low productivity growth, greater inequality, high demand for 
safe assets, etc.) and to other more conjunctural factors, such as, in particular, 
central banks’ asset purchase programmes. This factor has continued contributing 
to euro area sovereign risk and non-financial corporations bond premia remaining at 
low levels (see Chart 1.4.4). The latter, except in the high yield segment in the euro 
area, have even declined in recent months, currently standing below their historical 
average. This might be due to lower market concern for non-financial corporations’ 
credit risks, which would be in line with the more favourable performance of defaults 
and the positive balance between upward and downward credit rating revisions in 
recent months. However, around one third of the outstanding balance of debt 
issuances in the euro area with BBB rating continues to have a negative outlook. Box 
1.1 analyses in depth the factors determining sovereign debt long-term interest rates 
in Europe and the United States.
A	potential	earlier	than	expected	withdrawal	by	the	markets	of	central	banks’	
monetary	 stimuli	 might	 raise	 long-term	 risk-free	 interest	 rates	 further	 and	
trigger corrections in asset prices. This scenario could materialise, for example, 
if the rise in inflation observed in the advanced economies were more persistent 
than anticipated. The possible increase in yields could be transferred more intensely 
to corporate bonds, since their risk premia are abnormally low according to their 
historical relationship with their usual determinants, such as enterprise value and 
uncertainty over enterprise value, leveraging and risk aversion (see Chart 1.5.1). This 
seems to be related to the persistence of very accommodative monetary conditions.6 
In the stock markets, although risk premia do not appear to have been so influenced 
by expansionary monetary policies and are currently above their historical average, 
these developments could lead to a fall in share prices. In fact, their current high 
level, compared with firms’ earnings, seems to be largely due to low long-term real 
interest rates (see Chart 1.5.2). In any event, the impact of an increase in long-term 
interest rates on the price of risk-bearing assets would probably be cushioned if this 
movement were accompanied by an improvement in the macroeconomic outlook, 
given the beneficial effect this would have on the economic and financial position of 
the issuers of these assets. 
Under	this	hypothetical	correction	scenario,	there	would	also	be	a	tightening	
of	financing	conditions	with	possible	adverse	implications	for	credit	risk.	First, 
this shock could reduce economic agents’ spending, negatively affecting economic 
growth. Second, in this scenario, indebted agents’ financial burden would tend to 
increase, although the speed and intensity of this effect would depend on the structure 
of their liabilities and on how interest rates evolve over the different maturities.
6	 	For	further	details,	see	Box	1.1	of	the	Financial Stability Report Spring 2021 and	J.M.	Gálvez	and	I.	Roibás	(2021),	
“Asset	price	misalignments	in	financial	markets:	an	empirical	analysis”,	Working	Paper,	Banco	de	España	(forthcoming).
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A	potential	worsening	of	 the	macroeconomic	outlook	or	an	 increase	 in	 the	
uncertainty	surrounding	 it	might	also	 trigger	price	corrections	 in	corporate	
bonds and shares in the international markets. This scenario might arise, for 
instance, if the risks described in the previous section were to materialise. This 
would translate into a reduction in the expected future path of firms’ earnings or 
greater uncertainty about said path, which would adversely affect the value of shares 
through its negative impact on shareholder remuneration. Corporate bond prices 
would be affected to the extent that this situation causes risk premia to rise through 
an increase in perceived credit risks or lower investor tolerance thereto.
1.2.2 Spanish real estate market
House	sales	rose	sharply	in	the	first	eight	months	of	2021,	by	almost	14%	over	
the	 same	 period	 of	 2019,	 in	 contrast	 to	 housing	 supply	 which	 was	 more	
Corporate credit risk premia are below the level warranted by their historical relationship with determinants such as enterprise value and 
uncertainty over enterprise value, leveraging or risk aversion. For their part, stock prices in the United States and the euro area are high 
compared with the cyclically-adjusted earnings of listed firms. This appears to be explained not by low stock market risk premia (which are 
above their historical average) but rather by low long-term real interest rates.
PRICES OF RISK-BEARING FINANCIAL ASSETS ARE STILL HIGH COMPARED WITH SOME OF THEIR DETERMINANTS
Chart 1.5
SOURCES: Refinitiv Datastream and Banco de España.
a The difference between the corporate credit risk premium observed and that predicted by a corporate bond valuation model based on four factors: 
expected enterprise value (EV), uncertainty over expected EV, corporate sector leverage, and investor risk aversion. For more details, see Galvez and 
Roibás, “Asset price misalignments: an empirical analysis”, Working Paper (forthcoming), Banco de España.
b The cyclically-adjusted PER is calculated as the ratio of the share price to the 10-year moving average of earnings. The historical averages are 
calculated for the period 1997-2021.
c The stock market risk premium is calculated using a 2-stage dividend discount model. For more details, see Fuller and Hsia (1984), “A simplified 
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contained. The recent housing demand dynamics appear to be backed, not only by 
the improvement in the general economic situation and the accommodative financial 
conditions, but also by the materialisation of investment decisions that had been 
postponed following the onset of the pandemic and by changes in households’ 
housing preferences arising from that shock (see Chart 1.6.1). In particular, these 
changes are being reflected in a comparatively more dynamic demand for single-
family homes and new housing. But housing supply is less dynamic and, were the 
current patterns to continue, it could be insufficient to absorb higher demand in the 
coming years. In any event, in the medium term, the Housing Renovation and Urban 
Regeneration Plan, to be implemented within the framework of the Recovery, 
Transformation and Resilience Plan (RTRP), which has funding of €6,820 million out 
of the NGEU funds, could drive activity in the residential sector, including both 
renovation and new housing.
This increase in house purchases prompted an acceleration in average house 
prices	in	Q2,	reversing	the	slowdown	observed	since	early	2019.	House prices, 
which rose by 3.3% year-on-year (see Chart 1.6.2), were stronger both in the new 
housing segment (6%) and, to a lesser extent, in second-hand housing (2.9%). New 
house prices have risen the most in recent years, which could be related to the fact 
that new housing can be more easily adapted to buyers’ preferences and is in shorter 
supply than second-hand housing. Going forward, the recent sharp increase in the 
cost of building industry inputs, were it to persist, could put further pressure on new 
house prices. It should also be borne in mind that the growth in activity stemming 
from the implementation of the RTRP could further tighten the costs of building 
industry inputs and labour. Despite these recent developments in house prices, 
there are still no signs that these prices are, on average, significantly above their 
long-term equilibrium level (see Chapter 3 of this report).
In	keeping	with	 the	greater	dynamism	of	house	sales,	new	mortgage	 loans	
also	 recorded	 strong	 growth	 in	 2021  H1.	 Specifically, new lending for house 
purchase was some 40% higher than in 2019  H1. Nevertheless, the outstanding 
amount of mortgage lending has increased very moderately, as mortgage repayments 
have also risen, possibly because households have used the savings they 
accumulated in the early stages of the pandemic to early repay all or part of their 
mortgage loans. Another possible factor is the end of the moratorium programmes, 
which entails the restart of mortgage repayments that had been suspended.
This	mortgage	 loan	growth	essentially	appears	 to	 respond	 to	demand-side	
factors,	as	there	are	no	signs	of	easing	of	credit	standards	in	recent	months,	
although	 interest	 rate	 spreads	 in	 the	 fixed-rate	 mortgage	 segment	 have	
narrowed	recently.	For instance, average loan-to-price (LTP) ratios have held quite 
steady in recent months, although for floating-rate mortgages they have dipped 
slightly; this suggests that mortgage lending criteria may have become somewhat 
more stringent. Moreover, the proportion of mortgage loans with LTP ratios over 
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80% has not increased. Interest rate spreads have remained steady for floating-rate 
mortgages, but fixed-rate spreads have narrowed to their lowest levels in recent 
years (see Chart  1.6.3). At the same time, fixed-rate mortgage maturities have 
lengthened and their share of new mortgages has increased.
Housing transactions have risen sharply in 2021 to date compared with the same period of 2019, while housing supply dynamics have been 
weak. Accordingly, average house prices accelerated in Q2, especially in the new housing segment. Although mortgage conditions have 
remained generally steady, fixed-rate mortgage spreads have narrowed significantly in the year. In the commercial real estate market, average 
prices fell again in Q1, followed by some signs of recovery in Q2.
HOUSE SALES AND PRICES HAVE ACCELERATED SIGNIFICANTLY IN 2021 TO DATE, WHILE AVERAGE PRICES OF
COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE SHOWED SOME SIGNS OF RECOVERY IN Q2
Chart 1.6
SOURCES: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Ministerio de Transportes, Movilidad y Agenda Urbana, TINSA, Colegio de Registradores and Banco de 
España.
a Housing supply comprises new housing, proxied by building completion certificates, and second-hand housing, proxied by the net supply of housing 
on the main real estate portals compiled by TINSA. Housing demand data refer to housing sales published by INE.
b The rate spread of each new mortgage over the euro IRS curve or swap curve. For floating-rate mortgages, the 1-year IRS rate is used to calculate 
the spread; for fixed-rate mortgages, the term equivalent to the mortgage term is chosen. The chart depicts the median of the spreads for the two 
types of mortgages. The 2021 Q2 data are provisional.
c To calculate these indices, each market is divided into strata of homogeneous real estate. A price is then estimated for each stratum, using a hedonic 
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In	the	commercial	real	estate	markets,	prices	fell	back	again	in	2021 Q1,	but	
showed	some	signs	of	recovery	in	Q2.	By market segment, prices of offices and 
industrial premises rose moderately in Q2, but prices of retail premises, which make 
up the majority of commercial real estate, continued to fall (see Chart 1.6.4). The 
average price of real estate in prime locations (the prime segment) also rose in Q2, 
after the decline observed since the start of the health crisis.
1.3  Non-financial sectors
1.3.1 Non-financial corporations and households
The	 economic	 situation	 of	 firms	 evolved	 favourably	 throughout	 2021  H1,	
although	with	 a	 notable	 degree	 of	 heterogeneity	 across	 sectors.	Corporate 
earnings posted a strong recovery, so that in most branches of activity turnover 
returned to 2019 H1 levels (see Chart 1.7.1). However, in the economic sectors most 
affected by the COVID-19 crisis,7 sales grew more moderately and are still well short 
of pre-pandemic levels. These more favourable developments in terms of business 
activity have driven up firms’ profitability. Thus, on Central Balance Sheet Data 
Office Quarterly Survey (CBQ) data, the percentage of firms in 2021 H1 with negative 
return on assets (ROA)8 is 8 pp lower than in the same period a year earlier, although 
it is still 5  pp higher than in 20199 (see Chart  1.7.2). This is consistent with the 
microsimulations made by the Banco de España, which project a gradual recovery 
in corporate earnings this year and over the next two years, in keeping with the 
greater economic dynamism expected. Nevertheless, this improvement will be 
slower in the economic sectors most affected by the health crisis, and is subject to 
the business risks indicated in section 1.1 above.10
The	recovery	in	economic	activity,	the	halt	in	the	tightening	of	credit	standards11 
and	longer	average	debt	maturities	all	appear	to	be	helping	ease	firms’	liquidity	
risks. Overall, in firms’ debt maturity structures, longer maturities account for a 
higher share of the total than they did before the COVID-19 crisis, partly owing to the 
Official Credit Institute (ICO) guarantee scheme. Recent developments in average 
  7	 	The	economic	sectors	most	affected	by	the	COVID-19	pandemic	are	those	whose	turnover	in	2020	was	down	
more	 than	15%	on	2019,	 specifically:	 hospitality,	 oil	 refining,	 social	 and	cultural	 services,	 transportation	 and	
storage,	the	textile	industry	and	the	manufacture	of	transport	equipment.
 8	 	Return	on	assets	=	(Ordinary	net	profit	+	Financial	costs)	/	Net	assets	(net	of	non-interest-bearing	borrowing).
 9  See “Results	 of	 non-financial	 corporations	 to	 2021  Q2”,	 Analytical Articles, Economic Bulletin	 4/2021,	
Banco de España. 
10  See	“Impact	of	the	COVID-19	crisis	on	Spanish	firms’	financial	vulnerability”,	Occasional Paper No 2119,	Banco	
de España.
11  See “The	July 2021	Bank	Lending	Survey	in	Spain”,	Analytical Articles, Economic Bulletin	3/2021,	Banco	de	España.
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payment periods to suppliers, which on CBQ data returned, in 2021 Q2, to levels 
similar to their pre-pandemic levels, also point to a drop in liquidity tensions.12
The	risks	related	to	the	solvency	of	non-financial	corporations	also	appear	to	
be	 easing,	 as	 the	 recovery	 in	 economic	 activity	 has	 been	 accompanied	 by	
lower debt growth. In consequence, average debt and debt burden ratios have 
fallen, in the case of the latter driven also by the decline in the average cost of 
outstanding debt. Developments in the volume and quality of bank debt and the use 
of support measures such as the ICO guarantees have been uneven across economic 
sectors and firms (see Chapter 2 of this report).
The	 economic	 situation	 of	 households	 has	 also	 recovered,	 as	 evidenced	 by	
recent household income and labour market developments, but again with a 
12	 	See	Box 1,	“Recent	developments	in	trade	finance	granted	and	received	by	non-financial	corporations”,	in	“Results 
of	non-financial	corporations	to	2021 Q2”, Analytical Articles, Economic Bulletin 4/2021,	Banco	de	España.	
During the first half of the year, business turnover in most economic sectors returned to pre-pandemic levels. However, in the sectors severely 
affected by the health crisis, the recovery is proving to be slower and activity is still clearly below 2019 levels. Growth in corporate earnings 
has translated into an – albeit still incomplete – improvement in profitability.
FIRMS’ SALES AND PROFITABILITY HAVE IMPROVED, ALBEIT VERY UNEVENLY ACROSS ECONOMIC SECTORS
Chart 1.7
SOURCES: Agencia Estatal de Administración Tributaria and Banco de España.
a Economic sectors severely affected: those whose turnover fell by more than 15% in 2020.
b Economic sectors moderately affected: those whose turnover fell by more than 8% but less than 15% in 2020.
c Economic sectors least affected: those whose turnover fell by less than 8% in 2020.
d CBQ data. Return on assets (R) = (Ordinary net profit + Financial costs) / Net assets (net of non-interest-bearing borrowing).
R <= 0% 0% < R <= 5% 5% < R <= 10%
10% < R <= 15% R > 15%
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certain	degree	of	heterogeneity. Specifically, households’ gross disposable income 
(GDI) rose by 1% in 2021 H1, but it is still 3.9% below the 2019 levels. Also, at September 
2021, effective social security registrations13 were barely 1.2% lower than their pre-
pandemic levels (see Chart 1.8.1), placing the number of employed workers of the Labor 
Force Survey (EPA), in this same period, above those observed before the pandemic. 
Similarly, according to the European Commission’s consumer survey, at that date 
households either expected their economic situation to improve over the next 12 
months (households in the top two income quartiles) or to hold relatively steady 
(households in the bottom two income quartiles)14 (see Chart 1.8.2). It must also be 
borne in mind that since the start of the year there has been a significant cutback in 
some of the household income support measures, such as the loan moratoria,15 and 
this will have had most impact on the more vulnerable households.
The	average	debt	ratio	rose	slightly	in	2021 H1,	while	the	average	debt	burden	
ratio	fell	due	to	the	decline	in	the	average	cost	of	outstanding	debt.	Thus, the 
debt-to-GDI ratio stood at 94.9% in June, 4.2  pp above the pre-pandemic level, 
while the debt burden-to-GDI ratio was 0.5 pp above its pre-pandemic level.
The	 more	 granular	 data	 point	 to	 different	 lending	 dynamics	 according	 to	
certain household characteristics. Households that had loans before the outbreak 
of the pandemic have generally reduced their level of debt, albeit at an increasingly 
more moderate pace. The lowest reductions in the outstanding sum of bank loans 
are recorded among higher income households (proxied according to income by 
postcode) and among those resident in the municipalities hardest hit by the crisis 
(proxied by those with the highest percentage of firms with furloughed workers) (see 
Chart 1.8.3). The latter might be explained, at least in part, by the greater use made 
of loan moratoria in the areas most affected by the crisis.16 An analysis of the new 
debt taken on by households that had no loans at the onset of the pandemic also 
shows stronger lending growth in higher income areas and in those hardest hit by 
the crisis (see Chart 1.8.4). For all households, whether or not indebted at the start 
of the crisis, income is the variable that best explains credit developments.17 This 
suggests that higher income households, and especially those in the top income 
quintile, were most likely to take on debt and/or to have had greater access to credit 
since the beginning of the pandemic.
13	 	Effective	 social	 security	 registrations	 are	 total	 registrations	 excluding	 workers	 subject	 to	 furlough	 schemes	
(ERTEs by their Spanish name).
14  See the European Commission’s monthly consumer survey. 
15	 	For	instance,	the	application	period	for	bank	loan	moratoria,	with	a	maximum	duration	of	nine	months,	ended	on	
31 March 2021.	See	Royal	Decree-Law	3/2021	of	2 February 2021	adopting	measures	to	narrow	the	gender	
gap and on other Social Security and economic matters.
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At September, effective social security registrations were already very close to their pre-pandemic levels; indeed, Labour Force Survey (EPA) 
employment figures were above those levels. Workers who are still furloughed make up almost all employment still to be recovered. This 
positive picture of households’ situation was also reflected in their expectations for the next 12 months: in September, households expected 
their economic situation to improve over that horizon (the two highest income quartiles) or to hold relatively steady (the two lowest income 
quartiles). In general, households with outstanding loans before the health crisis have reduced their debt levels. Higher income households 
and those resident in municipalities with a higher percentage of firms with furloughed workers have done so to a lesser extent. These 
population segments also account for much of the new debt taken on by households that had no loans before the pandemic.
THE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF HOUSEHOLDS ALSO RECOVERED IN 2021 H1, WITH INCOME, EMPLOYMENT AND
EXPECTATIONS ALL IMPROVING, ALBEIT UNEVENLY BY EMPLOYMENT SECTOR AND INCOME LEVEL, WHICH ALSO
CONDITION HOUSEHOLDS’ BORROWING DECISIONS
Chart 1.8
SOURCES: Ministerio de Inclusión, Seguridad Social y Migraciones, European Commission, INE and Banco de España.
a The average data for each month are taken and are seasonally adjusted.
b Effective social security registrations are total registrations excluding furloughed workers.
c Indicator = percentage of households expecting their economic situation to improve significantly × 1 + percentage expecting their economic situation 
to improve somewhat × 1/2 – percentage of households expecting their economic situation to worsen somewhat × 1/2 – percentage expecting their 
economic situation to worsen significantly × 1.
d Classification by income quintiles at postcode level. Each postcode is assigned the percentage of firms using the furlough scheme in the 
corresponding municipality. Households are defined considering individual borrowers (natural persons and sole proprietors). Each individual 
borrower is assigned the amount of credit resulting from the sum of the proportional part of each of the loans in their name.
e Postcodes in very small municipalities for which no postcode-level income data are available have been excluded. In order for all quintiles to have 
equal importance, a double allocation criterion has been used in each. The postcodes (municipalities) are ranked by income, by the impact of the 
furlough scheme (measured as the percentage of firms using the furlough scheme over the number of firms in the municipality in March 2021) and 
by the stock of credit at the start of the crisis (December 2019). Thus, the first quintile includes the postcodes (municipalities) that account for 20% 
of loans at the start of the crisis and have the lowest income level or the lowest percentage of firms using the furlough scheme in the municipality, 
and so on for the other four quintiles.
f The contribution to the change in lending to households that had no bank debt in December 2019 is defined as the ratio of their bank debt in June 2021 
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The	 increase	 in	 households’	 aggregate	 wealth	 —on	 account	 of	 the	 rising	
prices	of	both	 financial	and	real	assets	and	the	savings	accumulated—	has	
also	 strengthened	 the	 financial	 position	of	 households.	As consumption has 
increased, the household saving rate has moderated, but it is still above its historical 
average. In addition, the Household Budget Survey18 shows that all household 
income quartiles made a positive contribution to the significant increase in aggregate 
saving in 2020, although the contribution of lower income households was smaller.
1.3.2  General government in Spain
The	latest	data	available,	corresponding	to	2021 H1,	are	beginning	to	reflect	a	
certain	correction	in	the	imbalance	in	public	finances	in	Spain	compared	with	
the	high	levels	reached	in	2020.	The general government deficit stood at 8.7% of 
GDP in June in cumulative 12-month terms, slightly more than 2 pp below the end-
2020 figure (see Chart 1.9.1), while public debt stood at a still very high 123% of GDP 
in June. The deficit correction is explained by the pick-up in income (10.5% compared 
with the same period of the previous year) arising from the economic recovery under 
way, and by the moderation of expenditure growth, on the back of lower extraordinary 
expenses related to the response to COVID-19 (total expenditure remained constant 
compared with the same period of the previous year). 
Bearing	in	mind	these	developments,	the	Banco	de	España’s	latest	projections,	
published in September,19	expect	the	general	government	deficit	 to	 improve	
significantly	in	2021	and	over	the	next	two	years (see Chart 1.9.2). After reaching 
11% of GDP in 2020, the budget deficit could close 2021 around 7.6%. This forecast 
takes into account the measures adopted to temper the strong surge in electricity 
prices, and also the costs of a further extension, to the end of the year, of the 
COVID-19-related furlough schemes. The imbalance in public finances is expected 
to continue to correct in 2022 and 2023, thanks to the improved cyclical momentum 
expected and to the withdrawal of the extraordinary COVID-19-related measures.20 
Nevertheless, the deficit will still be above 3% of GDP in 2023 and public debt will 
decline by barely 5 pp over the projection horizon.
The	structural	deficit	and	debt	levels	envisaged	for	the	end	of	the	projection	
horizon	 (2021-2023)	 place	Spanish	 public	 finances	 in	 a	 vulnerable	 position,	
which could also continue over longer horizons. In addition to the high level of 
public debt expected for 2023 (over 110% of GDP), the structural adjustment of Spanish 
18  See the INE’s Household Budget Survey. Year 2020.
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public expenditure and revenue remains outstanding (over 3% of GDP), along with 
the challenges posed by population ageing. In the short and medium term, the 
monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the economic growth 
momentum foreseeable as a result of the take-up of the NGEU funds are expected 
In the first half of 2021 the general government deficit declined, a process that is expected to continue during the rest of the year and over 
the next two years. However, if no new measures are introduced, the public debt and budget deficit levels expected for the end of the 
projection horizon will remain high, representing a source of vulnerability for the Spanish economy. This vulnerability is mitigated by low 
interest rate levels, which are reflected in reduced and declining cost of debt service. Although, in the short term, the expansionary fiscal 
policy should continue to help support the ongoing economic recovery, the need for a future credible and sustainable fiscal consolidation 
process advises that details of this process be defined and announced without delay.
THE SPANISH BUDGET DEFICIT HAS DECLINED IN 2021, BUT IT REMAINS ABOVE ITS PRE-PANDEMIC LEVEL AND THE 
PROJECTED DEBT REDUCTION UP TO 2023 IS LIMITED
Chart 1.9
SOURCES: Intervención General de la Administración del Estado (IGAE) and Banco de España.
a Four-quarter cumulative data.
b Banco de España macroeconomic projections published on 21 September 2021. The squares in 2020 denote the figure revised by the National 
Audit Office (IGAE) nine days later.
c The pre-COVID-19 scenario replicates the simulations of the public debt-to-GDP ratio made with data and projections at December 2019. The 
neutral fiscal policy scenario simulates the debt projections drawing on the Banco de España’s latest forecasts (see Macroeconomic projections 
for the Spanish economy (2021-2023)), with no additional restrictions on the change in the structural balance. Fulfilment of the SGP scenario 
assumes a public debt consolidation plan with a reduction in the structural deficit, up to budgetary equilibrium, of 0.5 pp of GDP every year. The 
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to help contain this vulnerability. So far, the impact of the rise in the debt ratio on 
interest expenses (see Chart 1.9.3) has also been mitigated by the low interest rates. 
However, a hypothetical future increase in interest rates would trigger a spike in 
interest expenses, adding pressure to the fiscal position, although this effect would 
not be immediate, given the maturities of the public debt. Moreover, an accommodative 
fiscal policy remains necessary to consolidate the economic recovery currently 
under way. In any event, this does not preclude the need for fiscal consolidation, to 
ensure that, in the medium term, the Spanish economy is in a better position to 
address the challenges outstanding, and in a less vulnerable position in the event of 
future adverse economic developments or a crisis of confidence. According to the 
simulation exercises performed, in the absence of budgetary consolidation measures 
the debt ratio would remain around 115% of GDP over the next fifteen years, under 
the assumption that the Spanish economy maintained growth rates similar to the 
average of recent decades. By contrast, fulfilment of the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP), especially if it is accompanied by structural reforms, would allow to reach 
over that period a lower level of indebtedness than that observed before the outbreak 
of the pandemic (see Chart 1.9.4).21
1.3.3  Financial flows vis-à-vis the rest of the world and the international 
investment position
In	2021 H1,	 and	 in	 contrast	 to	 2020,	 international	 investors	again	made	net	
purchases	of	Spanish	general	government	debt,	an	 indication	 that	 financial	
flows	 vis-à-vis	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 world	 were	 returning	 to	 normal. International 
investors’ net purchases in 2021  H1 totalled €41.2  billion. In consequence, their 
holdings, which amount to around 45% of Spanish sovereign debt, ceased to fall as 
a proportion of the total (see Chart 1.10.1).
The	 Spanish	 economy’s	 negative	 net	 international	 investment	 position	 (IIP)	
stood	at	78.4%	of	GDP	in	June,	representing	an	element	of	vulnerability	in	the	
event	 of	 deterioration	 of	 financing	 conditions	 in	 the	 international	 markets.	
Nevertheless, the ratio has fallen significantly since end-2020, specifically by 7.2 pp, 
of which 2.8 pp are explained by GDP growth. The valuation effects resulting from 
the increase in value of foreign assets held by Spanish residents and the decrease 
in value of Spanish liabilities held by international investors (see Chart 1.10.2) explains 
a further significant portion of this adjustment. In any event, this level of negative net 
IIP to GDP is still 3.4 pp higher than that existing at end-2019.
21	 	The	SGP	envisages	a	public	finance	adjustment	that	translates	into	an	improvement	in	the	structural	balance	of	
0.5 pp	of	GDP	per	year	until	the	level	of	this	balance	reaches	zero.	Furthermore,	the	debt	rule	requires	that	the	
excess	of	 the	debt-to-GDP	 ratio	 above	 the	60%	benchmark	be	 reduced	by	one	 twentieth	per	 year.	As	 the	
Spanish	public	debt	 ratio	 reached	120%	of	GDP	 in	2020,	 that	excess	 is	60 pp.	Therefore,	according	 to	 the	
European	rule,	the	debt	ratio	should	be	reduced,	on	average,	by	3 pp	per	year.
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Spain’s	gross	external	debt	rose	by	€66.4 billion	in	2021 H1;	although	it	fell	to	
197.9%	 of	 GDP	 thanks	 to	 output	 growth,	 it	 is	 still	 28.4  pp	 above	 the	 pre-
pandemic level. This high debt level is an element of vulnerability in the event of a 
possible tightening of financing conditions in the international markets. However, 
this vulnerability is mitigated, to a certain extent, by the debt composition, as slightly 
more than half is public sector debt (general government and Banco de España), 
and by the fact that the average repayment periods are lengthy and it is mostly euro-
denominated debt. 
Non-resident sectors again made net purchases of Spanish general government debt in 2021 H1, an indication that financial flows vis-à-vis 
the rest of the world were returning to normal. In the same period, the Spanish economy’s negative net international investment position (IIP) 
fell by 7.2 pp of GDP, thanks to positive valuation effects (due both to an increase in the value of foreign assets held by Spanish residents 
and a decrease in the value of Spanish liabilities held by foreign investors), net financial transactions vis-à-vis the rest of the world that were 
also positive (the counterpart of the current and capital account surpluses), and GDP growth.
IN 2021 H1, INTERNATIONAL INVESTORS RETURNED TO THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT DEBT MARKET AND SPAIN’S 
NEGATIVE NET INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POSITION DECLINED
Chart 1.10
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The net IIP is the difference between the value of resident sectors’ foreign assets and that of the liabilities to the rest of the world.
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Box	1.1
THE DETERMINANTS OF INTEREST RATES IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE
Long-term (10-year) risk-free interest rates have seen 
significant fluctuations over the course of the pandemic, 
in both the euro area and the United States. Between 
the onset of the pandemic and the roll-out of vaccines, 
the economic uncertainty brought about by the crisis 
led to a reduction in risk-free nominal rates, which was 
also reflected in inflation expectations. The largest fall in 
nominal rates seen in the United States was due to the 
substantial cut to the monetary policy interest rate in 
March 20201. Afterwards, nominal rates remained 
broadly stable during this stage of the crisis. In the 
second phase of the pandemic, as vaccines were rolled 
out, promising news on vaccine effectiveness and the 
recovery of certain sectors led to a more encouraging 
economic outlook and a slight rebound in real and 
nominal rates. This trend was reversed in mid-2021 and 
until August 2021, amid a worsening market outlook 
that led to a sizeable fall in nominal rates. Finally, since 
the last days of August, a further rise in nominal rates has 
been taking place in the euro area, together with an 
increase in inflation expectations. In the US, there has 
also been a rise since September.
With these developments in mind, this box seeks to 
examine the importance of the factors underlying the 
changes in long-term (10-year) nominal interest rates2 
over the course of the pandemic, in the euro area and the 
United States. To this end, statistical methods have been 
deployed to identify the economic and financial factors 
that explain the changes in nominal rates3. In particular, 
the box examines the role played by the expected inflation 
as implied by derivatives, short-term rate expectations, 
financial market uncertainty, the economic expectations 
reflected by the equity market and a residual variable that 
addresses all other factors. 
In this respect, Charts 1 and 2 show the deviation of long-
term nominal rates from their historical averages, as well 
1	 	In	the	United	States,	the	Federal	Funds	Rate	was	reduced	by	50	bp	on	3	March,	and	by	a	further	100	bp	on	16	March,	to	stand	in	the	range	0-0.25%.	
Meanwhile,	the	deposit	facility	rate	in	the	euro	area	has	remained	unchanged	since	it	was	set	at	-0.5%	in	September	2019.







SOURCES: Bloomberg, Datastream, Thomson Reuters and Banco de España.
a Deviations (in pp) are shown with respect to the historical average for the period running from August 2008 to September 2021. Expected inflation 
refers to 10-year inflation linked swaps (ILS), the VIX shows the implied volatility of the S&P 500, and economic conditions are proxied by the level 
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Box	1.1
THE DETERMINANTS OF INTEREST RATES IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE (cont’d)
as the contribution made by each of the above factors. 
Certain aspects of such contributions vary across time 
and between the two geographic regions. Thus, in the 
case of Europe, the changes in long-term nominal rates 
following the restrictions on movement set in place in 
March 2020 can be explained by greater market 
uncertainty and, to a lesser degree, a worse economic 
outlook. In the United States, the initial fall in long-term 
nominal rates was essentially due to the easing of 
monetary policy and the rate cut immediately after the 
outbreak of the pandemic. One aspect common to both 
regions is that the contribution of expected inflation to 
nominal rates has been below its historical average, 
especially in Europe in the stage of the crisis prior to the 
announcement of the development of vaccines. In the 
case of Europe, this moderating effect of inflation 
expectations on rates was already apparent before the 
outbreak of the crisis.
Nonetheless, this situation began to change towards the 
end of 2020, amid a more encouraging economic 
environment and promising news on vaccine development. 
Thus, rising inflation brought upward pressure to bear on 
nominal rates in the euro area, especially from summer 
2021 onwards. Also worth noting is the minor role played 
by the VIX component during this period, suggesting that 
nominal rates have not been affected by greater 
uncertainty, even though US public debt is seen as a safe 
asset that serves as a haven from uncertainty.
The overall contribution made by other factors is also 
notable. Specifically, purchase programmes and 
accommodative monetary policy may have helped ensure 
that rates in the euro area have remained lower than might 
be expected solely from the economic variables expressly 
included in the model, particularly between June and 
October 2021. In the United States, these other factors 
have contributed to steeper rate increases in the first half 
of 2021. This could be explained by more optimistic 
expectations of growth in specific sectors, above all those 
dependent on the reopening of the economy (hotels, 
transport, leisure, etc.), which far outperformed the 
general index (S&P 500) used in the estimates assessing 
economic conditions. 
In short, the changes in long-term nominal interest rates 
over 2021 appear to have been closely related to 
expectations of rising inflation following the post-
pandemic resumption of activity and a brighter economic 
outlook. The rebound observed in the last month, which 
has been of greater intensity in the euro area, is mainly 
due to the higher levels of inflation expected.
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Bank lending has been notably more subdued in the first half of 2021, mainly as a 
result of the fall in demand. This moderation contrasts with the growth observed 
during the initial phases of the pandemic, which was driven by the private sector’s 
liquidity needs and the support schemes established to mitigate the impact of the 
crisis. The volume of non-performing loans (NPLs) has continued to decline, although 
significant latent risks have been detected. Specifically, these are more 
pronounced in the loans granted under the support schemes which were naturally 
concentrated in the hardest-hit sectors and businesses. The economic upturn has 
led to the recovery in bank profitability which, nevertheless, remains relatively low 
compared with that of other sectors and non-euro area banking systems. The 
measures implemented by the authorities have also been key to increasing banks’ 
solvency in the past year. In this connection, the stress tests conducted by the Banco 
de España and the European Banking Authority (EBA) reflect the banking sector’s 
considerable resilience, in aggregate terms, to the materialisation of the risks 
identified, although there are notable differences across banks in terms of capital 
charges under the adverse scenario. In any case, the results of these tests do not 
indicate a need for extensive supervisory intervention under this scenario. The high 
risk-absorbing capacity of banks can be partly explained by the measures adopted 
by the authorities to address the economic and social effects of the crisis.   
2.1 Deposit institutions
2.1.1 Balance sheet structure, risks and vulnerabilities
Credit risk
The	volume	of	lending	to	the	resident	private	sector	in	Spain	remained	stable	
in the last 12 months as a whole. Lending by deposit institutions to the resident 
private sector fell by 0.2%1 from June 2020 (see Chart 2.1.1), in clear contrast to the 
increase posted between December 2019 and June 2020, which was largely due to 
the economic policy measures implemented to alleviate the effects of the pandemic. 
The slight decline in the stock was influenced by the sharp decrease in total new 
lending granted to households and non-financial corporations (NFCs) in 2021 H1, 
which fell by 31% year-on-year. This reduction is mainly explained by the lower 
1	 	The	change	in	June	2021	was	affected	by	a	corporate	transaction	consisting	of	the	absorption	of	an	SLI	into	a	
significant	deposit	institution	(DI).	Excluding	this	operation,	the	year-on-year	decrease	in	credit	would	be	0.8%.
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volume of new loans with ICO guarantees which amounted to less than €10 billion, 
far below the amount of almost €70 billion recorded in 2020 H1.  The increase in 
principal drawn down also moderated, thus converging to pre-pandemic levels.
Slower	growth	in	lending	to	NFCs	and	sole	proprietors,	mainly	those	hardest	
hit	 by	 the	 pandemic,	 contrasted	 with	 the	 quickening	 growth	 of	 lending	 to	
households. The volume of lending to NFCs and sole proprietors decreased by 
1.6% (see Chart 2.2.1) in the last 12 months, reflecting the significant contraction, of 
40%, in new lending to these enterprises in 2021 H1 overall, compared with the 
same period a year earlier. In fact, lending to NFCs and sole proprietors in the sectors 
most severely affected by the pandemic posted the strongest growth in 2020 H1.2 
So far in 2021, growth rates have levelled across different sectors, all of which show 
a clear trend towards stabilisation (see Chart 2.2.2). Lending to households rose by 
1.2% year-on-year, following growth of 20.1% in new lending in H1, compared with 
2	 	Lending	to	the	hardest-hit	sectors	is	proxied	by	that	corresponding	to	the	sectors	with	a	fall	in	turnover	of	more	
than	15%	in	2020,	which	can	be	identified	in	the	FI-130	regulatory	return.	Specifically,	lending	to	the	most	severely	
affected	 sectors	 includes	 hospitality,	 the	 manufacture	 of	 refined	 petroleum	 products,	 social	 services	 and	
entertainment,	transportation	and	storage,	and	the	manufacture	of	transport	equipment.
The stock of credit, which grew at the start of the pandemic as a result of the economic policy measures adopted (mainly ICO guarantees), 
remained stable over the last 12 months (-0.2% year-on-year in June 2021). In 2021 H1, new lending to non-financial corporations and sole 
proprietors decreased notably with respect to the previous year owing to the lower volume of new ICO-backed loans to businesses. However, 
new lending to households rose significantly.
THE VOLUME OF LENDING TO THE RESIDENT PRIVATE SECTOR REMAINED STABLE OVER THE LAST 12 MONTHS, LARGELY
DUE TO THE MODERATION IN NEW LOANS WITH ICO GUARANTEES
Chart 2.1
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the same period a year earlier. Specifically, new lending for house purchase, which 
notably exceeded that recorded in the same period in 2019. 
The	volume	of	NPLs	has	continued	to	decline	in	2021,	albeit	at	a	slower	pace	
than	in	pre-pandemic	years. In June 2021, non-performing assets fell by 5.8% 
year-on-year, compared with the double-digit declines posted in the years before 
the pandemic. Since December 2013, NPLs have decreased by €137 billion, 
representing a cumulative decline of 73%.3 The fact that they have not increased 
since the onset of the pandemic marks a departure from past economic crises in 
Spain, when NPLs rose strongly during the first year of economic contraction. 
3	 	The	application	since	1	January	2021	of	EBA	guidelines	(EBA/GL/2016/07)	with	respect	to	the	new	definition	
of	 default	 pursuant	 to	Article	 178	of	 (EU)	Regulation	575/2013	has	given	 rise	 to	 some	differences	 in	 the	
amounts	classified	as	“non-performing	for	accounting	purposes”	(accounting	definition	contained	in	Banco	
de	España	Circular	4/2017)	and	“non-performing	for	prudential	purposes”	(according	to	previous	guidelines).	
Specifically,	 in	 the	 first	 six	months	 of	 2021,	 the	 so-called	 “NPLs	 for	 prudential	 purposes”	 accounted	 for	
around	10%	more	than	“NPLs	for	accounting	purposes”,	which	in	absolute	terms	amounts	to	approximately	
€5.5 billion.
The volume of lending to non-financial corporations and sole proprietors declined slightly in the last year, contrasting with the strong growth 
posted at the start of the pandemic, mainly in the most severely affected sectors. The subdued growth rates in lending to the most severely 
affected sectors has resulted in convergence towards that of those less affected. The stock of loans to households grew moderately in H1, 
while the flow of new lending was notably higher than in the same period a year earlier.
LENDING TO THE CORPORATE SECTOR DECLINED IN 2021 H1, WITH DIFFERENT SECTORS SHOWING MORE EVEN
BEHAVIOUR THAN IN 2020. IN CONTRAST, LENDING TO HOUSEHOLDS GREW IN THE SAME PERIOD
Chart 2.2
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Lending to the more severely affected sectors is proxied by that corresponding to sectors with a fall in turnover of more than 15% in 2020, which 
can be identified in the FI-130 regulatory return. Specifically, lending to the more severely affected sectors includes hospitality, the manufacture of 
refined petroleum products, social services and entertainment, transportation and storage, and the manufacture of transport equipment. Lending to 
moderately affected sectors is proxied using the following sectorisation in the FI-130 regulatory return: metallurgy, manufacture of machinery, other 
manufacturing activities, professional services, mining and quarrying, wholesale and retail trade, and repair of vehicles. Other productive activities 
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The NPL ratio also continued to decline in the last 12 months, again more 
moderately	than	before	the	outbreak	of	the	COVID-19	crisis. In June 2021, the 
NPL ratio for lending to the resident private sector stood at 4.3% (see Chart 2.3.1), 
down 0.25 pp from the same month a year earlier. The lower decline in NPLs 
(numerator) and the stalling growth in lending (denominator) explain the moderate 
fall in the ratio in the last 12 months.  As mentioned in previous FSRs, economic 
policy measures such as furlough schemes, tax moratoria and public guarantee and 
debt moratoria schemes have sustained the financial capacity of economic agents, 
particularly firms, thus cushioning the impact of the economic downturn observed in 
Spain as a result of the pandemic. In this connection, the rate of decline of NPLs of 
non-financial corporations and sole proprietors slowed, whereas in the case of 
households, the NPL ratio continued to fall.
Despite	the	aggregate	decline	in	NPLs,	there	are	some	signs	of	credit	quality	
impairment,	in	particular	the	increase	in	refinanced	and	Stage	2	loans.	Stage 
2 loans, with a higher anticipated probability of default than other performing 
loans,4 increased substantially (53%) in the last 12 months (see Chart 2.3.2). This 
trend began to be observed in 2020 Q3, quickening notably in 2020 Q4, with the 
year-on-year rate of change in these loans continuing to rise. Forborne loans, 
which had declined more moderately in recent quarters, posted an increase of 
8.8% year-on-year in June 2021, possibly indicating some banks’ greater recourse 
to them to mitigate the loan repayment difficulties encountered by some borrowers, 
especially NFCs.5
The	 sectors	 hardest	 hit	 by	 the	pandemic	 are	 those	with	 the	most	 evident	
signs	of	current	and	potential	credit	impairment. NFCs and sole proprietors in 
these economic sectors, which were particularly affected, first and foremost 
because of the restrictions on activity, have seen their ability to repay existing 
loans diminish. This initially led to higher Stage 2 loans to these sectors, especially 




increased. The proportion of loans linked to expired or cancelled moratoria which 
showed signs of credit impairment (see Chart 2.4.1) was 20% for Stage 2 (compared 
with 19% in December 2020), and 9% for NPLs (compared with 8% in December 
2020). This impairment could increase in the coming quarters, since a significant 
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The volume of NPLs continued on the downward trend of recent years, although the decline was more moderate. This, along with the 
stabilisation of lending between June 2020 and June 2021, led to a lower decline also in the NPL ratio. However, early signs of loan 
repayment difficulties by economic agents were observed, such as the strong increase in Stage 2 loans, particularly in the sectors most 
severely affected by the pandemic, and a year-on-year increase in refinanced loans, something which had not occurred since the end of the 
global financial crisis.
THE VOLUME OF NPLs CONTINUED TO DECLINE, ALTHOUGH SOME SIGNS OF CREDIT QUALITY IMPAIRMENT AND UNEVEN
BEHAVIOUR ACROSS SECTORS WERE OBSERVED
Chart 2.3
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Lending to the more severely affected sectors is proxied by that corresponding to sectors with a fall in turnover of more than 15% in 2020, which 
can be identified in the FI-130 regulatory return. Specifically, lending to the more severely affected sectors includes hospitality, the manufacture of 
refined petroleum products, social services and entertainment, transportation and storage, and the manufacture of transport equipment. Lending to 
moderately affected sectors is proxied using the following sectorisation in the FI-130 regulatory return: metallurgy, manufacture of machinery, other 
manufacturing activities, professional services, mining and quarrying, wholesale and retail trade, and repair of vehicles. Other productive activities 
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2021. However, the loans benefitting from moratoria account for a small percentage 
of banks’ portfolios.6 The situation of ICO-guaranteed loans granted to non-financial 
corporations and sole proprietors had deteriorated in June 2021 with respect to 
December 2020 (see Chart 2.4.2). In transactions with ICO guarantees, Stage 2 
loans accounted for 16% of the credit drawn, an increase of 8 percentage points 
(pp). The increase was more subdued in the case of sole proprietors, but it reached 
the same percentage. It should be borne in mind that a large portion of these ICO-
guaranteed loans currently have payment holidays, which reduces the possibility of 
credit risks materialising in the short term.  It is also observed that the proportion of 
ICO loans linked to customers with one or more troubled loans (of all their loans, not 
only those with ICO guarantees) has increased significantly in the case of NFCs. The 
abundant signs of credit impairment in customers with ICO guarantees suggests 
that risk in ICO-backed loans may materialise to a greater extent, once the payment 
holidays have expired. Box 2.1 analyses in more detail the characteristics of the 
6	 	Loans	that	have	become	subject	to	moratoria	at	any	point	since	the	onset	of	the	crisis	amount	to	€60.5	billion	
(8.6%	of	all	lending	in	the	loan	portfolios	eligible	for	moratoria	and	5.5%	of	all	lending	to	the	non-financial	private	
sector in December 2020.
The credit quality of loans linked to expired moratoria worsened in 2021 H1 owing to the behaviour of those with no mortgage guarantee. The 
credit quality of ICO backed loans deteriorated, as the ratio of loans in Stage 2 and of non-performing loans increased. This deterioration can 
also be observed when analysing the overall quality of all loans arranged by customers who have been granted ICO-backed loans.
THE SIGNS OF DETERIORATION IN THE CREDIT QUALITY OF LOANS WITH EXPIRED MORATORIA REMAIN AND HAVE
INTENSIFIED IN THE CASE OF ICO-BACKED LOANS
Chart 2.4
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a In the customer-level analysis, for each firm or sole proprietor with one or more ICO-backed loans all possible deteriorations are identified in any of 
their loans (ICO-backed or otherwise) arranged with the bank that granted it the ICO-backed loan or with other banks. If customers have problematic 
loans above a minimum materiality threshold, they are flagged as a customer with some sign of deterioration. In the analysis at customer-guaranteed 
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businesses and banks which have participated in ICO guarantee schemes, and 
the effect of these on the structure of banking relationships. Box 2.2 examines 
recent developments in the duration and expiry of payment holidays for ICO-
backed loans.




December 2019 to June 2021, the volume of euro-denominated assets abroad of 
Spanish deposit institutions fell by 11.8%. Several factors unrelated to the bank 
lending situation in the geographical areas in which these institutions operate 
contributed to this decline. In particular, there was significant divestment in the 
United States by a Spanish deposit institution, with reclassification of the amount to 
non-current assets held for sale until the transaction was completed in 2021 Q2. The 
decline in Turkey was mainly due to the behaviour of its currency vis-à-vis the euro. 
Such behaviour was similar, but less pronounced, in Brazil and Mexico (see Chart 
2.5.1). Although NPL ratios remained stable in 2020 in the main geographical areas 
in which Spanish deposit institutions are present, they increased across the board 
in 2021 H1. The NPL ratio in Turkey stood at 8.8% in June 2021, up 2.4 pp since 
Credit exposure abroad has decreased by 11.8% since the pandemic broke. The decline observed in the United States was the result of the 
divestment in that geographical area by a Spanish bank. The appreciation of the euro against local currencies contributed to the decline in 
the exposure to Turkey, Mexico and Brazil. NPL ratios held stable during the initial quarters of the pandemic, but started to rise in 2021 H1, 
reaching the highest values in Turkey and Brazil.
THE VOLUME OF ASSETS HELD ABROAD BY SPANISH BANKS HAS FALLEN SINCE THE ONSET OF THE PANDEMIC, PARTLY
AS A RESULT OF THE ACROSS-THE-BOARD APPRECIATION OF THE EURO AND THE DIVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
Chart 2.5
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December 2020, while Brazil posted 5.4% and Mexico 3.8%, with increases of 1.8 




operations (TLTRO III), which have pushed down interest rates on unsecured 
loans. The Eurosystem’s balance sheet has almost doubled since the start of the 
pandemic, driven by the different purchase programmes and loan facilities, which 
have led to a rise in the system’s excess liquidity. Money market interest rates have 
continued to fall in this setting of ample liquidity (see Chart 2.6.1). The significant 
increase in refinancing operations in the summer of 20207 led to a gradual fall in the 
unsecured rate (€STR8) and therefore, to a considerably larger negative gap 
between the latter and the deposit facility rate, which has remained largely unchanged 
in 2021. The repo rate9 has also tended to decline owing to excess liquidity, and the 
reduction of available collateral resulting from, among other factors, the increase in 
purchases by the Eurosystem. However, the relationship between the repo-deposit 
facility rate spread and excess liquidity has been less intense in recent months, 
thanks to the increase in securities lending by the Eurosystem since end-2020, and 
to the relaxation of collateral requirements in financing transactions in which assets 
other than sovereign debt are accepted.10 
The	interbank	funding	spread11	has	remained	relatively	stable,	while	the	market	
perception	 of	 credit	 risk	 at	 Spanish	 banks	 is	 very	 low (see Chart 2.6.2). The 
interbank funding spread has remained at levels similar to those observed at the date 
of the last report, with a slight rebound in the months of September and October, and 
market expectations regarding this indicator suggest that the interbank costs could 
increase slightly in 2022, coinciding with the termination of the PEPP and the end of 
the favourable financing conditions applied to TLTRO III.12 
 7	 	In	the	fourth	and	fifth	rounds	of	TLTRO	III	in	2020,	euro	area	banks	applied	for	€1,308	billion	and	€175	billion,	




provided by the 48 euro area MMSR reporting banks. 
 9	 	Refers	to	the	overnight	rate,	according	to	the	data	reported	by	banks	to	the	MMSR,	agreed	with	other	financial	








BANCO DE ESPAÑA 59 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT. AUTUMN 2021  2. RISKS TO THE FINANCIAL SECTOR AND ITS RESILIENCE
The	cost	of	issuance	for	banks	on	the	wholesale	market	has	decreased	across	
the	board,	whereas	 the	volume	of	 issues	remains	high (see Charts 2.6.3 and 
2.6.4). Investors’ perception of risk regarding debt issued by banks13 is very low, as 
13	 	Measured	using	 the	credit	 risk	premium	 for	unsecured	bank	 lending	 (in	euro),	which	 is	calculated	as	 the	spread	
between	the	interest	rate	on	the	secondary	market	of	each	listed	bond	and	the	German	Bund	with	the	same	maturity.	
Money market interest rates have remained on a downward path in 2021, with a strong negative correlation between money market spreads and the 
deposit facility rate and rising volumes of excess liquidity and growth in purchase programmes. However, the impact of purchase programmes’ on 
lower repo rates through collateral availability seems to have diminished in 2021. Likewise, interbank funding costs are expected to recover slightly in 
2022, when some monetary policy measures are set to end, but would hold at pre-COVID levels; so too would the risk premium for Spanish banks’ 
bond issuances. Consistent with this, the cost (and volume) of bank issuances on the wholesale market remain at historically low (high) levels.
IN 2021, THE STABILISATION OF MONETARY POLICY HAS CONTINUED TO CONTRIBUTE, ALBEIT LESS SO THAN IN 2020,
TOWARDS IMPROVING INTERBANK AND WHOLESALE FUNDING CONDITIONS
Chart 2.6
SOURCES: Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters and Banco de España.
a The dots show the daily figure for the €STR-DFR and repo-DFR spreads, respectively (vertical axis), and the excess liquidity (horizontal axis). The 
post-COVID period runs from 26 June to 31 December 2020. The data for 2021 include from 1 January to 22 October 2021.
b The solid line (blue) shows the spread between the Euribor-3M (3-months forward) rate and the OIS curve 3-month forward rate, while the series of 
points shows the projections for this spread over different time horizons.
c The credit risk spread is calculated for unsecured debt bonds issued in euro by Spanish banks (Santander, BBVA and CaixaBank). First, the average interest 
rate on the secondary market for these bonds is obtained and the spread is calculated against the German Bund (risk-free) with the same maturity.
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reflected also in the wholesale funding market, where costs have decreased or held 
steady in 2021 for most debt instruments, particularly in the case of different types 
of senior debt (non-preferred, secured and unsecured).  Also, the cost of issuance is 
less dispersed in these cases, unlike subordinated debt (Tier II) and contingent 
convertible bonds (CoCos), where dispersion has increased due to the divergence 
of costs observed between banks. The dispersion in the cost of CoCo issuance 
indicates that in 2020 this had been limited to larger banks, whereas in 2021, smaller 
banks have also been able to issue CoCos, at a higher cost. In the first ten months 
of 2021, banks have benefitted from these lower funding costs to increase the volume 
of issues of instruments directly associated with regulatory, prudential or resolution 
requirements, in particular, MREL-eligible instruments classified as senior non-
preferred instruments.14 However, this has not occurred in the issuance of secured 
or unsecured senior bonds, whose volume decreased with respect to 2020, largely 
owing to the current context of excess liquidity.
Bank deposits have slowed, but continue to grow at a good pace. Indeed, 
households and companies have moderated the pace of growth of their deposits in 
institutions once uncertainty has been reduced, the profitability of other financial 
assets has increased, there is no longer forced savings and most of the loan 
programme with public guarantees has been deployed. Specifically, the year-on-year 
rate of change of deposits from households and firms until June 2021 stood at close 
to 5% in business in Spain, around 2.5 pp below the rate observed in the same month 
of the previous year. The slowdown is being more intense among firms, which register 
yearly increases of just 2%. Unlike other European countries, the volume of deposits 
remunerated at negative rates is not material and is limited to large firms.
2.1.2 Profitability and solvency
Profitability
The	Spanish	banking	system	earned	consolidated	net	profit	of	€13.8	billion	in	
2021	H1,	up	significantly	on	the	figure	for	the	same	period	of	2020. After the 
losses recognised by the Spanish banking sector in 2020 H1, consolidated net profit 
has improved by €23 billion. This translates into a return on assets (ROA) of 0.71% 
(up 1.2 pp from -0.5% in June 2020) and a return on equity (ROE) of 11.2% (up 18.5 
pp from -7.3% in June 2020).15
Extraordinary	gains	and	losses	(a	net	loss	in	2020	and	a	net	gain	in	2021)	have	
a	significant	impact	on	this	year-on-year	improvement	in	profitability. In 2021 
14  This category also includes CoCos and eligible subordinated debt instruments as Tier II capital.
15	 	In	the	case	of	ROE,	the	year-on-year	difference	also	increased	due	to	the	5%	decline	in	average	equity	between	
June	2020	and	June	2021,	whereas	average	total	assets	held	steadier	during	that	period,	growing	by	1.9%.
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H1 there was a net gain of more than €2.5 billion, while in 2020 H1 there was a net 
loss of more than €14 billion.16  Excluding these extraordinary items, the sector’s 
ROA would have stood at 0.6%, an increase of 0.3 pp from June 2020 (which would 
have been 0.3%) (see Chart 2.7.1). In June 2021 the geographical distribution of the 
profit of Spanish banks with significant international presence returned to values 
similar to those of June 2019 (see Chart 2.8.1). Behind Spain, Mexico, the United 










appreciation	of	 the	 local	 currencies	against	 the	euro.	The	profit	measured	 in	 euro	diminished	partially	 in	 the	
United	States	and	Turkey	due	to	the	appreciation	of	the	euro	against	their	local	currencies.		
After the losses recognised in June 2020, the Spanish banking sector's profitability recovered in 2021 H1. In addition to the positive impact
of the extraordinary items, lower provisioning also contributed to this improvement. The increase in profitability was widespread among 
banks, resulting in it standing at levels similar to those prior to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic.
THE SPANISH BANKING SECTOR'S PROFITABILITY IMPROVED SIGNIFICANTLY IN JUNE 2021 COMPARED WITH A YEAR
EARLIER. THIS WAS LARGELY BECAUSE OF EXTRAORDINARY ITEMS AND LOWER IMPAIRMENT PROVISIONING
Chart 2.7
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The red (green) colour of the bars denotes a negative (positive) contribution of the corresponding item to the change in consolidated profit in June 
2021 compared with June 2020. The black diamonds denote the ROA excluding extraordinary items. Specifically, in June 2020: adjustments to 
goodwill (-€12.2 billion), the adjustment for deferred tax assets (-€2.5 billion) and the sale of an asset management business (€0.3 billion); and in 
June 2021: an extraordinary net gain as a result of a merger (€2.9 billion) particularly, badwill; the spin-off of an insurance company (€0.9 billion) 
and extraordinary restructuring costs (-€1.2 billion).
b Including, among others, the aforementioned extraordinary items.
c The chart depicts the density function of ROA for Spanish deposit institutions, weighted by average total assets. The density function is estimated 
by means of a kernel estimator, which enables non-parametric estimation and provides a continuous, smoothed graphic representation of the 
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In	 2021	H1	 the	 profitability	 of	 our	 European	 peers’	 banking	 systems	 also	
improved, with it close to returning to pre-pandemic levels. Despite other 
European banks also seeing net interest income decrease between June 2020 
and June 2021, the steep decline in impairment provisioning led to improved 
profitability in the sector at European level (see Chart 2.8.2). In recent years, 
Spanish banks’ net interest income and impairment provisioning have been higher 
than those of their European peers. 
Profitability	has	 improved	across	the	board,	and	the	sector’s	pre-pandemic	
profitability	 levels	 have	 been	 resumed.	Compared with the previous year, the 
distribution of ROA in June 2021 has shifted markedly to the right. This reflects the 
widespread improvement in profit in the sector. This upturn was more pronounced 
at a group of banks that fared worse in June 2020. Consequently, the distribution of 
ROA in June 2021 is similar to the pre-pandemic distribution (see Chart 2.7.2). Even 
so, it should be borne in mind that the banking sector’s low profitability, both in 
Spain and in the main European countries, was already one of the sector’s main 
challenges before the pandemic broke.  
The significant decline in cost of risk (provisioning) led to an improvement in the sector’s profitability at European level, despite net interest 
income decreasing for European banks between June 2020 and June 2021. In June 2021 the amount and geographical distribution of the 
profit of banks with significant international activity returned to values similar to those of June 2019.
THE GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF SPANISH BANKS’ PROFIT IS APPROACHING ITS PRE-CRISIS LEVEL AND
COMPOSITION. MEANWHILE, THE PROFITABILITY OF THE EUROPEAN BANKING SECTOR AS A WHOLE HAS IMPROVED,
UNDERPINNED BY THE LOWER COST OF RISK
Chart 2.8
SOURCES: European Banking Authority and Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores.
a Four banks with significant international activity are included in this chart and non-recurring items in the period 2019-2021 are excluded.
b Percentiles calculated based on the aggregate financial ratios published by the EBA for each of the banking systems in the EU; the United Kingdom 
is excluded from the sample of countries in the three years considered. Net interest income is defined as interest income less interest expense 
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Lower impairment provisioning – which, at consolidated level, returned to 
pre-pandemic	 levels	 –	 was	 behind	 the	 improvement	 in	 ordinary	 profit. 
Consolidated provisioning charges for impairment losses on financial assets fell by 
50% to stand at levels similar to pre-pandemic ones (see Chart 2.9.1). Provisioning 
in operations in Spain decreased by almost as much as consolidated provisioning, 
but remained above pre-pandemic levels. The potential materialisation of latent 
risks and their impact on credit quality might require some banks to recognise 
additional provisions over the coming years. This is especially true under the least-
favourable scenario for the effectiveness of the support measures rolled out in 
response to the pandemic (see Chart 2.9.2). The scale of this additional effort is 
markedly uneven across banks.      
Provisioning charges recognised in 2021 H1 are 50% lower than those recognised in 2020 H1 as a result of the improved outlook for the 
potential impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on credit quality. At consolidated level, this decrease resulted in provisioning returning to 
pre-pandemic levels. Provisioning charges associated with operations in Spain remain above their pre-pandemic levels. The estimated 
additional provisioning needs over the coming years are uneven among banks and  depend, among other factors, on the degree of credit 
impairment of the loan portfolio guaranteed by the ICO.
PROVISIONING CHARGES IN 2021 H1 FELL TO HALF THE AMOUNT RECOGNISED IN THE SAME PERIOD OF 2020. THE DECLINE
WAS LESS STEEP IN OPERATIONS IN SPAIN
Chart 2.9
SOURCES: Banco de España and European Systemic Risk Board.
a The estimated provisioning charges for the period 2021-2023 are obtained from the baseline scenario used in the FLESB stress-testing exercise. 
Banks are grouped into three categories, based on the volume of estimated provisioning charges relative to the 2021 provisioning effort. The bars 
depict the aggregate lending of each category of bank as a percentage of total lending. The first group (no additional provisioning need) comprises 
banks whose 2021 provisioning effort (those provisions recognised for 2021 H1, multiplied by two to extrapolate them for the entire year) is sufficient 
to cover the estimated provisioning requirements for 2021-2023 under the FLESB framework. The second group (average additional provisioning 
needs) is formed by banks whose provisioning effort in 2021 is between 50% and 100% of the provisioning charges estimated for 2021-2023. The 
third group (high additional provisioning needs) consists of banks whose provisioning charges in 2021 are below 50% of the provisioning charges 
estimated for 2021-2023. For the estimated provisioning over the entire 2021-2023 period, two scenarios are considered in relation to the effect of 
the support measures (essentially the ICO guarantee scheme): moderate and average. Under the moderate scenario, the quality of credit guaranteed 
by the ICO is similar to that of the overall business lending portfolio. Meanwhile, under the average scenario credit quality is at a midway point 
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Gross	income	fell	in	2021	H1	compared	with	the	same	period	a	year	earlier,	as	
the	decline	in	net	interest	income	was	not	offset	by	the	improvement	in	net	fee	
and commission income (see Annex 2). Net interest income fell 5.1% year-on-year, 
while net fee and commission income increased 4%. The more than 10% drop in 
gains and losses on financial assets and liabilities also contributed to the decline in 
gross income. The operating expenses of the sector as a whole rose. This led to a 
decline in net operating income and to an increase of almost 3 pp in the cost-to-
income ratio (from 48.8% in June 2020 to 51.7% in June 2021). However, excluding 
the extraordinary costs associated with the merger of two banks during this period 
(see footnote 16), net operating income would have fallen less and the cost-to-
income ratio would have improved slightly. In any event, the efficiency advantage 
over our European peers’ banking systems has been retained (see Chart 2.10.1). 
From a structural standpoint, the number of branches continue to fall across the 
euro area, with the employment level remaining more stable (see Chart 2.10.2).
Solvency
Capital	ratios	improved	slightly	in	2021	H1,	and	significantly	over	the	last	12	
months (see Chart 2.11.1). This was due both to the increase in capital levels (the 
ratios’ numerators) and to the decline in risk-weighted assets (RWAs) (the ratios’ 
Broadly speaking, the cost-to-income ratio of our peers’ banking systems has improved after the downturn recorded in 2020 H1 due to the 
period’s atypical effects. The cost-to-income ratio of Spanish institutions in 2021 is still affected by extraordinary negative factors. From a 
structural standpoint, the number of branches continues to decrease throughout the euro area, while the adjustment to employment has 
stalled.
SPANISH BANKS MAINTAIN THE COST-TO-INCOME RATIO ADVANTAGE OVER THEIR EUROPEAN PEERS
Chart 2.10
SOURCES: European Central Bank and European Banking Authority.
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denominator). Two distinct stages can be identified. The improvement in the common 
equity tier 1 (CET1) ratio was more pronounced between June 2020 and December 
2020, when it rose by 69 bp. This was the result of growth of 3.6% in CET1 and the 
1.8% decline in RWAs. The measures implemented by the authorities to mitigate the 
impact of the pandemic largely explain these developments.18 The increase in the CET1 
ratio moderated between December 2020 and June 2021 (amounting to 14 bp) due to 
lower growth in CET1 in that period (0.4%) and a smaller decline in RWAs (0.7%). A 
similar pattern is observed for the Tier 1 and total capital ratios (see Chart 2.11.1).19
The	 increase	over	 the	 last	12	months	 in	 the	Spanish	banking	sector’s	CET1	
ratio	was	in	 line	with	that	of	the	main	European	countries. The CET1 ratio of 
Spanish banks continued to trail that of the main European countries and remained 
around 2.7 pp off the European average (see Chart 2.11). This difference vis-à-vis the 
European average existed prior to the COVID-19 crisis and owes partly to structural 
factors such as the greater use of the standardised approach by Spanish banks. 




growth	of	capital	 ratios.	 In	 fully	 loaded	terms,	the	CET1	ratio	grew	most	 (27	bp	 in	2021	H1)	 from	12.77%	in	
December	2020	to	13.04%	in	June	2021.
The CET1 ratio increased by 83 bp between June 2020 and June 2021 to stand at 13.4%, as a result both of the increase in capital and the 
decrease in RWAs. Most of this increase (69 bp) arose in 2020 H2 and was largely due to the measures adopted by the authorities to mitigate 
the effects of the health crisis. The CET1 ratio of Spanish deposit institutions remains the lowest of the main European countries, while 
year-on-year growth in the ratio was in line with the growth recorded by our peers.
THE AGGREGATE CAPITAL RATIOS OF THE SPANISH BANKING SECTOR INCREASED SLIGHTLY IN 2021 H1
Chart 2.11
SOURCES: European Banking Authority and Banco de España.
a Data for Spain are in red.
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Indeed, if solvency is measured in terms of the leverage ratio, Spain’s significant 
institutions (5.7%) are in line with the European average.
CET1 increased across the board, whereas the change in RWAs was more 
uneven (see Chart 2.12.1). Indeed, most banks recorded a rise in RWAs. However, 
the total amount of RWAs in the system fell due to the notable decline at some of the 
bigger banks20 and, in particular, to the divestment in the United States by one of the 
banks with the largest international presence. Overall, the CET1 ratio has improved, 
which is reflected by the shift of its distribution to the right (see Chart 2.12.2).
2.1.3  Forward-looking assessment of the Spanish banking system’s resilience





Most banks increased their volume of CET1 between June 2020 and June 2021. Despite the overall decrease in RWAs in the Spanish 
banking sector, most banks increased their RWAs over the last year, with a small but significant number of banks reducing them. The shift 
towards more positive values in the distribution of the CET1 ratio was above all recorded between June 2020 and December 2020.
CET1 INCREASED ACROSS THE BOARD, WHILE THE DECLINE IN RWAs MOSTLY AFFECTED SOME SIGNIFICANT 
INSTITUTIONS 
Chart 2.12
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The red dots represent banks directly supervised by the SSM. The dots above the bisector depict increases (decreases) in the volume of CET1 
over the last year that are higher (lower) than the increase (decrease) in the volume of RWAs. Consequently, they refer to increases in the CET1 
ratio between June 2020 and June 2021. The opposite applies for the dots beneath the bisector.
b The chart depicts the CET1 ratio density function for Spanish deposit institutions, weighted by the amount of RWAs. The density function is estimated 
using a kernel estimator, which enables non-parametric estimation and provides a continuous, smoothed graphic representation of the function. The 
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The FLESB framework enables analysis of different macro-financial scenarios using 
a set of models and hypotheses developed in-house (“top-down” approach), 
underpinned by the granular information available through regulatory and supervisory 
reporting. As with last year’s exercise, this year’s also included the effect of the 
economic policy measures to mitigate the impact of COVID-19, taking into account 
the roll-out of the ICO guarantees since the cut-off date for the previous exercise.21 
Other developments include the consideration of the possible latent credit risk due 
to the combination in 2020 of a severe economic shock and important mitigating 
measures, in addition to the more granular modelling of credit risk in lending to 
business. The methodological fundamentals and main characteristics of this exercise 
are summarised below. 
The	macroeconomic	scenarios	used	match	those	designed	for	the	2021	stress	
test	coordinated	at	European	level	by	the	EBA.22 The baseline scenario covers 
the most likely economic developments over the exercise’s horizon (2021-2023) and 
is used to assess the banking system’s solvency under normal conditions. The 
adverse scenario includes the materialisation of the main risks facing the European 
economy identified by the ESRB. These are related to the uncertainty over the course 
of the COVID-19 pandemic and lower confidence, which would trigger a protracted 
contraction in economic activity and low and even negative interest rates for longer. 
For	 the	 Spanish	 economy	 (see	 Table	 2.1),	 the	 baseline	 scenario	 reflects	 a	
recovery,	 resulting	 in	 cumulative	 real	 GDP	 growth	 over	 the	 three	 years	 of	
13.2%.	 The	 adverse	 scenario	 envisages	 a	 cumulative	 contraction	 of	 3.2%. 
Noteworthy among the other macroeconomic variables is the severity of developments 
in the unemployment rate (21.2% on average over the three years) and house prices 
(a cumulative decline of 17.0%) under the adverse scenario. Interest rates do not 
show signs of being significantly stressed, since the scenarios include the 
expectations that the monetary policy stance will remain expansionary. The paths of 
the macroeconomic variables for the other countries also match those included in 
the EBA 2021 exercise (see Chart 2.13). The baseline scenario reflects a widespread 
recovery, whereas the adverse scenario envisages a persistent contraction in activity, 
both in advanced and in emerging market economies. The FLESB also includes 
other variables of interest that do not feature in the EBA’s scenarios, such as credit 
developments in Spain and in the geographical areas where Spanish banks have a 
significant presence. These are projected using the Banco de España’s in-house 
models in a manner consistent with the other variables in each scenario.
21	 	The	first	scheme	(for	guarantees	totalling	€100	billion)	was	approved	in	March	2020	(Royal	Decree-Law	8/2020).	
It	was	then	increased	in	July	(Royal	Decree-Law	25/2020)	by	a	further	€40	billion.	
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The	portfolios	of	business	loans	are	broken	down	by	sector	of	activity	and	firm	
size	 to	 obtain	 a	 more	 granular	 estimate	 of	 the	 credit	 risk	 parameters. 
Specifically, the sectoral breakdown of those credit portfolios has been enhanced to 
a level similar to two-digit Spanish National Classification of Economic Activities 
(CNAE by its Spanish initials) codes. In addition to the macroeconomic variables of 
the scenarios, this more granular treatment factors in paths for real gross value 
added for each sector and firms’ various financial ratios, which are consistent with 
the scenarios in the projection horizon.23
The	exercise	also	envisages	the	possible	future	deterioration	in	credit	quality,	
which	did	not	materialise	in	2020	because	of	the	positive	effect	of	the	economic	
policy	measures	 implemented	 in	response	to	 the	COVID-19. These measures 
have largely mitigated the economic effects of the pandemic. Yet they have also put 
off some of the financial consequences of the crisis until the future, when households 
and firms will have to repay debts incurred in 2020 to meet liquidity needs stemming 
from the crisis. 
To	facilitate	their	interpretation,	the	results	are	presented	in	three	groups	of	
banks,	as	the	business	models	and	sources	of	risk	vary	across	the	different	
groups. The first group comprises Spanish banks directly supervised by the SSM 
with the most significant international presence.24 The second group consists of the 
other banks under the direct supervision of the SSM. Lastly, the third group includes 






MACROECONOMIC SCENARIOS FOR SPAIN IN THE STRESS TEST
Table 2.1
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smaller banks with no significant international presence which are under the direct 
supervision of the Banco de España. In all cases, the impacts in terms of the fully 
loaded CET1 ratio are shown.
Results of the stress tests
For	the	group	of	banks	with	greater	 international	activity	supervised	by	the	
SSM	an	 increase	of	1	pp	and	a	decrease	of	2.2	pp	 in	 their	CET1	ratio	were	
projected	under	the	baseline	and	adverse	scenarios,	respectively	 (see Chart 
2.14). This group’s starting CET1 ratio was 11.8 pp, lower than that of the other two 
groups of banks. Under the baseline scenario, available provisions to cover 
impairment losses in Spain (2% of RWAs) and the capacity to generate new capital 
(4.2% of RWAs) offset the volume of impairment losses in operations in Spain and 
sovereign exposure valuation adjustments (overall, 3.7% of RWAs). As a result of the 
global recovery forecast over the period 2021-2023, operations outside Spain help 
increase net profit under the baseline scenario. Conversely, the other impacts make 
a negative contribution (1.6% of RWAs) to solvency, due to the net effect of other 
gains and losses, the effect of taxes and profit distributions. The final result is a 
CET1 ratio of 12.8 pp in 2023. Under the adverse scenario, the continued contraction 
in activity results in a significantly lower generation of capital (1% of RWAs). This is 
largely because of the greater impairment losses in operations outside Spain and, in 
The scenarios for the other geographical areas where Spanish banks have significant activity are also consistent with those used in the EBA 
stress-testing exercise conducted at European level. The baseline scenario assumes a widespread recovery, whereas the adverse scenario 
envisages the materialisation of risks to financial stability related to the uncertainty surrounding the course of the COVID-19 pandemic and a 
drop in confidence causing a prolongation of the downturn.
IN THE GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS WHERE SPANISH BANKS HAVE SIGNIFICANT PRESENCE, THE BASELINE SCENARIO
ENVISAGES A WIDESPREAD RECOVERY, WHEREAS THE ADVERSE SCENARIO REFLECTS A PROLONGATION OF THE
CONTRACTION TRIGGERED BY THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC
Chart 2.13



















ES BR GB MX TR US
BASELINE SCENARIO ADVERSE SCENARIO




















ES BR GB MX TR US
1  CUMULATIVE CHANGE IN GDP, 2021-2023
%
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 70 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT. AUTUMN 2021  2. RISKS TO THE FINANCIAL SECTOR AND ITS RESILIENCE
the same vein, impairment losses in Spain totalling 5.7% of RWAs. Under the adverse 
scenario, the CET1 ratio stands at 9.6% at the end of the projection horizon.
For	 the	 other	 banks	 supervised	 by	 the	 SSM,	 an	 increase	 of	 1.3	 pp	 and	 a	
decrease	of	 3.3	pp	 in	 the	CET1	 ratio	 are	estimated	under	 the	baseline	and	
adverse	scenarios,	respectively (see Chart 2.15). This group’s CET1 ratio at the 
start of the exercise (13.9%) was better than that of banks with significant international 
activity. Under the baseline scenario, impairment losses in Spain (9.3% of RWAs) are 
significantly higher than in the case of banks with significant international activity 
because of the lesser geographical distribution of their risks. Provisions (4.7%) and 
the generation of net operating income (5.8%) more than suffice to absorb the 
impairment losses, thereby raising the CET1 ratio to 15.2%. Under the adverse 
scenario, generation of capital falls vis-à-vis the baseline scenario (4.2% of RWAs) 
and impairment losses increase (15.4% of RWAs). This results in solvency being 
undermined, despite the positive contribution (3.2%) of the other impacts, associated 
with the lower lending projected under this scenario.  Capital consumption under the 
adverse scenario is higher than for the other groups of banks, resulting in a CET1 
ratio of 10.6% in 2023. 
Banks with significant international exposure remain notably resilient, despite the relatively high volume of impairment losses in operations in 
Spain under both scenarios. Under the baseline scenario the use of provisions and the generation of capital offset the impairment losses, 
while under the adverse scenario the additional impairment and lower capital-generation capacity lead to a decrease in the 2023 CET1 ratio 
compared with the starting ratio. However, it remains above the minimum requirement.
THE BANKS WITH THE LARGEST INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE REMAIN FIRMLY RESILIENT, EVEN TO THE CONTINUED 
GLOBAL DOWNTURN ENVISAGED UNDER THE ADVERSE SCENARIO
Chart 2.14
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The red (green) bars indicate a negative (positive) contribution of the corresponding item to the change in the CET1 ratio at the end of the projection 
horizon (2023) compared with the start of the exercise (2020).
b Generation of loss-absorbing capital in the case of banks with significant international activity includes the net operating income for Spain and net 
profit in operations abroad.
c Impairment losses on loans and foreclosed assets in operations in Spain and the impact on capital of a potential deterioration of sovereign 
exposures at consolidated level.
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The	CET1	ratio	of	the	institutions	supervised	directly	by	the	Banco	de	España	
improves	under	both	the	baseline	and	adverse	scenarios,	rising	2.6	pp	and	1.3	
pp,	respectively	 (see Chart 2.16), with	the	latter	result	 largely	stemming	from	
the	institutions’	deleveraging.	This third group of institutions has a higher starting 
CET1 ratio (18.8 pp) than the other groups and a simpler and more conservative 
business model in terms of products (a higher relative share of mortgage loans and 
government debt holdings). They also operate in a reduced geographical area. Under 
the baseline scenario, existing provisions (4.8% of RWAs) and capital generated 
(4.4% of RWAs) more than offset the impairment losses (6.8% of RWAs). This gives 
rise to an end-exercise aggregate CET1 ratio of 21.4%. Under the adverse scenario, 
the generation of new loss-absorbing capital declines (3.4% of RWAs) and impairment 
losses increase (10.5% of RWAs). However, this set of institutions ends the exercise 
with higher solvency on account of other effects (3.2% of RWAs). Under the adverse 
scenario, the CET1 ratio improvement is primarily linked to the institutions’ 
deleveraging, given that credit – which accounts for a large share of these 
institutions’ exposures – shrinks. Thus, under the adverse scenario the CET1 ratio 
stands at 20.1% in 2023, the highest value of the three groups. 
The other SSM banks record a relatively high volume of impairment losses relative to their loss-absorbing capital in the business in Spain 
under both scenarios. Under the adverse scenario, the use of provisions and generation of net operating income are insufficient to offset the 
losses. However, the end-exercise solvency position is notable, owing to a higher starting CET1 ratio and a degree of deleveraging, captured 
in the RWA reduction included in other impacts.
OTHER SSM BANKS WOULD RECORD RELATIVELY LARGE IMPAIRMENTS RELATIVE TO THEIR LOSS-ABSORBING CAPITAL.
NONETHELESS, THE ENDING CET1 RATIO IS SOUND, PARTLY OWING TO THE FAVOURABLE STARTING POSITION AND RWA
REDUCTION
Chart 2.15
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The red (green) colour of the columns indicates a negative (positive) contribution of the item concerned to the change in the CET1 ratio at the end 
of the projection exercise (2023) vis-à-vis the start of the exercise (2020).
b The generation of loss-absorbing capital for other SSM banks mainly includes net operating income in Spain, with a very small contribution from net 
profit from foreign operations.
c Impairment losses on loans and foreclosed assets in business in Spain, and the impact on capital of the potential impairment on sovereign 
exposures at consolidated level.
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These	 results	 reflect	 Spanish	 deposit	 institutions’	 considerable	 aggregate	
resilience against a persistent downturn, although there is some cross-institution 
heterogeneity. All three sets of institutions end the exercise with CET1 ratios above 9% 
under both the baseline and adverse scenarios. However, not all institutions end the 
exercise in the same situation and heterogeneous behaviour in terms of capital charges 
is observed under the adverse scenario. In any case, the distribution of the CET1 ratio 
across banks under the adverse scenario does not suggest the need for extensive 
additional supervisory intervention, in line with the results of other stress tests at European 
level, such as the EBA exercise discussed in this chapter. Moreover, the results are subject 
to the marked uncertainties facing the banking sector. Caveats specific to the current 
environment should also be highlighted. For instance, the possibility of more adverse 
adjustments in financing conditions than envisaged under the scenarios, were the 
growing risk of financial market correction to intensify and materialise. 
Spanish	institutions	also	had	a	robust	liquidity	position	at	end-2020,	supported	
by	 the	ECB’s	monetary	 policy	 stance. As in previous years, a stress test was 
conducted on the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), with Spanish institutions maintaining 
appropriate liquidity levels comparable to previous tests.
The CET1 ratio of the institutions supervised directly by the Banco de España improves under both the baseline and adverse scenarios, 
despite also deteriorating significantly. As well as starting out with a substantially higher CET1 ratio, the impairment losses are offset by the 
effect of provisions, capital generation and the RWA reduction.
INSTITUTIONS SUPERVISED DIRECTLY BY THE BANCO DE ESPAÑA, WHICH START WITH A HIGH CAPITAL LEVEL AND
EXPOSURE TO LOWER-RISK ASSETS, EXPERIENCE SIGNIFICANT IMPAIRMENT. HOWEVER, THIS IS OFFSET BY
PROVISIONS, CAPITAL GENERATION AND DELEVERAGING UNDER BOTH SCENARIOS
Chart 2.16
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The red (green) colour of the columns indicates a negative (positive) contribution of the item concerned to the change in the CET1 ratio at the end 
of the projection exercise (2023) vis-à-vis the start of the exercise (2020).
b The generation of loss-absorbing capital is determined by net operating income in Spain.
c Impairment losses on loans and foreclosed assets in business in Spain, and the impact on capital of the potential impairment on sovereign 
exposures at consolidated level.
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Granular assessment of the effect of State guarantees and firms’ PDs 
The	exercise	factors	in	the	mitigating	effect	on	Spanish	institutions’	solvency	
had	by	the	public	guarantee	scheme	for	business	 lending. Since the scale of 
this effect remains uncertain, an impact range has been estimated taking into 
account various assumptions regarding the probability of default of the guaranteed 
loans (see Chart 2.17.1). The bottom end of the range assumes that the expected loss 
is equal to the average for the corporate credit portfolio; the top end assumes that 
the guaranteed loans are concentrated among higher-risk debtors. The previous 
section’s findings are based on the impact of the ICO guarantees standing at the 
midpoint of this range. It should be borne in mind that the more impairment losses 
the programme is able to absorb, the greater its budgetary cost. 
The	mitigating	 effects	 of	 the	State	 guarantee	 scheme	 for	 business	 lending	
include	reducing	the	loss	given	default,	but	also	lowering	the	risk	weights	of	
State guarantees for corporate credit have a positive impact on the CET1 ratio under both scenarios, particularly the adverse scenario. The 
more granular treatment of corporate credit portfolios means risk is captured based on sensitivity to the economic cycle and specific potential 
shocks that may affect each sector and firm size.
ICO GUARANTEES LIMIT THE IMPACT ON CAPITAL OF LOAN LOSSES. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE UNDER THE ADVERSE
SCENARIO, WHICH PRESENTS AN UNEVEN CREDIT QUALITY IMPAIRMENT RELATIVE TO THE BASELINE SCENARIO ACROSS 
FIRMS OF DIFFERENT SIZE AND SECTOR
Chart 2.17
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The effect of the guarantee facility under an intermediate assumption, together with the restrictions on profit distribution and the impact of TLTROs, 
are incorporated into the main analysis, the results of which are set out in Charts 2.14, 2.15 and 2.16.
b Shown is the range of the measure's impact on the expected loss of the corporates portfolio (left panel) and on the CET1 ratio (right panel), 
depending on the assumptions regarding the credit quality of loans extended to firms and sole proprietors in Spain under the ICO guarantee facility. 
The minimum effect assumes that the expected loss is equal to the average of the corporate lending portfolio, while the maximum effect assumes 
that NPL inflows are primarily concentrated among guaranteed loans. The black line denotes the midrange effect.
c Probability of default (PD) is defined as the probability of transitioning from performing status to non-performing status in a 12-month period. This 
probability is estimated using a model that links observed PD to the firms’ macroeconomic variables and financial ratios. The chart shows the 
density function of the difference (in pp) between the PD estimated for each sector under the adverse scenario vis-à-vis the baseline scenario. This 
is estimated for each bank, but the weighted average for each sector is shown. The weighting is based on number of holders. The density function 
is approximated by means of a kernel estimator, which enables non-parametric estimation and provides a continuous, smoothed graphic 
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the loans. The risk weight of the guaranteed portion of the loans granted under 
the scheme are lowered to the 0% risk weight assigned to sovereign exposures. 
In the event of default, the loss is assumed proportionally by the State. Thus, 
under the baseline scenario the assumptions regarding the guaranteed loans’ 
credit quality would result in the guarantees absorbing between 11.5% and 69.5% 
of the expected loss (midpoint of 40.5%), while under the adverse scenario the 
range is from 15.4% to 78.5% (midpoint of 47%).25 The impact on the CET1 ratio 
at the midpoint would be 0.6 pp and 1.7 pp under the baseline and adverse 
scenario, respectively.
The	 firms’	 characteristics	 (size,	 sector,	 etc.)	 have	 a	 bearing	 on	 the	 PDs	
projected	 for	 the	 loans. Hence, under the adverse scenario the increase in PD 
relative to the baseline scenario is larger for small and medium-sized enterprises 
(see Chart 2.17.2). Likewise, much cross-sector heterogeneity is observed in the 
difference between PDs under the baseline and adverse scenarios. 
Results of the EU-wide stress test published by the European Banking Authority
The	results	obtained	by	the	EBA	for	50	banks	in	the	European	Union	and	the	
European Economic Area show a CET1 capital ratio increase under the 
baseline	scenario	and	a	significant	contraction	under	the	adverse	scenario.	
Under the baseline scenario, this ratio would rise from 15% (fully loaded at end-
2020) to 15.8% in 2023 (see Chart 2.18.1). The Spanish institutions participating in 
the exercise26 would, under this scenario, record a far sharper ratio increase (2.2 pp), 
rising from 11.9% (fully loaded in December 2020) to 14.1% at the end of the projection 
horizon. Under the adverse scenario the participating institutions would, overall, see 
their CET1 capital ratio fall by 4.9 pp, placing it at 10.2% of RWAs at the end of the 
exercise. The reduction is smaller for Spanish banks (of 2.9 pp to 9%). Thus, Spanish 
banks show greater resilience to the adverse scenario and greater capacity to 
generate capital under the baseline scenario than their European peers, despite 
starting out with a lower capital ratio. This was also true in the 2018 EU-wide stress 
tests coordinated by the EBA.
Spanish	 banks	 face	 one	 of	 the	 smallest	 adverse	 impacts	 on	 capital	 ratios	
under the adverse scenario. A country-level analysis of the results (see Chart 
2.18.2) places Spanish banks (together with those of Poland and Norway) among 
those that experience a smaller capital ratio impact. At the other end of the scale are 
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Danish and Irish banks, whose CET1 capital ratios end the exercise down by more 
than 6 pp.
The	differences	–	in	terms	of	methodology,	scope	and	risks	analysed	–	between	
the EBA exercise and the FLESB lie behind certain disparities in the results 
obtained	 for	Spanish	banks.	The most significant differences between the two 
exercises are associated with the fact that the EBA methodology assumes a static 
balance sheet in all years. By contrast, the FLESB adapts to the macroeconomic 
developments implicit in the scenarios. Similarly, the EBA-coordinated exercises 
consider the impact of the scenarios on market and operational risk, aspects that fall 
partially outside the scope of the FLESB. The EBA exercise likewise considers a 
small sample of all Spanish deposit institutions, compared with the broader coverage 
provided by the FLESB. In any event, both exercises evidence the Spanish banking 
sector’s aggregate resilience to an adverse economic environment.
2.1.4 Deposit institutions’ operational risks
Spanish	banks’	operational	risk	losses	have	been	in	decline	since	2015,	with	a	
simultaneous	 increase	 in	 perceived	 cyber	 risks. Despite the reduction in 
operational risk losses (see Chart 2.19.1), the number of external fraud events has 
increased, with the vast majority being cyber incidents. It comes as no surprise, 
then, that concern surrounding cybersecurity has intensified over the last decade (see 
The results obtained show that the participating institutions would, overall, see their CET1 capital ratio increase slightly under the baseline 
scenario and decline by nearly 5 pp under the adverse scenario. The solvency of Spanish banks would change more favourably than the 
average for participating institutions in both exercises.
EUROPEAN BANKS SHOW STRONG RESILIENCE UNDER THE ADVERSE SCENARIO OF THE EBA STRESS TEST, 
WITH BETTER-THAN-AVERAGE RESILIENCE FOR SPANISH BANKS
Chart 2.18
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Chart 2.19.2). The extraordinary circumstances of 2020 and the necessary commitment 
to remote working created new opportunities for cybercriminals to exploit the growing 
reliance on communication networks. The three main types of cybersecurity incidents 
in 2020 were data kidnapping, data theft and server hacking. The banking sector is 
particularly susceptible to such attacks, as evidenced by it topping the ranking in terms 
of attack numbers for the fifth consecutive year. Guarding against these increasingly 
frequent and costly incidents entails banks implementing safeguards and mitigation 
measures. The immediate monetary costs stemming from cyber risk are highly 
uncertain. However, the total costs would be even greater and material, since the critical 
asset of customer confidence would be compromised.  
2.2 Non-bank financial sector and systemic interconnections
2.2.1  Non-bank financial sector
Specialised lending institutions
The	credit	extended	by	specialised	lending	institutions	(SLIs)	stabilised	in	the	
last 12 months, while NPLs declined and income statements recovered. In 
Operational risk losses have declined significantly since 2015, although the number of external fraud events has increased. Concern over the 
possible future impact of cyber risks is on a rising trajectory, as revealed by Google searches, although the scant data hinders any systematic 
measurement of their impact and cost.
OPERATIONAL RISK LOSSES HAVE DECLINED IN RECENT YEARS, BUT THERE IS GROWING CONCERN OVER THE FUTURE
COSTS OF CYBER RISKS
Chart 2.19
SOURCES: Google Trends and Banco de España.
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June 2021 the credit extended by SLIs to the resident private sector grew by 0.2% 
year-on-year, improving markedly on previous quarters. The consumer credit 
portfolio (a segment in which SLIs specialise) grew by 5.4% year-on-year, drawing 
close to pre-pandemic levels. NPLs declined sharply in the last 12 months (-13.1%), 
although much of that fall owed to the write-off of NPLs at a single institution. Thus, 
the NPL ratio in June 2021 stood at 6.5%, down 1 pp on the same month a year 
earlier. As with banks, the moderation of loan loss provisions has led to growth in 
profit after tax, in this case by 11.8%, increasing the ROA by 30 bp over the last 12 
months to 1.8% in June 2021. 
Insurance companies
In	 the	 insurance	 sector,	 profitability	 and	 solvency	 indicators	 were	 largely	
unchanged	in	2021	H1,	while	the	companies’	premiums	and	total	assets	both	
grew.27 Specifically, the volume of premiums increased by 5.5% as compared with 
the same period a year earlier, with stronger growth in life premiums (9.3%) than 
non-life premiums (3.4%). The overall saving managed by insurance companies 
increased by 3.2% as compared with the same period a year earlier.  
Investment funds
Investment	funds	domiciled	in	the	euro	area	recorded	net	capital	inflows	in	
2021	 H1.	 Inflows have steadily recovered since end-2020, coinciding with an 
improvement in economic expectations (see Chart 2.20.1), and rising returns in 
some segments, following the sharp outflows during the initial weeks of the 
pandemic in certain segments of the industry. This recovery has been intense, 
comfortably offsetting the outflows that took place at the onset of the crisis, with 
the exception of funds domiciled in Italy. Developments in capital flows differ 
across the various vehicles, with equity funds recording the strongest flows. 
Inflows have been more moderate for mixed funds, which invest in both fixed 
income and equity, and above all in bond and money market funds, with some 
jurisdictions even registering net capital outflows.
Spanish	investment	funds	tend	to	have	a	fixed-income	portfolio	with	shorter	
maturities	and	larger	liquidity	holdings	than	average	for	euro	area	funds. For 
the latter, the average maturity of fixed-income portfolios is around ten years, while 
that for funds domiciled in Spain is considerably shorter (around four and a half 
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years). The value of the exposures is therefore less sensitive to changes in interest 
rates (see Chart 2.20.2). Regarding these vehicles’ holdings of liquid assets 
(approximated through deposit and cash holdings as a percentage of the total), the 
values for funds domiciled in Spain (10.6%) are five times higher than for the euro 
area overall, although such holdings have declined slightly in the last two years for 
Spanish funds. Both the maturity and liquid asset holdings of Spanish funds appear 
to denote a liquidity risk profile below the average for euro area funds. However, this 
higher liquidity may come at the cost of lower profitability relative to funds in the euro 
area overall. Lastly, it should be noted that the Spanish financial system could be 
exposed to risks through funds not domiciled in Spain operating in global financial 
markets with significant cross-jurisdiction interconnections.
Pension funds
There has been a broad-based decline in net contributions to pension funds in the 
year to date, while their returns and total assets have risen. Despite the drop in net 
contributions, in June 2021 pension plan assets had increased by 10.9% as 
In recent months, net capital inflows into euro area investment funds have increased, essentially due to higher flows for equity funds. In the last 
year and half, the average maturity of these vehicles’ fixed-income portfolios has increased moderately, meaning the value of the funds’ exposures 
could be more sensitive to changes in interest rates. Holdings of highly liquid assets have declined slightly in the funds domiciled in Spain.
EURO AREA INVESTMENT FUND CAPITAL INFLOWS PERSISTED IN H1, WITH THE MATURITY OF THEIR FIXED-INCOME 
PORTFOLIOS RISING SLIGHTLY SINCE THE ONSET OF THE CRISIS
Chart 2.20
SOURCES: Refinitiv, Securities Holdings Statistics by Sector, ECB and Banco de España.
a Cumulative change in investment fund net capital inflows and outflows, as a percentage of the total net assets of the funds of each country on 
15 January 2020, drawing on a representative sample of funds domiciled in euro area countries. The data for days with atypical flow values are 
omitted. Data up to early-October  2021.
b Average maturity refers to the weighted average remaining maturity (in years) of long position bonds in investment fund portfolios (the weightings 
are the volume of holdings). The degree of liquidity of the holdings is measured as the ratio of deposits and cash held by the investment funds to 
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compared with the same month a year earlier, with H1 also showing growth (4.7% 
since December 2020). This increase reflects pension funds’ high annual average 
returns, which have climbed by 12.78 pp since June 2020 to stand at 11% in June 
2021. For their part, long-term returns (25 years) have held at around 3.4% in the last 
12 months.
2.2.2 Systemic interconnections 
The	 analysis	 of	 interconnections	 between	 different	 economic	 agents	 and	
markets	 helps	 identify	 potentially	 systemic	 vulnerabilities	 resulting	 from	
linkage	within	the	financial	sector	itself	or	with	the	non-financial	sector. This 
section analyses the banking sector’s direct exposure to other economic sectors 
and the indirect interconnections within the Spanish financial system through 
common holdings. 
The	 Spanish	 banking	 system’s	 total	 assets	 and	 liabilities	 vis-à-vis	 other	
resident	 and	 non-resident	 sectors	 increased	 slightly	 during	 the	 first	 few	
months	of	the	health	crisis.	In	the	case	of	assets,	this	was	followed	by	slight	
moderation over the subsequent quarters. The value of the banking sector’s 
assets vis-à-vis other sectors has held close to 190% of GDP since end-2019, with 
a temporary upturn around mid-2020 (see Chart 2.21.1). For the banking sector’s 
liabilities, which stand close to 180% of GDP, the increase recorded in mid-2020 
appears not to have reversed (see Chart 2.21.2). The distribution of the assets reveals 
relatively uniform exposure to households and NFCs and smaller exposure to general 
government. Box 2.3 analyses these exposures to the public sector in greater depth; 
whose contribution to the risks of the banking sector during the COVID-19 crisis is 
very different to that during the global financial crisis. However, on the liability side 
exposures to households (essentially deposits) predominate. It should also be noted 
that the banking sector’s assets vis-à-vis investment funds, insurance companies 
and pension funds are far lower (less than 1% of GDP) than those held with non-
financial sectors and other financial sectors (19% of GDP).28 The liabilities held by 
banks vis-à-vis insurance companies, investment funds and pension funds stand 
close to 2%, 4% and 1% of GDP, respectively, throughout the period. International 
exposures are significant, with similar shares for assets (51% of GDP) and liabilities 
(48% of GDP).
Banks’	 indirect	 interconnectedness	 with	 other	 resident	 financial	 sectors,	
measured	via	common	securities	holdings,	is	largely	unchanged	relative	to	the	
pre-pandemic	 situation,	 while	 that	 of	 other	 financial	 sectors	 has	 declined	
28	 	Other	 financial	 sectors	 include	 specialised	 lending	 institutions	 and	 financial	monetary	 institutions	 other	 than	
insurance	 companies,	 investment	 funds	 and	 pension	 funds	 (such	 as:	 financial	 auxiliaries,	 captive	 financial	
institutions	and	money	lenders	and	other	financial	intermediaries).	
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somewhat.29,30 The interconnections between the banking sector and other 
financial sectors were highly stable between December 2019 and June 2021, 
except for a slight decline in interconnectedness with investment funds (see Chart 
2.22). However, there has been a more evident reduction in interconnectedness 
between investment and pension funds and other financial sectors. This reduction 
comes alongside a compositional change, with increased interconnectedness 
through high credit quality assets (AAA to AA-) and unrated assets, and reduced 
interconnectedness through exposures of intermediate credit quality (A+ to A-). 
There has also been a broad-based decline in indirect interconnections between 
29	 	The	common	holdings	refer,	for	instance,	to	the	same	holdings	of	a	bank	and	an	insurance	of	debt	securities	




billion	 for	pension	 funds.	These	amounts	 represent	around	24%	of	 individual	 financial	assets	 for	 the	banking	
sector	 and	 80%	 for	 the	 resident	 non-bank	 financial	 sectors	 considered	 in	 this	 analysis	 (investment	 funds,	
insurance	companies	and	pension	funds).
At June 2021, exposure to the resident non-financial sector predominated on the asset side (123% of GDP), while exposure to resident 
financial institutions was limited to 19% of GDP. On the liability side, the resident non-financial sector accounted for a somewhat lower share 
(116% of GDP), and in addition to liabilities vis-à-vis other financial sectors (17% of GDP, 1 pp higher than pre-crisis) there are relevant 
liabilities vis-à-vis insurance companies and investment and pension funds (combined share of 7% of GDP, 0.2 pp higher than pre-crisis). The 
international exposures are relevant, with similar shares for assets (51% of GDP) and liabilities (48% of GDP).
THE LEVEL AND STRUCTURE OF BANKS' DIRECT INTERCONNECTIONS WITH OTHER SECTORS THROUGH THEIR ASSETS 
AND LIABILITIES HAVE NOT BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY ALTERED BY THE CRISIS (a)
Chart 2.21
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Individual data, presented as a percentage of 2019 GDP.
b The “other financial sectors” category includes specialised lending institutions and non-monetary financial institutions other than insurance 
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insurance companies and other financial sectors, albeit far more moderate and 
with smaller compositional changes.  
The common holdings of various financial intermediaries are concentrated in high credit quality bonds. As was the case in previous periods, 
common holdings represent a lower proportion of total assets for banks than for other financial intermediaries.
A SLIGHT DECLINE IS OBSERVED IN THE FINANCIAL SECTORS' COMMON HOLDINGS, ESPECIALLY INVESTMENT 
AND PENSION FUNDS (a)
Chart 2.22
SOURCES: Securities Holding Statistics by Sector and Refinitiv.
a Each column represents one financial sector’s common holdings with another, as a proportion of the former’s total securities portfolio, with the 
different rating segments identified. For each financial sector, the share of common holdings with each of the other three is shown at 2019 Q4 and 
2021 Q2. For example, the first column shows that, at 2019 Q4, the common holdings between banks and investment funds represented 47% of 
the banking sector’s total securities portfolio. Of these, approximately 11% have ratings on the cusp of investment-grade (BBB+ to BBB-). Taken 
into account are the market value of the holdings reported by the institutions (or, if applicable, the fair value) and the long positions in the portfolio 
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IMPACT OF THE PUBLIC GUARANTEE SCHEME ON LENDING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FIRMS AND BANKS 
The main aim of the ICO guarantee scheme, set in place 
under successive Royal Decrees (RDL 8/2020, RDL 
25/2020 and RDL 34/2020), is to enable firms1 to draw on 
the funds needed to deal with the fall-out of the crisis 
brought about by the sudden emergence of COVID-19. 
While such guarantees have had great success in 
providing liquidity to prop up and ensure firms’ survival 
during the initial phases of the crisis,2 their effects will be 
felt beyond 2020. Thus, this scheme may have longer-
term consequences – analysed in this box – for the lending 
relationships between non-financial corporations and the 
banking sector. In particular, the characteristics of the 
firms and banks involved in ICO transactions are analysed, 
and the impact of the ICO scheme on the level and 
structure of banking relationships.
Firm-bank characteristics associated with the granting 
of ICO loans
To analyse the likelihood of a firm receiving an ICO-backed 
loan, all firm-bank pairings on the Banco de España’s 
Central Credit Register (CCR) in respect of new financing 
transactions arranged between March and December 
2020 are identified. Firm-bank pairings in respect of new 
financing transactions requested by firms in that same 
period from banks with which they had no prior relationship 
have been added to this group. The database also 
includes all banking relationships at December 2019 
involving the firms that have obtained and/or requested 
funding identified in the two preceding steps. Lastly, the 
database is completed with economic and financial 
information on this set of firms at end-2019, drawing on 
the Banco de España’s Central Balance Sheet Data Office 
(CBSO) and using figures from banks’ end-2019 balance 
sheets and income statements taken from their regulatory 
reporting to the Banco de España. As a result, the group 
of firms that have actively sought funding is identified, and 
their associated structure of pre-existing banking 
relationships and the characteristics of the lending banks. 
Drawing on all this information, a linear probability model 
is estimated to ascertain which variables have most 
influence (and with what outcome) on the likelihood of a 
firm having received an ICO-backed loan between March 
and December 2020.3 The firm-specific explanatory 
variables include size, ex-ante credit risk score based on 
firms’ financial ratios, and economic sector indicators and 
postcode. The bank-specific explanatory variables 
include their size, capital ratio, profitability, and liquidity 
and NPL ratios. Lastly, the closeness of the firm-bank 
relationship is measured according to each bank’s share 
of a firm’s overall bank borrowing.4
As can be seen in Chart 1, the characteristics of firms 
most likely to have been granted ICO guarantees are size 
(being an SME increases their chances by 28.5%), level 
of ex-ante risk (the chances increase by 10.1% for each 
standard deviation by which the score decreases) or 
belonging to a sector affected by the pandemic (increase 
of 11.1%). Larger banks, those with more liquid assets, 
with a higher NPL ratio or lower profitability are also 
associated with a greater likelihood of an ICO guarantee 
being granted (increasing, respectively, by 30.7%, 5.6%, 
7.9% and 7.5% for each standard variation by which the 
explanatory variable worsens). Moreover, the closer the 
prior banking relationship (measured by the share of 
financing), the higher the probability (increase of 10.7% 
per standard deviation). These results are confirmed 
where the analysis is limited to firms that have 
relationships with several banks, including fixed firm-
specific effects. It is thus possible to fully control for firm 
characteristics, including demand for financing.5
1	 	The	analysis	uses	accounting	and	financial	ratios	of	firms	in	2019	and	is	thus	restricted	to	non-financial	corporations	(referred	to	generally	as	firms	in	
the	rest	of	the	box),	excluding	sole	proprietors.
2	 	See,	for	example,	Alves	et	al.	(2020),	Recent	developments	in	financing	and	bank	lending	to	the	non-financial	sector, Analytical Article, Economic 
Bulletin	4/2020,	Banco	de	España,	in	particular	Box	1,	and	R.	Blanco,	S.	Mayordomo,	Á.	Menéndez	and	M.	Mulino	(2020),	Spanish	non-financial	
corporations’	liquidity	needs	and	solvency	after	the	COVID-19	shock, Occasional Paper No 2020, Banco de España. 
3	 The	dependent	variable	of	the	analysis	takes	the	value	of	1	in	the	observations	where	an	ICO	loan	has	effectively	been	obtained	over	this	period.	By	











IMPACT OF THE PUBLIC GUARANTEE SCHEME ON LENDING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FIRMS AND BANKS (cont’d)
Impact of the ICO guarantee scheme on the level and 
structure of bank-firm financing relationships
The impact of the ICO guarantee scheme on the 
closeness of bank-firm financing relationships was also 
analysed, and the extent to which the continuation of 
such relationships has depended on the use of ICO-
backed loans. To this end, a difference-in-differences 
analysis was conducted, comparing (for each firm-bank 
pairing) changes in their share of financing between 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Each bar denotes the relative change in the average probability of a non-financial corporation having received at least one ICO-backed loan between 
March and December 2020 as the variable indicated in the x axis increases, from a standard deviation if it is continuous or shifting from zero to one if 
it is discrete (Firms SMEs, Firms Sector most affected). For this calculation a linear probability model was estimated using CCR data, cross-matched 
with CBB data on firms, and bank data extracted from their regulatory reporting to the Banco de España at end-2019. Firms' ex-ante risk is captured 
with a variable obtained from a scoring model, calculated based on a high number of its financial ratios. The severely affected sectors by the crisis are 
defined as those whose turnover decreased by more than 15% in 2020. Bank size is measured in terms of the logarithm of total assets.
b Each bar denotes the impact (in percentage points) that a bank's arranging with a firm at least one ICO-backed loan between December 2019 and 
June 2021 has on the change in the share of financing of the bank and the firm between those dates, estimated using a difference-indifferences 
model drawing on CCR, CBB and regulatory reporting data.
c Each bar denotes the impact (in percentage points) that a bank's arranging with a firm at least one ICO-backed loan between December 2019 and 
June 2021 has on the change in the share of financing of the bank and the firm between those dates, according to the residual maturity (in months) 
of the firm's pre-existing loans with the bank at December 2019. The bank's share of the firm's total financing and its share of financing without ICO 
guarantees are considered. The impact has been estimated using a difference-in-differences model drawing on CCR, CBB and regulatory reporting 
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IMPACT OF THE GRANTING OF AN ICO-BACKED LOAN ON THE SHARE OF THE FIRM'S 
FINANCING WITH THE LENDING BANK (b)
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IMPACT OF THE PUBLIC GUARANTEE SCHEME ON LENDING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FIRMS AND BANKS (cont’d)
December 2019 and June 2021. This share is defined as 
the amount of loans obtained from each bank as a 
proportion of the bank funding the firm obtains. Two 
definitions of this share are analysed, for firms’ total bank 
funding and for financing excluding ICO-backed loans. In 
the terminology used in this type of study, firms with some 
type of ICO-backed loan during the period studied make 
up the treatment or study group, while all other observations 
make up the control group.6 As in the previous section, the 
characteristics of the firms and the lending banks are also 
taken into account.
Chart 2 shows that the grant of an ICO-backed loan by a 
bank to a firm is associated with a reduction in that bank’s 
share of bank loans without an ICO guarantee which that firm 
receives. Specifically, the change in the share of financing in 
loans without an ICO guarantee from December 2019 to 
June 2021 is 4.7 percentage points (pp) lower on average in 
this case. This effect is even more pronounced (8.1 pp lower) 
when the sample is restricted to firms with more than two 
bank relationships. When the impact of granting an ICO-
backed loan on the bank’s share of the firm’s total financing 
(including the financing guaranteed) is analysed, the opposite 
effect is observed: the change when an ICO-backed loan is 
granted is 14.6 pp higher for the total sample. Once again, 
the impact is greater (17.1 pp higher) when the sample is 
restricted to firms operating with more than one bank.
These results suggest that granting ICO-backed loans 
makes the overall firm-bank relationship closer, although it 
weakens when only the group of loans without public 
guarantees is considered. Consequently, it may be 
concluded that the granting of an ICO-backed loan is 
associated with different loan supply behaviour by the 
lending bank, which seeks to reinforce its relationship with 
the firm, but via loans with guarantees, reducing its 
exposure through other transactions.
As regards financing without an ICO guarantee, the 
above-mentioned reduction in share has been particularly 
sharp among firms with short residual bank debt 
maturities at end-2019. This suggests that banks and 
firms have replaced loans that have matured or are close 
to maturity with new ICO-guaranteed loans (see Chart 3). 
The fall in the share of financing without an ICO guarantee 
is also sharper for firms with a greater ex-ante risk, 
belonging to sectors hardest hit by the pandemic, and 
for banksthat had lower capital ratios at the start of the 
crisis. As regards the share of total financing, which 
includes ICO-backed loans, the presence of short 
residual maturities at December 2019 is associated with 
a more positive change (owing to the granting of new 
ICO-backed loans), albeit to a lesser extent for firms with 




Royal Decree-Law 34/2020 entered into force in November 
2020. This amended the ICO guarantee programme 
(established under Royal Decree-Law 8/2020 and 
amended by Royal Decree-Law 25/2020), with a view to 
staving off liquidity problems at firms by permitting, in 
certain cases, the extension of maturities and of payment 
holidays. As Box 2.1 discusses, the programme has 
smoothed the provision of liquidity to the corporate sector 
during the pandemic. It has been used most intensively by 
firms with higher ex-ante credit risk and by banks with 
weaker balance sheets prior to the onset of the crisis. 
However, to gain a proper understanding of the risks to 
financial stability, the implications of the legislative changes 
introduced in November 2020 (through Royal Decree-Law 
34/2020) must be analysed. These legislative changes 
allow debtors with an ICO-backed loan to extend, by 
agreement with the bank, the loan maturity to eight years 
from the previous maximum of five. They also provide for 
an additional extension of a debtor’s payment holiday by 
up to 12 months, to a maximum of 24 months. Further, this 
new maturity can be directly applied to guarantees granted 
pursuant to Royal Decree-Law 25/2020 of 3 July 2020. 
This box aims to study firms’ take-up of the option to 
extend maturities and payment holidays.
The analysis shows that the average maturity of 
outstanding ICO-backed loans increased from March 
2021 and peaked in April 2021. A similar trend is evident 
for the average duration of payment holidays (see Chart 1). 
These developments may be picking up a composition 
effect (if new loans have longer maturities than loans) or 
that existing loans were taking the opportunity to extend 
maturities or payment holidays. The analysis of existing 
loans identifies effective recourse to the maturity extension 
envisaged in the legislative change introduced by Royal 
Decree-Law 34/2020. This came into effect from March 
2021, when the maturity extension was applied to 6.5% of 
loans (of these, 3.8% had the maturity extended alone 
and 2.7% both the maturity and the payment holiday 
extended), while 0.8% had the payment holiday extended 
only. Overall, in March 2021, 7.3% of loans took advantage 
of the legislative change. This percentage climbed to 
20.4% in May 2021 and subsequently declined to less 
than 1% in June. Thus, 41% of ICO-backed loans have 
made use of the maturity or payment holiday extension, 
which underlines the measure’s importance. The high 
number of firms taking advantage of the extensions may 
signal a latent risk, which could potentially materialise 
from 2022 Q2 (when most payment holidays come to an 
Box	2.2
RECOURSE TO MATURITY AND PAYMENT HOLIDAY EXTENSIONS UNDER THE PUBLIC GUARANTEE PROGRAMME FOR 
LOANS TO FIRMS  
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The right-hand scale shows the average residual maturity (in months) of outstanding ICO-backed loans at each date and the average payment period 
(in months) of outstanding loans with payment holidays at each date. Outstanding loans include both pre-existing and new loans. The left-hand scale 
indicates the percentage of ICO-backed loans whose maturity or payment holiday has been extended, out of those that were outstanding in the 
previous month.
b Results of a linear probability model with binary variables for sector, post code and bank controls. The risk variable is the firm’s Z-score, calculated 
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Box	2.2
RECOURSE TO MATURITY AND PAYMENT HOLIDAY EXTENSIONS UNDER THE PUBLIC GUARANTEE PROGRAMME FOR 
LOANS TO FIRMS (cont’d) 
end) should the prospects of economic recovery fail to 
take root.
The study of decisions to extend maturities and payment 
holidays is based on all guaranteed loans obtained from 
the Banco de España’s Central Credit Register (CCR). 
Those data are complemented, at the firm level, by data 
drawn from the Banco de España’s Central Balance Sheet 
Data Office (CBSO) and, at the bank level, from the 
institutions’ regulatory reporting, in both cases relating to 
end-2019. This dataset is subject to an econometric 
analysis to assess the probability of an existing guaranteed 
loan taking advantage of Royal Decree-Law 34/2020 to 
extend either its maturity or payment holiday. Specifically, 
the estimates of a linear probability model (see Chart 2) 
indicate that the probability of extending the maturity 
or payment holiday is higher for loans with an existing 
payment holiday (95.4% higher than those without, 
indicating the complimentary use of these measures to 
defer payments). Bearing in mind the very widespread 
recourse to payment holidays, the relative importance of 
firm-level factors is comparatively lower. Thus, belonging 
to one of the sectors hardest hit by the pandemic increases 
this probability by 7.3%, while firms with higher ex-ante 
credit risk show an increase of 10% for each standard 
deviation decrease in the score. There is no overall pattern 
regarding the characteristics of the banks that have 
assented to these arrangements, and therefore their use 
appears prevalent across the banks.
The analysis of recourse to maturity and payment holiday 
extensions for ICO-backed loans suggests strong 
demand. Said demand is higher for loans with an existing 
payment holiday and for firms facing greater difficulties. 
The results indicate an improvement in the firms’ liquidity 
profile, with the subsequent easing of short-term risks. 
However, they reinforce the importance of closely 
monitoring these loans during the recovery period, to 
ensure that any materialisation of risks to financial stability 
is detected at an early juncture.
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In certain contexts, the existence of a high number of 
financial interconnections between banks and the public 
sector may pose risks to financial stability. The 
interconnections exist primarily because banks are 
typically significant holders of government debt securities 
and, furthermore, fiscal intervention is perceived as being 
the last resort in the event the banking sector faces 
solvency problems. Potential banking system or sovereign 
problems may result in a doom loop. The doom loop 
between the banking system and the sovereign 
materialised directly following the global financial crisis 
and in the subsequent sovereign debt crisis of 2012 which 
affected several European countries. In the wake of the 
global pandemic, the ICO guarantees represent an 
interconnection shared by banks and the public sector 
with the corporate sector.1 This box aims to describe how 
these nexus work and review the materiality of the risk to 
the Spanish banking system stemming from the 
interconnections with the sovereign after the outbreak of 
the global pandemic.
The sovereign-bank nexus can create feedback loops 
through two fundamental channels, as shown in Figure 1, 
which are separate from the indirect nexus with the non-
financial corporate sector.2 First, problems in the banking 
system spread to the sovereign when the latter is expected 
to bail out a bank. Here, the expected budgetary cost 
associated with the bail-out increases the sovereign’s 
financing costs. Second, a drop in the price of sovereign 
debt impairs banks’ sovereign debt holdings on their 
balance sheets. This is particularly pronounced when 
these holdings are significant and are mostly measured at 
market value. This spillover from the sovereign to banks 
drives up the cost of bank financing. Consequently, 
lending by the banking system contracts, generating a 
tightened “liquidity channel” (see Bocola (2016))3. 
In both cases there may be feedback loops, as higher 
financing costs for the sovereign have an adverse effect on 
banks’ balance sheets as holders of sovereign debt, and 
vice versa. In addition, the widespread increase in financing 
costs reduces economic growth. This has adverse 
implications both for the quality of banks’ balance sheets 
and for government budget balances.
Banks’ government debt holdings are key in the sovereign-
bank nexus. These holdings are justified, among other 
reasons, due to banks’ need to hold liquid assets on their 
balance sheets; government debt tends to be the safest 
and most liquid asset on the financial markets. Indeed, 
general government debt holdings account for the largest 
share of Spanish banks’ debt securities (see Chart 1). 
Spanish banks’ exposure to sovereign risk through these 
holdings has remained relatively stable since December 
2019 (between 9.1% and 10.5% of total consolidated 
assets). This contrasts with the sharp rise in bank lending 
to the private sector during the initial phases of the 
pandemic. 
As a percentage of total assets, Spanish banks’ holdings 
of Spanish sovereign debt are greater than those of 
French and German banks, but smaller than those of 
Italian banks. However, it should be noted that Spanish 
and Italian banks’ greater exposure largely originated 
from the global financial crisis. This is particularly true in 
the case of Spanish banks. Indeed, during the years 
leading up to the pandemic, the Spanish banking sector 
had gradually reduced its exposure to the Spanish 
sovereign. The COVID-19 crisis disrupted this trend, albeit 
without increasing exposure, as occurred during the 
global financial crisis (see Chart 3). Specifically, the main 
Spanish banks’ holdings of government debt, as a 
percentage of total assets, fell slightly during the 
pandemic. The decrease was greater in fair-value debt 
holdings, which are those that create greater exposure to 
the doom loop, as their valuation is updated automatically 
on the basis of debt market fluctuations (see Chart 4). 
This trend is similar to that of other euro area banking 
systems, except Italy, where these holdings have risen.  
Finally, in the wake of the global pandemic, the corporate 
sector’s financial problems could become central to the 
Box	2.3
THE SOVEREIGN-BANK NEXUS
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Box	2.3
THE SOVEREIGN-BANK NEXUS (cont`d)
sovereign-bank nexus owing to the loan guarantee scheme 
for firms established by the ICO. Indeed, the policies 
implemented to channel credit to the corporate sector 
through ICO guarantees has led to an increase in the 
sovereign’s contingent liabilities. The volume of ICO-backed 
lending to the corporate sector was close to 9% of GDP in 
June 2021, almost doubling the previous year’s figure. This 
means that the banking sector would be less exposed to the 
potential impairment of loans to the corporate sector, since 
the public guarantees cover a significant portion of its loan 
portfolio. Specifically, loans with ICO guarantees account for 
25% of total lending to the corporate sector and are 
equivalent to 40% of bank capital. However, an adverse 
shock to the sovereign would eventually affect the banking 
sector, through the feedback loop described above. 
Economic policy action can significantly mitigate the 
risks of the sovereign-bank nexus. In the current context, 
the ECB’s monetary policy response to the COVID-19 
crisis, and other support measures implemented by the 
economic authorities, have all contributed to preventing 
them from materialising. Thus, low interest rates, 
liquidity facilities, including the launch of a new TLTRO 
programme and the asset purchase programmes have 
all kept the sovereign risk premium in check, despite the 
increase in government debt, and banks’ funding needs 
have been satisfactorily met in a situation of marked 
economic downturn. These measures have also helped 
reduce the impairment of debtors’ credit quality and the 
contraction in lending by banks, thus avoiding further 
deterioration of the economy and banking solvency.  
However, the notable support provided by monetary policy is 
not without its risks. Many of these derive from a low interest 
rate environment potentially eroding certain elements of bank 
profitability.4 Low profitability in the banking sector poses 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The flowchart illustrates how an adverse shock to the financial valuation of the banking sector or the sovereign is transmitted to the other sector 
through different interconnection channels. The initial shock can originate from multiple sources, such as the materialisation of the costs of imbalances 
in the growth of lending in the banking sector, or an adverse shock to the sovereign's tax revenues.
Sovereign -> banking sector transmission channels
— Higher financing cost for the sovereign
— Increased risk perception
— Impairment of sovereign debt held as assets by     
the banking system
— Reduced lending 
— Lower revenue generated by the banking sector
— Downgraded credit quality of agents whose credit     
rating is poorer than the sovereign's
Adverse shock, 
sovereign
Adverse shock, banking 
sector
Banking sector -> sovereign transmission channels
— Expectations of a bank bail-out trigger a drop
in the price of sovereign debt
— Budgetary imbalance due to the cost of a bail-out
— Lower tax revenues due to the contraction in     
lending 
— Downturn in economic activity
Figure  1
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Box	2.3
THE SOVEREIGN-BANK NEXUS (cont`d)
risks to financial stability, through various channels. First, it 
can encourage the search for greater yields by the banking 
sector, by raising or underestimating the risk profile of 
investments. This effect may be magnified as low profitability 
reduces the market value of banks, which discourages 
shareholders from properly assessing the risks.5 Lastly, low 
profitability limits the growth capacity of capital and, therefore, 
of the solvency ratio.
The risks associated with the sovereign-bank nexus are 
therefore very different in an environment of low interest 
rates and GDP growth (persistent, more related to the 
generation and accumulation of interest income) from 
those prevailing during a period of a severe banking or 
sovereign crisis (concentrated in the short term, more 
related to financing costs and loan loss provisions and the 
materialisation of risks).
SOURCES: Banco de España, Instituto de Crédito Oficial, SDW and European Banking Authority.
a Consolidated data. Total deposit institutions.
b Individual data. Sovereign debt refers only to debt securities issued by the sovereign.
c Consolidated data. Total sovereign exposure as a percentage of total assets for the sample of banks reporting for each jurisdiction to the EBA 
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DISTRIBUTION OF SOVEREIGN EXPOSURES AS A % OF TOTAL ASSETS, BY 
COUNTRY (c)
5	 See	S.	Advjiev	and	J.	M.	Serena	(2020),	“Regulatory	capital,	market	capital	and	risk	taking	in	international	bank	lending”,	BIS Working Paper	No	912.	
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Box	2.3
THE SOVEREIGN-BANK NEXUS (cont`d)
In short, the COVID-19 crisis has not entailed any 
significant changes for Spanish banks’ exposure to 
Spanish sovereign risk, and the risk considerations 
identified in pre-pandemic years and associated with the 
low interest rate environment, which are very different from 
the doom-loop dynamics of the 2012 sovereign debt crisis, 
continue to take priority. However, the increase in public 
indebtedness and the important role played by the ICO 
guarantee schemes are an indication of potential 
vulnerabilities that need to be monitored going forward.
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This chapter analyses the various vulnerability and systemic risk indicators, focusing 
in particular on those used in decisions concerning the countercyclical capital buffer 
(CCyB). This analysis suggests that market risk has risen to some extent recently, 
but that it remains contained. The indicators of credit imbalances do not show 
warning signals either, although close monitoring is needed of the correction of 
those that exceeded the risk thresholds during the initial phases of the pandemic on 
account of the sharp fall in GDP. The chapter goes on to review various recent 
regulatory developments and macroprudential measures relevant to financial 
stability. Overall, significant activity is under way on this front, with the implementation 
of reforms agreed before the pandemic and of new initiatives stemming from the 
lessons learned in this crisis and in response to the rise of emerging risks (e.g. those 
associated with digitalisation, new technologies and climate change). 
3.1 Analysis of risk indicators and systemic vulnerabilities
Although	the	tension	unleashed	in	the	financial	markets	by	the	outbreak	of	the	
pandemic	had	been	almost	completely	corrected	throughout	2021,	it	has	risen	
slightly	 since	August,	 prompted	by	higher	 volatility. The systemic risk indicator 
(SRI)1 increased sharply during the financial market turmoil between February and 
March 2020. It then moved onto a sustained downward path from April 2020, returning 
to almost its pre-turmoil level by end-2020 (see Chart 3.1.1). However, since August 2021 
the SRI has risen slightly, owing to heightened volatility in the four segments of the 
Spanish financial market,2 particularly in the equity segment. This higher financial 
market volatility is not unique to Spain, but is widespread in the international markets, 
in a setting in which investors are starting to factor in the possible withdrawal of part of 
the main central banks’ monetary stimuli. Overall, this evidence suggests that market 
risks are currently significant and need close monitoring.
The	 SRISK	 indicator,	 which	 measures	 banks’	 strength	 vis-à-vis	 adverse	
systemic	shocks,	saw	a	notable	 improvement	 in	2021 H1	and	has	stabilised	
since the summer. SRISK3 quantifies the systemic importance of individual banks 
and the banking sector overall, since it assesses and aggregates the impact of an 
extreme negative market event on each bank. This latent risk indicator provides 
1	 	For	a	detailed	explanation	of	the	SRI	calculation	methodology,	see	Box 1.1	of	the	May 2013	FSR.
2	 	Money	market,	government	debt,	equity	and	financial	intermediaries.
3	 	See	C.	Brownlees	and	R.	Engle	(2017)	“SRISK:	A	conditional	capital	shortfall	measure	of	systemic	risk”,	The Review 
of Financial Studies Vol.	30,	pp.	48-79.
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an estimate of a bank’s expected capital shortfall after a hypothetical severe crisis 
in equity markets entailing a correction of its market capitalisation. The changes 
in this indicator since mid-2020 suggest a gradual decline in systemic risk in the 
banking sector, although it is still above pre-pandemic levels (see Chart  3.1.2). 
The improvement in this indicator has slowed down since July 2021, consistent 
with the signs of financial market volatility captured by the SRI.
The	recovery	in	economic	activity	has	helped	correct	part	of	the	imbalances	
in the credit-to-GDP gap and the output gap that arose during the pandemic. 
The credit-to-GDP gap, which is one of the main indicators guiding the setting of the 
CCyB during expansionary phases of the credit cycle, widened considerably after 
the outbreak of the pandemic. As mentioned in previous FSRs,4 in the context of the 
crisis prompted by the pandemic, this widening should not be interpreted as an early 
4  See FSR Spring 2021.
Having held at very relaxed levels since end-2020, the SRI has risen since August 2021 due to heightened volatility in the financial markets, 
particularly in the equity segment. Banks' systemic risk, measured by the SRISK indicator, has decreased over 2021, in line with the 
favourable performance of the markets, although the progression of the improvement appears to have stabilised.
THE SYSTEMIC RISK INDICATOR (SRI) HAS RISEN SINCE AUGUST 2021 AND THE IMPROVEMENT IN BANK SYSTEMIC
RISK HAS SLOWED SOMEWHAT. HOWEVER, BOTH METRICS REMAIN VERY FAR FROM THE 2020 STRESS LEVELS
Chart 3.1
SOURCES: Datastream, SNL, Instituto Nacional de Estadística and Banco de España.
a The systemic risk indicator (SRI) aggregates 12 individual stress indicators (volatilities, interest rate spreads, maximum historical losses, etc.) from different 
segments of the Spanish financial system. In calculating the SRI, the effect of cross-correlations is taken into account, whereby the SRI registers higher 
values if the correlation between the four markets is high, and lower values where there is less or negative correlation. For a detailed explanation of this 
indicator, see Box 1.1 of the May 2013 Financial Stability Report. Data updated as at 20 October 2021.
b SRISK captures the additional capital for covering bank capital requirements at market value when faced with a significant market shock, expressed as a 
percentage of each institution's total assets. The parameters used are k=4.5% for the capital requirement, C=10% for the market decline and h=22 business 
days for the period over which the hypothetical decline occurs, see Brownlees and Engle (2017) for further details. The SRISK index for the months of 2021 
Q3 is calculated from the values of assets and liabilities of 2021 Q2 with the stock prices data of the corresponding month. The series have been smoothed 
using a three-month moving average. Compared with the results published in the Spring 2021 Financial Stability Report, the sample of European banks has 
been extended to include smaller institutions.
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warning of the emergence of a cyclical imbalance. It is simply the consequence of 
the sharp drop in GDP (the denominator in the credit-to-GDP ratio) in 2020 and of the 
measures to support the provision of credit to the economy. The information 
available for 2021 Q2 shows a significant correction in the credit-to-GDP gap for 
the first time since the onset of the pandemic (see Chart 3.2.1). This change in trend 
owes chiefly to the rebound in GDP growth, although this only partially offsets the 
deterioration built up since 2020. Meanwhile, credit (the ratio’s numerator) has 
stabilised in recent quarters, after having risen significantly since 2020  Q2. 
Consequently, the partial correction of the widening of the credit-to-GDP gap in 
2021 Q2 is a positive signal that the imbalances seen in this variable since mid-2020 
may be temporary. Nevertheless, this indicator remains above the reference 
threshold of 2 pp, beyond which the gap is considered to show signs of imbalance 
in the credit cycle. It will therefore be important to monitor how the correction of 
this warning signal progresses over the coming quarters.
The	rebound	in	GDP	growth	has	also	contributed	to	a	favourable	performance	
of	other	macroeconomic	 indicators. In particular, the negative output gap has 
begun to narrow, with the upward trend observed since late 2020 gaining momentum. 
In line with the expectations of recovery, this favourable trend is set to progress 
substantially over the coming quarters. Nevertheless, it remains at significantly 
negative values that are far from pre-pandemic levels (see Chart 3.2.1). 
Indicators	of	house	price	imbalances	suggest	that	such	prices	stand	above,	
but	 very	 close	 to,	 their	 equilibrium	 levels. It is essential that possible price 
imbalances in the real estate market be analysed, because the situation in this 
market has a particular impact on the credit cycle, as it can amplify the cycle through 
mortgage loans and loans to the construction sector and to real estate activities. 
The Banco de España regularly analyses a series of indicators of house price 
imbalances that measure the difference between the average price index and their 
estimated long-term equilibrium level, provided by various econometric models. As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, all the indicators are currently close to equilibrium levels, 
with no signs of overvaluation (see Chart 3.2.2). Nevertheless, these indicators have 
risen since the run-up to the outbreak of the pandemic. Thus, while in 2019 they 
tended to be negative but close to equilibrium levels, they now tend to be positive 
but, again, close to equilibrium. It will therefore be important to monitor these 
indicators closely as well, to determine whether they stabilise at their current values 
or begin to rise to warning levels.
Since	the	outbreak	of	the	pandemic,	notable	differences	have	been	observed	
in	new	loans	to	households	and	firms	and	in	the	contribution	of	supply	and	
demand-side	 factors	 to	changes	 therein,	which	were	of	opposite	signs	 in	
2021 H1. Drawing on econometric models, changes in new loans to households 
and firms can be broken down into estimated supply and demand-side factors. 
The estimates from these models show that the significant decline in new loans to 
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households in 2020 Q2 owed mainly to lower demand. This situation reversed swiftly 
in 2020 H2 and, even more so, in 2021 H1, when such lending rose sharply, further 
underpinned by supply-side factors (see Chart  3.3.1). New lending to firms grew 
notably in 2020  Q2, owing to supply-side and, to a lesser extent, demand-side 
factors. This reflects, on the one hand, firms’ demand for liquidity due to the abrupt 
fall in their income and, on the other, the pick-up in supply facilitated by the guarantee 
schemes and other support measures adopted in response to the pandemic. 
However, this type of lending has declined since 2020 Q3, owing to the decrease in 
both demand and supply, which could point to the waning stimulation capacity of 
the support schemes (see Chart 3.3.2). These findings are consistent with the Bank 
Lending Survey for 2021 Q2, which suggests that concern about non-performing 
loans has led the supply of credit to firms to tighten somewhat in 2021  H1 as a 
The information available for 2021 Q2 shows a significant correction in indicators such as the credit-to-GDP gap and credit intensity. This 
recovery owes chiefly to the rebound in GDP growth, which has not yet reached its pre-pandemic level but is beginning to move closer to its 
potential. The credit-to-GDP gap remains above the reference threshold of 2 pp and should therefore be carefullly monitored in the coming 
months for potential signs of imbalances in the credit cycle.
INDICATORS SUCH AS THE CREDIT-TO-GDP GAP AND CREDIT INTENSITY HAVE UNDERGONE CORRECTIONS AS A
RESULT OF THE REBOUND IN ECONOMIC GROWTH, WHICH IS BEGINNING TO MOVE CLOSER TO ITS POTENTIAL, BUT
HAS NOT YET REACHED ITS PRE-PANDEMIC LEVEL (a)
Chart 3.2
SOURCES: Instituto Nacional de Estadística and Banco de España.
a The areas shaded in grey represent the periods of the two financial crises in Spain since 2009: the systemic banking crisis (2009 Q1 to 2013 Q4) 
and the crisis unleashed by the COVID-19 pandemic (2020 Q1 to 2021 Q2).
b The output gap is the percentage difference between observed GDP and potential GDP. Values calculated at constant 2010 prices. See P. 
Cuadrado and E. Moral-Benito (2016) "Potential growth of the Spanish economy", Occasional Paper 1603, Banco de España. The credit-to-GDP 
gap is calculated as the difference, in percentage points, between the observed ratio and the long-term trend calculated using a statistical 
one-sided Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter equal to 25,000. This parameter is calibrated to the financial cycles historically 
observed in Spain. See J. E. Galán (2019) "Measuring credit-to- GDP gaps. The Hodrick-Prescott filter revisited", Occasional Paper 1906, Banco 
de España. Data available up to June 2021. The broken red horizontal line represents the reference CCyB activation threshold of 2 pp for the 
credit-to-GDP gap.
c The area shaded in blue represents the minimum and maximum values of the four indicators of imbalances in house prices. The indicators are: 
i) the real house price gap, ii) the house prices to household disposable income ratio gap, iii) the ordinary least squares model which estimates 
house prices based on long-term trends in household disposable income and mortgage interest rates, and iv) the error correction model which 
estimates house prices based on household disposable income, mortgage interest rates and fiscal effects. The long-term trends are calculated 
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whole. In any event, this effect may be temporary, as the latest data suggest that the 
supply of credit to firms is stabilising.5
Taking	this	set	of	macro-financial	indicators	into	account,	the	Banco	de	España	
has	maintained	the	CCyB	rate	at	0%	and	does	not	envisage	increasing	it	until	
economic	 activity	 has	 returned	 to	 its	 potential	 level	 or	 there	 are	 signs	 of	
imbalances	 arising	 in	 the	 credit	 cycle.	 As it has regularly announced6 since 
March 2020, the Banco de España continues to consider it appropriate to maintain the 
CCyB rate applicable to exposures in Spain at the minimum of 0% to make it easier for 
banks to be able to sustain the credit flow and thus contribute to alleviating the negative 
5	 	See	 A.	Menéndez	 and	M.	Mulino	 (2021)	 “The	 July  2021	Bank	 Lending	 Survey	 in	 Spain”,	Analytical Articles, 
Economic	Bulletin	3/2021,	Banco	de	España,	and	A.	Menéndez	and	M.	Mulino	(2021)	“The	October 2021	Bank	
Lending	Survey	in	Spain”, Analytical Articles, Economic Bulletin 4/2021,	Banco	de	España
6 	 	The	Banco	de	España	has	recently	adapted	its	statements	on	the	quarterly	CCyB	decisions	on	account	of	the	
amendments set out in Directive	(EU)	2019/878	(CRD	V)	simplifying	the	framework	for	notifying	CCyB	measures	
in	those	quarters	when	the	rate	for	this	tool	is	not	recalibrated.	Specifically,	the	Banco	de	España’s	quarterly	press	
releases	on	the	CCyB	that	were	released	until	March 2021	have	been	replaced	by	the	dissemination	of	an	updated	
Excel	 file	with	 the	 quantitative	 information	 used	 to	 inform	 the	 latest	 quarterly	 decision	 (available	 in	 the	CCyB 
section	of	the	Banco	de	España’s	website).
In the early months of the pandemic, loans to households declined owing to a sharp contraction in demand, while loans to firms grew notably 
driven by these agents' demand for liquidity and the supply stimulus provided by the support measures implemented. From 2020 H2 to 2021 
H1 the pattern reversed in both cases. There has been a strong increase in lending to households, due to both supply and demand-side 
factors, and a contraction in lending to firms, owing to both a decline in demand attributable to lower liquidity needs and a contraction in 
supply, at least partly explained by the base effect induced by the support measures implemented in the second quarter of 2020.
IN THE FIRST SEMESTER OF 2021 SUPPLY AND DEMAND-SIDE FACTORS HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY BOOSTED NEW LENDING
TO HOUSEHOLDS, WHILE CONTRACTING NEW LENDING TO FIRMS
Chart 3.3
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Cumulative change over four quarters. Breakdown of the supply and demand-side effects obtained using a structural vectoral autoregression (S-VAR) 
model through which the short-term relationships between credit and interest rate spreads are estimated, allowing for simultaneous shocks between 
the two variables. The models are estimated separately for lending to households and firms. Data on new lending in euro area countries are used. New 
lending excludes renegotiations, overdrafts and credit card balances. For further details, see Box 1 in P. Alves, F. Arrizabalaga, J. Delgado, J. Galán, E. 
Pérez, C. Pérez and C. Trucharte (2021) "Recent developments in financing and bank lending to the non-financial private sector", Analytical Articles, 
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pressure on economic growth. Holding the CCyB rate at 0% is consistent with the 
guidance on the flexible application of prudential requirements in response to this crisis 
advocated by the ECB and other EU (ESRB, EBA) and global bodies (BCBS and FSB).7 
Insofar as the economic recovery takes hold, the CCyB rate, no longer in a context 
of crisis, will be conditional upon the path of recovery and the possible emergence of 
systemic imbalances that could be tackled by this macroprudential tool. 
Some	European	countries	are	 taking	measures	 to	 raise	 the	CCyB	 rate.	The 
macro-financial situation of other European economies is highly diverse. Some are 
already in a marked upward phase of their credit cycle, in which cyclical systemic 
imbalances have arisen, and have already announced measures for restoring the 
CCyB. Specifically, the authorities in Bulgaria,8 Denmark9 and Sweden10 have in 
recent months announced that the CCyB rate is to be set at 1%, while those in the 
Czech Republic11 and Norway12 have opted to set it at 1.5%. All these measures, 
which are geared towards replenishing part or all of the CCyB in place in these 
countries at the start of the pandemic, will be effective from 2022 Q3. 
The empirical evidence during the pandemic suggests that building up 
macroprudential	 buffers	 in	 normal	 times	and	 subsequently	 releasing	 them	 in	
crisis	situations	helps	stabilise	 lending	 to	 the	economy. Econometric estimates 
can be made of the probability of different credit growth scenarios over a one-year 
horizon, assessing how they are affected by changes in macroprudential policy.13 The 
results of this analysis for European countries show that expected growth already 
exceeds the pre-pandemic estimate. This is the case both in countries that were able 
to ease macroprudential measures in response to the pandemic and in those that were 
unable to do so owing to a lack of macroprudential space, as they had not previously 
activated such measures because they did not present systemic risk (see Chart 3.4). 





 8  See the	Countercyclical	Capital	Buffer	section	of	the	Bulgarian	National	Bank’s	website.
 9  See “Reactivation	of	the	countercyclical	capital	buffer”,	Danish Systemic Risk Council (Det Systemiske Risikorad) 
recommendation	of	22 June 2021.
10  See “FI	intends	to	raise	the	countercyclical	buffer	rate	to	1	per	cent”,	Swedish	Financial	Supervisory	Authority	
(Finansinspektionen)	press	release	of	9 September 2021.
11  See	 “Provision	 of	 a	 general	 nature	 III/2021	 on	 setting	 the	 countercyclical	 capital	 buffer	 rate	 for	 the	 Czech	
Republic”	of	26 August 2021,	Česká	národní	banka.
12  See “Advice	on	the	countercyclical	capital	buffer	2021 Q2”,	Norges	Bank	press	release	of	17 June 2021.	The	
Norwegian	 central	 bank	 has	 become	 the	 national	 designated	 authority	 for	 decision-making	 concerning	 this	
macroprudential	tool,	having	been	recently	delegated	this	competence,	which	was	previously	the	responsibility	
of	the	Ministry	of	Finance.	See	“New	Tasks	for	Norges	Bank”,	press	release	of	3 September 2021.
13	 	These	 estimates	 are	made	 using	 quantile	 regressions	 of	 credit	 growth	 based	 on	 the	methodology	 recently	
developed	by	the	Banco	de	España	for	assessing	the	impact	of	the	build-up	of	cyclical	vulnerabilities,	the	bouts	
of	financial	stress	and	the	use	of	macroprudential	tools	on	GDP	growth	distribution.	For	a	detailed	description	of	
its use, see Box 3.1,	2020	Autumn	FSR,	and	for	methodological	details,	see	J.	E.	Galán	(2020)	“The	benefits	are	
at	the	tail:	Uncovering	the	impact	of	macroprudential	policy	on	growth-at-risk”, Journal of Financial Stability.
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However, there are significant differences between these two groups of countries as 
regards the so-called “credit growth-at-risk”, i.e. the credit growth rate that would be 
observed under an adverse scenario that occurs with a 5% probability. In countries 
that have eased macroprudential measures, the estimated decline in credit under 
the aforementioned adverse scenario has remained relatively stable since the start 
of the pandemic and is in fact lower than the pre-crisis estimate. By contrast, in 
countries without this type of buffer, credit growth-at-risk is more than two times 
lower and remains below pre-pandemic estimates. Given the similar median growth 
projections for the two groups of countries, it could be concluded that the existence 
of macroprudential space in crisis periods results in less uncertainty about the 
variability of credit growth compared with the baseline scenario and, therefore, more 
stable lending to the real economy throughout economic cycles. 
In	 July  2021	 the	 Banco	 de	 España	 announced	 the	 designation	 of	 other	
systemically	important	institutions	(O-SIIs),	together	with	their	macroprudential	
capital	 buffers	 applicable	 in	 2022.14 Designation as a systemically important 
14  See “The	 Banco	 de	 España	 updates	 the	 list	 of	 other	 systemically	 important	 institutions	 and	 sets	 their	
macroprudential	capital	buffer	rates	for	2022”,	press	release	of	29 July 2021.	
Estimates of median credit growth over a one-year horizon (50th percentile) do not differ significantly between countries that eased 
macroprudential measures and those that did not. However, significant differences are seen in terms of the change in credit that would be 
observed under an adverse scenario (5th percentile). While, under such a scenario, credit contraction is even lower than the pre-pandemic 
estimate in countries that eased macroprudential measures, it is more than twice as high, exceeding the pre-pandemic estimate, in those 
that did not have room to ease such measures.
COUNTRIES THAT HAD ROOM TO EASE MACROPRUDENTIAL MEASURES DURING THE PANDEMIC HAD A LOWER RISK OF
SEVERE CREDIT CONTRACTION, WITH THIS PATTERN CONTINUING IN 2021
Chart 3.4
SOURCE: European Banking Authority and Bank for International Settlements.
a The bars represent the average for the countries in the group under analysis in the 5th and 50th percentiles of the estimated credit growth distribution over a 
one year horizon, estimated at the dates indicated. The estimates are calculated using quantile regressions of one-year credit growth on variables capturing 
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institution entails the requirement of an additional capital surcharge, which aims to 
internalise the greater impact on financial stability were these banks to experience 
difficulties, and to mitigate possible competitive advantages they might have in the 
markets owing to their systemic nature. The list of O-SIIs has changed from previous 
years because BFA Tenedora de Acciones, S.A.U. (holding company of Bankia, S.A.) 
is no longer considered as such on account of the merger by acquisition of Bankia, 
S.A. by CaixaBank, S.A. in March 2021. CaixaBank’s greater systemic importance 
following this merger entails a 0.25 pp increase in its O-SII capital buffer, according 
to the methodology used by the Banco de España to determine this macroprudential 
requirement. In the light of last year’s crisis, this increase to 0.5% will be applied 
gradually until 1  January  2023, such that in 2022 the institution’s buffer will be 
0.375% (see Table 3.1).
3.2 Regulatory developments relevant to financial stability
Since	the	publication	of	the	Spring	FSR,	some	of	the	exceptional	temporary	
measures	 introduced	 in	 the	wake	of	 the	pandemic	have	been	withdrawn,	
while progress has continued in various initiatives to develop and strengthen 
the	 banking	 sector’s	 prudential	 regulation.	Most notably, the results of the 
stress tests on European banks and the improved macroeconomic outlook across 
the board have made it possible to lift the EU-wide precautionary restrictions on 
profit distribution by financial institutions. This return to normal has been 
accompanied in some countries by the tightening of some macroprudential 
measures, as analysed in Section 3.1. In recent months, the European Commission 
has begun the review of the macroprudential framework of EU banking regulation 
and has announced the legislative proposal for the technical developments for 
implementing the outstanding Basel III reforms in the EU. Other important areas 
of regulatory and supervisory focus will continue to be crypto-assets and climate 
change risks. 
CAPITAL BUFFERS FOR SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT INSTITUTIONS
Table 3.1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a G-SII means Global Systemically Important Institution.
b The capital buffer applicable to CaixaBank, S.A. will be 0.5% from 1 January 2023 onwards (to be confirmed in next year's O-SII decision).
      )a( noitangiseDnoitutitsnIreifitnedI ytitnE lageL
Capital buffer to be 
required in 2022 (b)
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The	 recommendations	 introducing	 system-wide	 restrictions	 in	 Europe	 on	
profit	distribution	by	financial	institutions	prompted	by	the	COVID-19	pandemic	
have been repealed. The economic upturn anticipated by the latest projections, 
the reassuring outcome of the EBA and SSM stress tests and lower uncertainty 
led the ECB to decide15 in July not to extend beyond 30  September  2021 its 
recommendation, in place since the start of the pandemic, that all significant credit 
institutions under its direct supervision limit dividend distribution. In coordination 
with other national authorities, the Banco de España also agreed16 not to extend its 
recommendation for less significant institutions in Spain, which also expired on 
30  September. At the same time, the ESRB also decided17 to allow its dividend 
recommendation affecting various sectors of the EU financial system to expire as of 
1 October. All these authorities have publicly reiterated the need to remain prudent 
in decisions on dividend distribution, equity buybacks and remuneration policies, 
paying particular attention to business model sustainability. 
Various studies suggest that the limitations on dividend distribution have had 
a	 significant	 positive	 impact	 on	 new	 lending	 and	 solvency	 ratios.	Empirical 
analysis of granular bank lending data shows that Spanish institutions which did not 
distribute dividends in 2020 were more active granting loans and, consequently, 
helped to mitigate the impact of the crisis on the real economy.18 At the global level, 
in countries where restrictions were implemented, capital ratios recovered from the 
falls in 2020 Q1, or even increased, despite the fall in profit. Conversely, capital ratios 
continued to decline in countries where no restrictions were implemented initially.19
The	 European	 macroprudential	 framework	 in	 the	 capital	 requirements	
legislation (CRR and CRD) will be reviewed in the coming months. As laid down 
in Article 513 of Regulation (EU) 2019/876 (CRR), by 30 June 2022, and every five 
years thereafter, the European Commission shall review whether the macroprudential 
rules contained in the EU regulations in force are sufficient to properly mitigate 
systemic risks. This review will allow the use and design of macroprudential tools to 
be examined in the light of the practical experience gained in recent years since 
macroprudential tools were effectively introduced in 2016 and of some of the lessons 
learned from the COVID-19 pandemic crisis in particular. Specifically, the desirability 
of increasing the share of releasable buffers, as opposed to structural buffers, and 
the practical difficulties faced by banks when using their buffers could be considered. 
15  See “ECB	decides	not	to	extend	dividend	recommendation	beyond	September 2021”,	ECB	press	release	of	
23 July 2021.
16  See	“Recomendación	sobre	distribución	de	dividendos	y	remuneración	variable”,	Banco de España statement 
of	23 July 2021	(only	available	in	Spanish).
17  See “The	General	Board	of	the	European	Systemic	Risk	Board	held	its	43rd	regular	meeting	on	23 September 2021”,	
ESRB	press	release	of	24 September 2021.
18	 	See	D.	Martínez	Miera	and	R.	Vegas	(2021)	“Impact	of	the	dividend	distribution	restriction	on	the	flow	of	credit	to	
non-financial	corporations	in	Spain”,	Analytical Article, Economic Bulletin 1/2021,	Banco	de	España.
19  See B. Hardy (2021)	“Covid-19	bank	dividend	payout	restrictions:	effects	and	trade-offs”,	BIS Bulletin 38.
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To	 review	 the	 macroprudential	 framework,	 the	 European	 Commission	 has	
requested	advisory	reports	from	the	ECB,	the	EBA	and	the	ESRB. Through a call 
for advice20 addressed to these three authorities, the Commission seeks to obtain 
qualitative and quantitative evidence to support possible legislative changes. The three 
authorities consulted will need to submit their views by 31  March  2022 so that the 
European Commission can propose a legislative reform no later than December 2022, 
which will then be negotiated with the Council and the European Parliament.
Further	 progress	 has	 been	 made	 on	 pending	 EU	 prudential	 regulatory	
developments. Notable in the macroprudential realm is the amendment of the 
regulatory technical standards (RTSs) for identifying G-SIIs, which set out the additional 
methodology for identifying these institutions.21 In addition, the EBA has submitted to 
public consultation the review of the prudential treatment of exposures secured by 
immovable property. Under this prudential treatment, the relevant authorities may set 
higher risk weights or increase the minimum LGD values when these do not adequately 
reflect risk or are inadequate and could adversely affect financial stability in the Member 
State. The EBA’s draft RTS was submitted to public consultation22 and its final version 
is expected to be ready in the coming months. 
On 27 October, the European Commission published a proposal to review the 
regulation applicable to the banking sector23, which includes legislative 
changes to implement the Basel III agreement24,	 considering	 the	 specific	
characteristics	of	the	European	banking	sector.	The proposal aims to strengthen 
EU banks’ resilience, without resulting in significant increases in capital requirements, 
and introduces an extended transitional period, starting in 2025 for some aspects. It 
also sets rules on the management, monitoring and disclosure to third parties of 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) risks, in keeping with the objectives 
of the EU’s sustainable finance strategy. Lastly, the supervisory toolkit is 
20  See	“Call	for	Advice	-	Review	of	the	EU	Macroprudential	Framework”,	European	Commission,	8 July 2021.
21  See Commission	Delegated	Regulation	(EU)	2021/539	of	11 February 2021	amending	Delegated	Regulation	
(EU)	No	1222/2014	supplementing	Directive	2013/36/EU	of	 the	European	Parliament	and	of	 the	Council	
with	regard	to	regulatory	technical	standards	for	the	specification	of	the	methodology	for	the	identification	
of	global	systemically	 important	 institutions	and	 for	 the	definition	of	subcategories	of	global	systemically	
important institutions.
22  See “EBA	consults	 on	draft	 technical	 standards	 specifying	 how	 to	 identify	 the	 appropriate	 risk	weights	 and	
conditions	when	assessing	minimum	LGD	values	for	exposures	secured	by	 immovable	property”, EBA press 
release	of	29 April 2021.
23  See	“Banking	Package	2021:	new	EU	rules	to	strengthen	banks’	resilience	and	better	prepare	for	the	future”, 
legislative	proposal	of	the	European	Commission	of	27	October.		








BANCO DE ESPAÑA 105 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, AUTUM 2021  3. SYSTEMIC RISK AND PRUDENTIAL POLICY
enhanced in certain areas to ensure sounder and more prudent management of EU 
banks. In addition, the European Commission has published a proposal to amend 
some prudential and resolution rules in order to clarify the regime of requirements for 
liabilities payable in chains of subsidiaries (the so-called Daisy chains) and the 
requirements in the area of resolution of institutions of global systemic importance 
(G-SII). This proposal will be processed in an accelerated and separate manner.
Faced	with	the	increasing	relevance	of	climate-related	impacts	on	finance,	both	
the EBA and the BCBS have published reports on this matter. In June, the EBA 
released25 a report on management and supervision of ESG risks. The report includes a 
comprehensive proposal on how ESG factors and ESG risks should be integrated into the 
strategy, governance and risk management of credit institutions and investment firms, as 
well as into supervisory processes. To enhance the supervisory review and evaluation 
process (SREP), in this report the EBA sees a need to extend the time horizon of the 
assessment and proposes including environmental and climate-related factors and risks 
into the business model. Later this year, the EBA plans to publish the disclosure 
requirements (Pillar 3) for credit institutions regarding the risks identified in this report.
In	April,	the	BCBS	published	two	analytical	reports	on	climate-related	financial	
risks.26 The two reports broach: (i) climate-related risk drivers and their transmission 
channels to the banking system and (ii) the corresponding measurement methodologies. 
Although climate risk can be captured in traditional financial risk categories, they both 
acknowledge that additional progress is needed to better estimate these risks. In this 
setting, the reports provide a conceptual basis for identifying gaps in the current Basel 
framework and possible measures to address them. The BCBS is working on a set of 
supervisory practices which it plans to consult on by the end of the year and will 
continue to analyse whether supervisory, regulatory or transparency measures are 
needed. Box 3.1 of this Report sets out the stress tests conducted on Spanish banks 
by the Banco de España to gauge the implications of the materialisation of some of 
these climate-related risks. Box 3.2 quantifies the potential implications of an episode 
of environmental deterioration, which can help measure the impact of the materialisation 
of climate-related physical risks in the future.
The	continued	growth	and	innovation	seen	in	crypto-assets,	including	so-known	
stablecoins,	further	underlines	the	importance	of	the	work	of	the	BCBS	and	
the	FSB	 in	 this	area,	which	 focuses	on	analysing	 the	 implications	 this	may	
have	for	the	stability	of	the	financial	system. Although banks’ exposure to crypto-
assets is currently limited, innovation in crypto-assets and related services, coupled 
with some banks’ increased interest, could heighten concerns about global financial 
25  See “EBA	publishes	its	Report	on	management	and	supervision	of	ESG	risks	for	credit	institutions	and	investment	
firms”,	EBA	press	release	of	23	June	2021.
26  See “Basel	Committee	publishes	analytical	reports	on	climate-related	financial	risks”, BCBS press release, April 
14 2021.
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stability and the risks to the banking system in the absence of a specific regulatory 
framework.27 The BCBS has run a public consultation on its proposals for the 
prudential treatment of banks’ crypto-asset exposures this year.28 In 2020, the FSB 
issued a series of high-level recommendations for the regulation, supervision and 
oversight of “global stablecoin” (GSC) arrangements,29 a specific type of crypto-asset 
which seeks to hold a stable value by pegging it to another asset, such as a stable 
fiat currency. The recommendations promote coordinated and effective regulation, 
supervision and oversight of GSCs to address the financial stability risks they pose, 
both domestically and globally, and are part of a broader FSB work programme 
which will continue until at least 2023. 
The	transposition	in	Spain	of	the	changes	in	the	bank	recovery	and	resolution	
framework	 (BRRD	 II)30 is also progressing. The BRRD II introduced significant 
new features in the EU resolution framework, such as a reviewed methodology for 
determining the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL), a 
requirement equivalent to TLAC standard for G-SIIs and the possibility for resolution 
authorities to suspend the contractual obligations of institutions. Its transposition 
into Spanish law has begun with Royal Decree-Law 7/2021 amending Law 11/2015, 
among other regulations, and is expected to conclude shortly with the publication of 
a royal decree amending Royal Decree 1012/2015.
The European Commission has also started to review the bank crisis 
management	 and	 deposit	 insurance	 framework,	 with	 the	 aim	 of	making	 it	
more	flexible	and	efficient	and	increasing	depositor	protection,	ensuring	they	
receive equal treatment. This review is part of the agenda to complete the Banking 
Union, which will culminate in the creation of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme 
(EDIS). The Commission is also contemplating harmonising insolvency regimes,31 
which would include quasi-resolution tools for the administrative winding-up of 
credit institutions and would ensure the support of insolvency deposit insurance 
schemes as an alternative to paying the covered deposits.32 The proposal for a 




28  See “Basel	Committee	consults	on	prudential	 treatment	of	 crypto-asset	exposures”,	BCBS	press	 release	of	
10 June 2021.
29  See	“Regulation,	Supervision	and	Oversight	of	Global	Stablecoin	Arrangements”,	FSB	report	of	13	October	2020.
30  See Directive	(EU)	2019/879	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	of	20 May 2019	amending	Directive	
2014/59/EU	as	 regards	 the	 loss-absorbing	and	 recapitalisation	capacity	of	credit	 institutions	and	 investment	
firms	and	Directive	98/26/EC.
31  See Report	from	the	Commission	to	the	European	Parliament	and	the	Council	on	the	application	and	review	of	
Directive	2014/59/EU (Bank	Recovery	and	Resolution	Directive)	and	Regulation	806/2014	 (Single	Resolution	
Mechanism Regulation) of	30 April 2019.
32  See Combined	evaluation	roadmap/inception	impact	assessment,	European	Commission,	10 November 2020.




IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE RISKS ON THE BANKING SECTOR
Climate change and the need to implement measures to 
move towards a more sustainable economy pose risks 
to the banking sector. Some stem from the materialisation 
of physical risks associated with extreme climate conditions, 
such as rising sea levels and water stress in certain areas. 
Another set of risks is associated with the transition to a 
more sustainable economy, since the implementation of 
measures to prevent or mitigate climate change would 
entail significant changes to human and economic activity. 
These two types of risks could materialise simultaneously, 
as risk mitigation measures may be late or insufficient. In 
both cases, assessing their impact requires the use of 
quantitative tools. 
This box summarises the first work undertaken by the 
Banco de España to quantify the impact of transition risks 
on the banking sector using analytical models. The results 
should be viewed with caution, as only part of the channels 
are modelled, with a methodology that captures just some 
of the adjustment costs. In addition, the box presents a 
more exploratory study of the potential long-term impact 
of physical risks on credit risk, comparing them with 
transition risks, using scenarios from the Network for 
Greening the Financial System (NGFS). This allows an 
assessment to be made of the advantages of taking action 
now to prevent climate change and avoid the costs that 
would arise if the physical risks materialise.
The scenarios used in this first analysis to assess the 
impact of climate change-related transition risks were 
prepared using the Carbon Tax Sectoral (CATS) model.1 
This is a general equilibrium model with a very detailed 
sectoral structure (51 non-energy and two energy sectors), 
designed to capture the impact of an increase in the cost 
of greenhouse gas emissions. The calibration of the model 
replicates the main characteristics of the Spanish economy 
in terms of productive structure, energy intensity, emissions 
by type of technology, etc. 
With this model, simulations were carried out to assess the 
impact on the Spanish economy of four different shocks: 
1) an increase in the price of emission allowances (from 
€25 to €100 per tonne of CO2 equivalent); 2) an extension 
of the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) to all firms, 
including those currently excluded for belonging to the 
so-called non-ETS sectors; 3) a combination of the two 
foregoing measures; and, additionally, 4) the extension of 
the ETS to also include emissions generated directly by 
households. The baseline scenario used to study the 
implementation of these measures considers an economic 
trend in Spain that is analogous to that prior to the 
COVID-19 crisis. 
According to the results of the model, the effect of these 
shocks on economic activity in aggregate terms would be 
noticeable but not huge (see Table 1). However, there are 
a number of reasons why these effects might constitute a 
1	 See	P.	Aguilar,	B.	González	and	S.	Hurtado	(2021),	“Carbon	Tax	Sectoral	Model	(CATS):	a	sectoral	model	for	climate	change	stress	test	scenarios”,	
Occasional Paper, Banco	de	España	(forthcoming).
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The lower bound of the range of impact on sectoral GVA under each scenario is the most negative difference between the accumulated rates of 
change over the three years of the exercise and the corresponding measures under the baseline scenario. The upper bound represents the analogous 
most positive difference. The scenarios 1) increase in the price of emission allowances; 2) extension of the ETS coverage; 3) combination (of the two 
shocks); and 4) combination including extension to households, correspond to those described in the text with the same numbering.
GDP Lower bound Upper bound
1.03.5-6.0-esaercni ecirp snoissimE
1.01.2-3.0-egarevoc STE fo noisnetxE
3.04.8-3.1-noitanibmoC
3.01.9-9.1-sdlohesuoh ot noisnetxe .lcni noitanibmoC
Range of impact on non-energy sectoral 
GVA (a)
IMPACT OF SIMULATED SHOCKS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
Table 1
Differences in accumulated rates of change (t+1, t+2, t+3) vis-à-vis the baseline scenario 




IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE RISKS ON THE BANKING SECTOR (cont’d)
lower bound. First, reallocating resources between 
sectors, as envisaged by the model, could be difficult in 
practice because of, for example, the high specialisation 
of human capital. In addition, the model does not consider 
the reallocation of physical capital, meaning that 
technological obsolescence costs are excluded by 
construction. 
Second, the model treats households homogeneously, 
underestimating the costs of climate change, as its impact 
is greater on lower-income families. Moreover, in the model 
the Spanish economy is not open to external trade. Thus, 
it only captures climate change effects through domestic 
demand, while those stemming from lower external 
demand are not considered. Lastly, the simulations are 
conducted under the assumption that the rise in energy 
prices in the scenarios is insufficient to cause permanent 
increases in inflation that are passed through to interest 
rates or that translate into sharp financial market 
corrections or significant shocks to house prices. A 
stronger influence of these nominal factors could generate 
more adverse scenarios.
Despite these limitations, the model’s detailed sectoral 
structure makes it possible to identify some sectors where 
this shock has a greater impact. The clearest example is 
energy sectors, whose value added is substantially reduced. 
But the effects also extend not only to the more directly 
affected non-energy sectors (e.g. the chemical sector) but 
even to those most closely related to them via their 
purchases (e.g. the manufacture of machinery and 
equipment) or sales (e.g. the waste treatment sector). 
Through these mechanisms, under the more severe 
scenarios, the sectors most exposed to such shocks would 
be significantly impacted, directly or indirectly (see Chart 1).
To model the impact of these scenarios on the banking 
sector, a framework of comparable granularity for 
measuring corporate default risk is needed.2 That is why 
sectoral granularity has been increased in the probability 
of default (PD) projection of the Forward Looking Exercise 
on Spanish Banks (FLESB) model used for stress testing. 
These sectoral PDs (50 sectors) vary according to the size 
of the firm and sector-specific and aggregate economic 
and financial variables.3



























EFFECT ON THREE-YEAR SECTORAL GVA GROWTH OF THE INCREASE IN THE EMISSIONS PRICE AND THE EXTENSION OF THE SCHEME TO ALL FIRMS AND HOUSEHOLDS 
IN THE TEN MOST AFFECTED SECTORS
Differences, in pp, in the accumulated change in t+1, t+2 and t+3 vis-à-vis the baseline scenario.




IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE RISKS ON THE BANKING SECTOR (cont’d)
It should be noted that this framework captures transition 
scenarios’ sectoral heterogeneity in two ways: i) by including 
economic and financial variables in all models, and ii) by 
constructing separate models by sector and size, providing 
different elasticities whenever the available information so 
allows.4 Considering sectoral financial ratios makes it 
possible to analyse PD sensitivity to firms’ hypothetical 
responses aimed at reducing their emissions (e.g. increasing 
borrowing to acquire new, greener technologies).
The impact on PDs of the transition scenarios varies 
among sectors. It is summarised in Chart 2, which presents 
a scatter plot, with each point representing a sector, 
showing the differences in GVA growth (three-year average, 
X axis) and in PD (average for 2021-2023, Y axis) between 
different scenarios and the baseline scenario. Specifically, 
the left-hand panel shows these differences for the 
emissions price increase scenario, while the right-hand 
panel depicts those for the scenario that also envisages 
extending ETS coverage to all firms and households 
(severest scenario). As is to be expected, the sectors hit 
hardest by the climate transition (those with the largest 
falls in GVA vis-à-vis the baseline scenario) tend to present 
higher PD increases. 
As shown in Chart 3, these higher probabilities of default 
would impact cumulative bank profitability. To illustrate this 
impact, the ratio of accumulated profit after tax divided by the 
volume of average risk-weighted assets (RWAs), both as 




SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Each point on the chart relates to a sector of business activity in accordance with the Spanish National Classification of Economic Activities and 
depicts the difference in that sector's average PD, weighted by the number of borrowers, over a three-year horizon between a trend-based baseline 
scenario (under which no measures are applied) and adverse scenarios resulting from different extensions of the CO2 emission allowances trading 
scheme. See Box 3.1 for further details.
b This adverse scenario considers an increase in CO2 emission allowance prices from €25 to €100.
c This adverse scenario considers a combination of the scenario described in (b) and an extension of the requirement for allowances to other productive 
sectors and to households.
d The bars show the difference in the ratio of profit after tax to RWAs between the corresponding scenario and the baseline scenario, for each of the 
three groups of institutions.
e The effects of the transition costs are calculated under four alternative scenarios. The first scenario, “emissions price increase”, considers an increase in 
CO2 emission allowance prices from €25 to €100. The second scenario, “extension of ETS coverage”, considers the extension of the ETS coverage to 
all firms. The “combination” scenario simultaneously considers the CO2 emission allowance price increase and the extension of the ETS coverage to all 
firms. Lastly, the “combination including extension to households” considers the ETS coverage also being extended to households.
f To calculate the ratio, the numerator (profit after tax) is cumulative for the three years in the exercise, while the denominator reflects the value of 



















EFFECT OF TRANSITION COSTS ON THE RATIO OF PROFIT AFTER TAX TO 
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IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE RISKS ON THE BANKING SECTOR (cont’d)
vis-à-vis the baseline scenario is presented for three groups 
of institutions: Spanish institutions directly supervised by the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) that have significant 
international activity (International SIs), the rest of the 
institutions supervised directly by the SSM (Other SIs) 
and institutions supervised directly by the Banco de 
España (LSIs). The emissions price increase has a larger 
impact for the three groups than the extension of ETS 
coverage, with the worst deterioration in smaller institutions 
with no significant international presence, as the scenario 
analysed only considers policy changes in Spain. Insofar as 
the emission allowance scheme is also implemented in other 
jurisdictions, the impact on International SIs’ profitability can 
be expected to be more similar to that for the other groups.5 
Under the scenario that combines both effects, the differences 
in terms of profit generation as a percentage of RWAs are 
-0.16 pp, -0.31 pp and -0.35 pp for the three groups of 
institutions, respectively. If the extension of ETS coverage to 
households is also included, the declines with respect to the 
baseline scenario stand at -0.19 pp, -0.41 pp and -0.41 pp, 
respectively. In terms of ROE,6 the difference in the adverse 
scenarios compared with the baseline scenario for the 
aggregate of institutions (i.e. all three groups) would be in a 
range of between approximately 0.9 pp and 1.5 pp. The 
institutions would not incur significant capital charges under 
any of the scenarios, which shows that the transition costs 
can be considered acceptable.
If the transition to a more sustainable economy is not 
completed or carried out in time, climate change will lead 
to the materialisation of physical risks. These can be 
expected to have potentially much stronger implications 
for the economy, the financial sector and society as a 
whole than those estimated in respect of transition risks 
in the first part of this box. Should climate change occur, 
the environmental fallout of a temperature rise 
(desertification, floods, fires, rising sea levels, etc.) would 
generate asset losses for institutions through various 
channels, in particular in respect of exposures subject to 
credit, market or operational risks.
Quantification of this risk is currently at an incipient stage 
owing to the challenges it poses: uncertainty about the 
future emissions and temperature trajectories, limited 
data, and forecast horizons that are much longer than 
usual, requiring new methodological developments,7 as it 
is normally assumed that, in such long time frames, agents 
will react. Nevertheless, studying physical risk is 
unavoidable in order to understand and assess the future 
effects that climate change could have on the financial 
system if no action to adopt measures is taken. 
To illustrate the possible impact of physical risk, a 
simplified example of the effect on credit risk is presented 
below. For this purpose, the NGFS long-term risk 
scenarios have been considered.8 These scenarios reflect 
transition risk and also physical risk, especially in the 
later years of the horizon. They consider a horizon up to 
2070 and two pathways: an Orderly Transition scenario, 
where the shift to a net-zero emission economy is swift 
and effective (similar to that considered in the previous 
exercise), and a Hot House World scenario, where no 
measures are applied and environmental degradation is 
therefore pronounced. A statistical model was then 
constructed for the aggregate 12-month PDs for 
households and for firms, and the two figures were 
projected up to 2070 under each scenario.9
Chart 4 depicts the difference in annual GDP growth under 
the scenario with larger materialization of physical risks 
(Hot House World) with respect to the Orderly Transition 
scenario. At the start of the pathway, when the transition 
costs predominate over physical costs, the difference is 
slightly positive, but the trend reverses in the longer term 
when the environmental costs of inaction materialise to 
their full extent. By 2070 annual GDP growth under the 
Hot House World scenario is 2.1 pp lower than under the 
Orderly Transition scenario. In the long term, physical 
risks would thus entail a high deterioration in activity, far 
exceeding the cost of the Orderly Transition. 
 5	 	By	construction,	the	scenarios	exclude	these	costs,	as	they	derive	from	a	closed	economy	model	(where	the	Spanish	economy	does	not	have	an	
external	sector).
 6	 	ROE	has	been	estimated	as	accumulated	 three-year	profit	after	 tax	as	a	percentage	of	average	equity	 in	 the	same	period.	Equity	 is	estimated	
assuming	a	trajectory	proportional	to	that	of	RWAs.
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Box	3.1
IMPACT OF CLIMATE CHANGE RISKS ON THE BANKING SECTOR (cont’d)
Chart 5 shows the difference in the projected PD paths for 
households and firms under each scenario, in the same 
terms as in Chart 4.10 Similar to the case of GDP growth, at 
the start of the pathway, credit default risk is somewhat 
higher under the Orderly Transition scenario (as reflected in 
the previous exercise) but, in the longer term, this situation is 
reversed owing to the materialisation of physical risk, and 
much higher probabilities of default are observed in the Hot 
House World scenario. In 2070 the PD for households is 0.57 
pp higher under the Hot House World scenario than under 
the Orderly Transition scenario, with this difference increasing 
to 1.11 pp for firms. Even if these differences could be 
interpreted as being contained in marginal terms, they are 
relevant since they reflect permanent deteriorations in credit 
quality, which have a significant impact when accumulated 
over the life of the loan. 
These findings show that ignoring the costs of the 
materialisation of climate change would lead to an 
underestimation of the costs of credit risk, and that investing 
in an orderly transition is clearly favourable in the medium and 
long run, in terms of mitigating economic and financial risks.
Despite its simplifications, this second exercise is useful 
for highlighting that, depending on how swiftly and 
intensely the transition to a net-zero emission economy is 
carried out, the long-term economic deterioration caused 
by the effects of climate change could have a significant 
and sustained impact on credit quality. The economic 
authorities, including the Banco de España, are working to 
overcome the aforementioned methodological challenges 
and have begun to develop regulatory frameworks for data 
collection, analyses and tools to improve the measurement 
and modelling of its impact.
SOURCES: NGFS and Banco de España.
a Differences in the Hot House World scenario with respect to the Orderly Transition scenario. 
Chart 5
DIFFERENCES IN PROBABILITY OF DEFAULT (a)
Households (left) and firms (right)
Chart 4
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The scarcity of past events of materialisation of the 
physical risks associated with climate change makes it 
particularly difficult to estimate their costs. At the same 
time, actions to avoid or mitigate this materialisation, 
which also have their cost, have to be taken in the present. 
Consequently, while the cost of acting is known quite 
accurately (the necessary investment), the benefits (costs 
avoided when the risk does not materialise) are much more 
uncertain. One way of increasing certainty consists in 
analysing the economic impact of environmental disasters 
that have already occurred; even if these are not a direct 
consequence of climate change, they share some of the 
characteristics of those that are. This box offers an 
example of this type of approximation, focusing on the 
Mar Menor region of Spain.
The Mar Menor, the largest salt-water lagoon in Europe, 
located in the region of Murcia, has in recent years 
experienced a process of degradation known as 
eutrophication. This process involves an increase in 
nutrients that leads to abnormal growth of phytoplankton 
and stimulates the proliferation of algae in the lagoon. This 
in turn means that not enough light can filter through and, 
consequently, a large part of the ecosystem has been 
destroyed since 2015. Decomposition of the resulting 
dead matter absorbs large quantities of oxygen; on several 
occasions this has led to large amounts of dead fish 
washing up on the shore. 
According to the report by the Spanish Institute of 
Oceanography on the evolution and current state of the 
Mar Menor (2020),2 the analysis of 50 years of time series 
data shows that the chlorophyll levels in the lagoon stood 
within a range characteristic of a low nutrient system until 
the phytoplankton proliferation episode of 2015. That 
year thus marks a turning point in the ecological evolution 
of the Mar Menor.
Various studies have attempted to measure the economic 
cost of this environmental catastrophe. Carvalho-Machado 
Sáez (2020)3, for example, compares Social Security 
registrations in Mar Menor municipalities with those for 
neighbouring municipalities, but fails to obtain robust or 
statistically significant findings. Other studies, in the 
political and environmental sciences fields, measure the 
economic impact using the cost of restoring the lagoon, 
ignoring the economic costs that the degradation may 
already be causing. 
The aim of this box is to analyse whether this situation is 
affecting the value of living in the Mar Menor region. If 
economic activity is generated in the Mar Menor region 
and it is attractive to tourists or residents the value of 
this present and future utility will be reflected in the 
price people are prepared to pay to live in and enjoy this 
natural environment.
From an analytical viewpoint, it is important to note that 
the area affected is very specific, the period of time in 
which the phenomenon commences is clearly defined 
(2015), and nearby housing with similar characteristics 
but unaffected by the Mar Menor phenomenon (the 
Mediterranean coast of south Alicante) can be used as a 
control group. 
The variable to be analysed is the price per square metre 
of housing sold in the areas of interest. The data are 
drawn from the Association of Registrars, whose 
databases cover all housing transactions, with details of 
the square metres of the properties sold, their prices, etc. 
The dwellings are grouped according to postcodes, 
distinguishing between areas affected by the ecological 
deterioration (Mar Menor) and unaffected areas (south 
Alicante). Sales of housing in south Alicante are used as 
the control group because this area borders on the Mar 
Menor region and is the same distance by car from the 
cities of Murcia and Madrid. To the south, the Mar Menor 
region adjoins Cartagena, an area with very different 
characteristics from the coastal zone that concerns us. As 
may be seen in Chart 1, the behaviour of the price per 
square metre in these two areas clearly diverges. The 
median return on a residential investment made in 2015 in 
the Mar Menor region would be 0% in 2021, while an 
investment in south Alicante would have generated a 
return of more than 43% over the same period. 
In order to analyse this difference statistically and 
confirm whether there has been a significant difference 
Box	3.2
HE VALUE OF HOUSING AND ECOLOGICAL DEGRADATION: THE CASE OF THE MAR MENOR1
1	 This	box	draws	on	the	findings	of	the	forthcoming	paper	“Environmental	destruction	and	Housing	Prices:	The	Case	of	Mar	Menor	in	Spain”	(2021)	by	
María	de	la	Luz	García	Lorenzo,	Javier	García	Villasur,	Matías	Lamas	and	Gabriel	Pérez	Quirós.
2 See the study by the	Spanish	Institute	of	Oceanography	(2020).	 
3	 “Socio-economic	Impact	of	Mar	Menor	Harmful	Algal	Bloom	in	2015-2016.”	Caterina	Carvalho-Machado	Sáez.	Universidad	Carlos	III	de	Madrid.




HE VALUE OF HOUSING AND ECOLOGICAL DEGRADATION: THE CASE OF THE MAR MENOR (cont’d)
in the behaviour of prices in the Mar Menor area 
following the ecological deterioration, a differences in 
differences method is used. This procedure compares, at 
postcode level, dwellings sold in the Mar Menor area (the 
affected group) with those sold in south Torrevieja (the 
unaffected or control group). The working hypothesis is 
that there were no significant differences in the behaviour 
of house prices between these two areas before 2015. 
However, from 2015, the prices of the Mar Menor districts 
began to lag behind. 
The left-hand panel of Chart 2 shows the estimation of 
the statistical differences between the prices of the two 
areas over time, taking 2014 as the base year. As can be 
seen in the chart, there is a negative effect on the 
evolution of the price of housing sold in the Mar Menor 
area from 2016. This effect increases up until 2019 and 
can be quantified as more than €500 per square metre 
at the end of the sample. Given the initial level of the 
price per square metre in the Mar Menor area, this 
approximately amounts to a 45% lower rise in value 
compared with housing in south Alicante. The result is 
consistent with the aggregate data in Chart 1. 
It is important, from a technical point of view, to confirm 
that this difference in the evolution of prices is not due to a 
change in the characteristics of the housing sold in these 
two areas. For this purpose, a sub-sample of the previous 
estimation is used consisting of dwellings sold at least 
twice in the period analysed. Comparing transactions 
involving the same dwellings at earlier and later points in 
time controls for the possibility that changes in the 
composition of the housing sold affect the evolution of 
prices. The results of the estimation of the price differences 
are presented in the right-hand panel of Chart 2 and are 
comparable to those in the left-hand panel.  This appears 
to confirm that the impact of the environmental degradation 
of the Mar Menor may have given rise to a difference in the 
return on residential investment of 45% over six years. 
From the standpoint of financial stability two questions arise 
in this context. First, the extent of the wealth effect associated 
with this reduction in the rate of return and, second, the 
SOURCE: Colegio de Registradores.
a The chart compares changes in house prices in postcodes in Murcia affected by the environmental catastrophe in the Mar Menor wih those in 
postcodes in the south of Alicante with similar characteristics.
b Both panels show the average effect on the price per square metre of a dwelling located in an area affected by the environmental catastrophe (Murcia) 
rather than in an unaffected but similar area (south of Alicante), taking the period prior to 2015 as the base or reference. To calculate these effects, a 
regression is carried out in which the price per square metre of the dwellings sold is explained according to whether they are located in one area or 
the other, also bearing in mind the year in which the transaction took place. The triangles represent the estimated coefficients and the lines the 95% 
confidence intervals for these estimates. In the left-hand panel, the sample includes all house sales in these areas. In the right-hand panel, only repeat 
transactions are included (sales of the same dwelling in different time periods). The latter allows changes in prices of the same unit to be assessed, 
thus controlling for possible changes in the composition of the houses sold over time, but leads to less precise estimates (wider confidence intervals), 
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consequences it may have on credit standards for loans 
secured by housing affected by an ecological deterioration of 
this type. Obviously, if this problem is limited to a very specific 
area, such as the Mar Menor, then the stability of the Spanish 
financial system will not be threatened. However, should it 
extend to a much wider area, which may occur, for example, 
if the sea level rises significantly as a result of climate change, 
the consequences may be material.  
Answering the first question on the wealth effect requires 
an estimation of the number of dwellings existing in the 
affected Mar Menor postcodes. A rough estimate is 
obtained using information from cadastral statistics. 
According to the latter, the total number of dwellings in 
the Mar Menor area in 2021 was 117,000. Given that the 
median dwelling is 72 square metres and the median price 
per square metre is €1,095 the total value of the housing is 
€9,224 million. The failure of the price of these dwellings to 
rise during the period analysed implies a loss of wealth of 
€4,150 million, relative to a scenario in which the ecological 
catastrophe did not occur.
A first approximation to the answer to the second question 
on credit market conditions is obtained by analysing the 
evolution of the median mortgage in both areas. In the Mar 
Menor area, the median mortgage remained unchanged 
between 2014 and 2021, at around €60,000. The median 
mortgage in the south Alicante area increased by more 
than 100%, from €44,000 in 2014 to a high of more than 
€90,000 in 2021, which shows the dynamism of one area 
compared with the stagnation of the other. The findings 
suggest that an ecological deterioration like the one 
described has the potential to significantly reduce the 
value of the available collateral, making access to credit 
more difficult in the affected areas. 
In short, this exercise, which gives a precise estimate of 
the serious economic impact of the environmental 
deterioration in the Mar Menor region, seeks to illustrate 
more generally the importance of the physical risks of 
climate change for financial stability and, specifically, the 
wealth of households and the quality of banks’ mortgage 
portfolios. This analysis suggests that, should the 
materialisation of climate change lead to comparable 
environmental damage in other areas of the Spanish 
Levante, the economic damage and its implications for 
financial stability could be significant.
Box	3.2
HE VALUE OF HOUSING AND ECOLOGICAL DEGRADATION: THE CASE OF THE MAR MENOR (cont’d)
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Annexes
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET (a)
DEPOSIT INSTITUTIONS
Annex 1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The figures for total assets, total liabilities and net equity, and for the components thereof, correspond directly to the consolidated account reported to 
the Banco de España in confidential returns. 
b Difference between funds received in liquidity-providing operations and funds delivered in liquidity-absorbing operations. June 2021 data. 







0.96.43110,274Cash and balances with central banks





Investments 25,508 -5.1 0.7




Other 155,294 -6.2 4.2
0.0018.0-913,688,3TOTAL ASSETS
1.850.3-070,702.2Financing to private sector
9.216.3553,225Financing to general government
1.28.4744,78Total NPLs







6.82.41949,383Balances from central banks







7.09.1779,72Provisions for pensions, tax and other
Other 153,693 7.3 3.7
7.399.0-801,736.3TOTAL LIABILITIES
0.08.74262,092Eurosystem net lending (b)
Own funds 281,500 6.9
5.01.22-179,51Minority interests
1.1-7.9162,84-Valuation adjustments relating to total equity
3.69.0012,942TOTAL EQUITY








SOURCE: Banco de España.
NOTE: The consolidated income statement includes pro-forma information pertaining to the months of activity of a significant institution absorbed in 









40.030.09.82297stnemurtsni latipac morf nruteR
37.148.15.4-924,33emocni laicnanif teN
Share of profit or loss of entities accounted for using the equity 
method 1,468 43.7 0.05 0.08
86.076.00.4791,31snoissimmoc teN
51.071.02.11-748,2seitilibail dna stessa laicnanif no sessol dna sniaG




Asset impairment losses (specific and general provisions) 7,438 -51.1 0.80 0.38
71.090.06.58062,3)ten( esnepxe gninoisivorP
12.067.0-_131,4)ten( slasopsid morf emocnI
39.052.0-_440,81)snoitarepo deunitnocsid gnidulcni( xat erofeb tiforP
17.005.0-_577,31emocni teN
Memorandum item
56.055.0-_335,21ytitne gnillortnoc eht ot elbatubirtta emocnI    
Jun-21
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Agencia Estatal de Administración Tributaria (State tax revenue 
service)
Average total assets
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
Bank for International Settlements
Billion
Basis points
Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive 
Banco de España Central Balance Sheet Data Office Quarterly 
Survey
Banco de España Central Balance Sheet Data Office
Banco de España Central Credit Register
Countercyclical capital buffer
Common Equity Tier 1
Clasificación Nacional de Actividades Económicas (Spanish 
National Classification of Economic Activities)








Economically active population survey
European Banking Authority
European Central Bank
European Deposit Insurance Scheme
European Economic Area
Excessive Deficit Protocol
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority
Emerging markets currency index
Encuesta de población activa (Labour Force Survey)
Expediente de regulación temporal de empleo (furlough 
schemes)
Environmental, social and governance




Euro Interbank Offered Rate
Enterprise Value
Forward-looking






Global systemically important institution
Gross value added
Half-year
Instituto Oficial de Crédito (Official Credit Institute)
Data obtained from individual financial statements
Intervención General de la Administración del Estado (National 
Audit Office)
International investment position







Money Market Statistical Reporting
Merrill Lynch Option Volatility Estimate
Minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities
Main refinancing operation
Statistical classification of economic activities in the European 
Community
National Bureau of Economic Research
Non-financial corporation
Next Generation EU
Network for Greening the Financial System
Non-performing loan
Overnight interest swap
Other systemically important institution
Probability of default









Recovery, Transformation and Resilience Plan
Regulatory technical standards
Risk-weighted asset
Sociedad de Gestión de Activos Procedentes de la 
Reestructuración Bancaria (asset management company for 
trading assets arising from bank restructuring)
Stability and Growth Pact
Significant institution
Specialised lending institution
Small and medium-sized enterprise
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